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Between Ethnic and Civic: 
A Paradox of National Identification in Contemporary Taiwan 
Chien-min Yang 
 
This dissertation analyzes the paradox of national identity in contemporary 
Taiwan.  Under the context of democratic transition and new dynamics of exchanges with 
Mainland China, Taiwan people's national identification has demonstrated a significant 
change in the past two decades.  Many empirical studies confirmed the emergence of a 
new Taiwanese identity, the sharp decline of traditional Chinese identity, and presented a 
clear trend of national identity change in Taiwan. However, there are several puzzling 
phenomena, such as the growth of dual identification (both "Chinese and Taiwanese"), 
the divergent rationale for the national identity and statehood preferences (Reunification 
vs. Independence), and the fluctuation of various national identity change patterns in the 
society left unanswered in the previous studies. 
Following the transition process-oriented approach, this dissertation focuses on 
the underlying organization principles (ethnic-cultural vs. civic-territorial mechanisms) 
that people take to define and redefine themselves in national terms, and assumes national 
identification changes and various change patterns in Taiwan were derived from different 
advantages between the two underlying identity formation mechanisms in response to the 
external transformations - democratization, new stages of cross-strait exchanges, and the 
rise of China in the world - that the society have experienced in the past two decades.    
 
 
In light of this new analytical approach, this dissertation explores and explains the 
changes of national identification in the past two decades - the paradox and puzzling 
aspects of two "conflicting" national identities, the existence of "dual identities" and both 
"Unification and Independence" acceptable  in a large segment of the population, the 
divergent rationales behind the national identity and statehood preferences, the decline of 
Chinese identity in two-stages with the new dynamics of cross-strait exchanges and the 
rise of China in the international society, and, finally, how Taiwanese identity becomes 
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
 
National Identity in Taiwan: A Paradox 
Since democratic transition in the late 1980s, the question of national identity has 
been the most controversial and divisive issue in Taiwan.  As many empirical surveys 
have shown in the past two decades,  Taiwanese people are holding two "conflicting" 
national orientations, Chinese nationalist vs. Taiwanese nationalist, while at the same 
time there are increasing numbers of people taking dual and open viewpoints regarding 
the national consciousness (Chinese identity vs. Taiwanese identity) and statehood 
preferences (Unification vs. Independence).  Given the general trend of rising Taiwanese 
identity and sharp declining Chinese identity, we however witnessed people with "dual 
identities" (both "Chinese and Taiwanese") grew to become the majority in the 1990s and 
began to decrease in the last decade;  and, through a new measurement of statehood 
preferences, we have also found there are more than a quarter of Taiwan residents 




These phenomena present a paradox of national identity in contemporary Taiwan 
not only because the inconsistency between the two constituting elements of national 
identification - the national identity (consciousness) and statehood preferences, but more 
importantly, under the traditional assumption that national identity and statehood 
preferences are one-dimensional categories and exclusive to each other.  If Chinese 
identity and Taiwanese identity are conflicting national identities, like previous studies 
have assumed, why do people hold conflicting national identities at the same time and 
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even become the majority in the society?  If reunification with China and Taiwanese 
independence are two exclusive options of statehood preferences, how do we explain the 
quarter of people who think "both unification and independence are acceptable"?  
The divisive and puzzling phenomenon of national identity in contemporary 
Taiwan has generated many empirical studies and scholarly debates, but many critical 
questions still remain unanswered, such as why and how multiple and opposing national 
orientations could coexist in the society, why and how the traditional Chinese ethno-
nationalism transforms into an open and inclusive Taiwanese identity instead of a revival 
of an exclusive Taiwanese ethno-nationalism under democratic transition in the past two 
decades, why and how a convergent, not a divergent, national identification emerged in 
the society.   
This dissertation is a study of national identification in contemporary Taiwan; it 
attempts to address these paradoxical phenomena, explore the dynamics of national 
identity evolution, and explain the gradual transformation of many various forms and 
patterns during the process.   
 
Research Questions and Analytical Approach 
 The key questions in this research are what, how and why has national identity 
changed in Taiwan?  In terms of the two types of nationalism, ethnic and civic, proposed 
by Anthony D. Smith
2
, are the changes of national identity in Taiwan - such as the rise of 
Taiwanese identity and decline of Chinese identity - characterized by the sentiments of 
ethnic nationalism, civic nationalism, or something in between? Why and how multiple 
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and opposing national orientations could coexist in the society? Why did national identity 
changes move toward a convergent, not divergent, direction of civic collective identity 
given the fact that Taiwan society has various ethnic groups with different historical 
experiences and national imaginations? 
To answers these questions, this dissertation conducts a critical review of the 
nationalist discourses in the contemporary Taiwan, revisit empirical studies of national 
identity surveys, and adopts a process-oriented analytical approach to address the national 
identity issues. 
First, unlike the existing literature and empirical studies of Taiwan tend to reduce 
the concept of national identity to either "Chinese versus Taiwanese identity" or 
"Unification versus Independence" preferences, this dissertation considers national 
identification as both a cultural and political term that includes two constituting 
dimensions --  the national identity (consciousness) and the statehood preferences.  The 
term national identification refers to people's sense of national belonging and how they 
identify themselves within the boundaries of specific nationhood and corresponding 
statehood.  I assume different people might choose between ethnic or civic mechanisms 
and identify themselves differently.  Through the conceptualization, this research will be 
able to provide a more comprehensive understanding of Taiwanese national orientations, 
illuminate various nationalist discourses, and help empirical studies to identify new 
patterns of changes that cannot be revealed through traditional one-dimensional definition.   
Second, different from the primordialist perspective that national identity is 
inborn, this dissertation adopts the constructivist approach and argues that both the 




under relevant context and, therefore, are subject to transformations, mutations, and 
various forms of convergence or divergence.  The experiences of Taiwan national 
identity transformation challenge the West/Civic versus East/Ethnic dichotomy.  It is 
argued that both ethnic and civic elements were included in people's national orientations. 
The relative mix of these two elements lies at the various underlying organization 
mechanisms (lineage, race, history, culture, citizenship rights, liberal institutions, ..., etc.) 
that people ascribed to form their national orientations.  From this approach, this 
dissertation attempts to explain why and how the national identity transformation 
occurred under a broad context that Taiwan experienced in the past twenty years, 
including democratic transition, new dynamics of cross-Strait exchanges and 
international factors, in particular, the rise of China in the international society. It is 
argued that national identity change does not necessarily revive into ethno-cultural 
nationalism nor grew naturally to be a civic nationalism under a liberal democracy. The 
case of transformation in Taiwan requires further political explanation that closely 
attached to a context in which the democratic practices and the role of political elites 
should be taken seriously in the process.      
Thirdly, this dissertation analyzes the national identification transformation under 
a broader historical context in which Taiwan has experienced in the past decades.  First, 
national identity transformation in Taiwan was first emerged as a result of the "identity 
crisis" caused by the diplomatic changes in the international society in the 1970s; the 
"one China" dilemma forced Taiwanese people to rethink the question of "who we are". 
Later in the 1980s, the national identification transformation was made possible through a 




underlying mechanisms help to develop a civic-territorial type of national identity. 
However, democratization itself does not explain why a converging collective identity 
would definitely occur without considering the new dynamics of exchanges between 
Taiwan and mainland China since the 1990s.  The interactions between the two 
communities across the Taiwan Straits allow Taiwanese people, across various ethnic 
backgrounds and age generations, to rethink the meaning of "We groups" versus "Others" 
during the process of seeking a new collective identity for themselves. 
It is worth noting that contextual factors do not necessarily determine the nature 
of national identity reconstruction. Contextual influences, as in the case of Taiwan, can 
be a double-edged sword in the sense that national identity transformation can move 
toward either direction of ethno-nationalism or civic nationalism. A careful analysis of 
the elite-mass linkage and the role played by the political elites and major political parties 
helps to better understand  and explain the direction of changes.  
Paying more attention to the identity transformation process, the dissertation  
analyzes the national identity transformation issues through an integrated analytical 
framework that includes three major contextual forces - democratization, new dynamics 
of cross-Strait exchanges, and international dimension, as well as the socio-demographic 
factors at the individual level . As empirical surveys have shown, the national identity in 
Taiwan is still in flux, and many people tend to hold a somewhat pragmatic view on the 
questions of national consciousness and statehood preferences. Whether the newly 
emerged Taiwan-centered national orientation would be further consolidated, and how 




development, or open to new possibilities, depend on how the ongoing contextual forces 
play out in the future. 
 
National Identity Crisis in Taiwan 
For more than four decades, the issue of national identity was a political taboo 
under the KMT’s repressive authoritarianism and ideological indoctrination in Taiwan.  
People were not allowed to discuss, let alone question, the officially defined Chinese 
identity and the “One China” Principle, i.e., that there is only one China, meaning the 
Republic of China, and Taiwan is a part of the Republic of China. Open debates 
concerning the status of Taiwan became possible only after the late-1980s with the lifting 
of martial law and gradual democratic transition. During the 1990s, the issues of national 
identity (Chinese vs. Taiwanese) came to the forefront of political debate, along with the 
controversy of reunification and independence ("tong du zheng yi" ).  
For over a decade, national identity issue became the most hotly debated issue in 
Taiwan's society and influenced the process of democratization and the development of 
cross-strait relations. Since the 1990s, in almost every island-wide elections, including 
the elections for the National Assembly, Legislative Yuan, Taiwan Governor, and 
President, the national identity issue always occupied the center stage of political 
campaigns, pushing aside other public policies debates. When Taiwan under a series of 
constitutional reforms in the 1990s, the national identity issue was again the crucial point 
underlying the political debates.  
During the first nation-wide presidential election in 1996, four candidates replied 




Chinese or Taiwanese?" The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) candidate, Peng Ming-
min, called himself a Taiwanese and, in his view, being a Taiwanese had nothing to do 
with being Chinese. While affirming his Taiwanese identity, the KMT official candidate 
Lee Teng-hui added that "I am also a Chinese." Another KMT candidate, Lin Yang-gang, 
considered himself a Chinese in the first place and also a Taiwanese. In contrast, the 
independent candidate Chen Luan claimed himself exclusively Chinese. However, what 




Not only political elites were divided on questions of national identity, many 
empirical surveys have also shown divisive national identity orientations among Taiwan 
public.
4
  For example, the Taiwanese identifiers arose to a record high and Chinese 
identifiers decreased to the lowest point, while the dual identities (i.e., both "Chinese and 
Taiwanese") holders remained the stable majority at the same time.  Besides the national 
identity, Taiwanese people are also divided in their preferences over the statehood issue. 
Some people maintain that Taiwan was part of China and should unite with China in the 
future, although Taiwan is now enjoying a de-facto independent status. Others argue that 
Taiwan was an isolated entity in most of her history, and the people living on the island 
should have the right of self-determination. Still others are wavering between the 
unification/independence oppositions, appalled by the dread of communist rule after 
unification and suspicious of the chance of peaceful coexistence once Taiwan declares 
independence.  
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 For detailed discussion of the distinction of different national identification approaches among the four 
presidential candidates in 1996 first nation-wide presidential election, see Shih Chengfeng, zuqun yu minzu 
zhuyi (Ethnicity and Nationalism),  Avanguard Publishing House, 1998, pp. 234-244.   
4
 See Szu-yin Ho and I-Chou Liu, "The Taiwanese/Chinese Identity of the Taiwan People in the 1990s," 




Underlying the national identity crisis is not just the puzzling and complex 
phenomenon but exists a more fundamental paradox of national identity in Taiwan.  First, 
as the two conflicting national identity orientations compete with each other, national 
identity confrontation would seriously divide the Taiwan society.  Second, while the 
traditional Chinese identity is questioned, the line of national consciousness and 
boundary of statehood becomes blurred in people's perceptions about the meaning of 
"national" identity. Thirdly, since late 1980s and early 1990s, new dynamics of cross-
Strait exchanges have further complicated the situation. In the past twenty years, the 
varying degrees of intensity to which the national identity issues were discussed in 
Taiwan mirrors the ups and downs in the cross-strait relationship, with the 1995-96 
missile crisis as the lowest point, and the trend continued from 2000 to 2008 during the 
first DPP regime under President Chen Shui-bian.  
A more rigorous cross-strait interaction started to rise only after the KMT 
resumed political power after the 2008 presidential election; since then, national identity 
debate entered into another new stage. Being uncertain about the relationship with the 
rising China, people in Taiwan are concerned about the institutional compatibility 
between the two societies and military crisis if Taiwan declares independence; these 
concerns make a supposedly straightforward issue of statehood preference a difficult 
question to answer in Taiwan.   
 
National Identity Studies in Taiwan 
 Facing the complex and puzzling phenomenon of national identity in Taiwan, 




Taiwanese nationalism and its competition with traditional Chinese nationalistic ideology 
through emphasizing specific factors such as Japanese colonial rule, the role of ethnic 
conflicts, the impact of KMT authoritarian rule, the effects of democratization and cross-
Strait confrontation, and international attitudes toward Taiwan-Mainland relations.
5 
Their 
attention was mainly focused on the various nationalist discourses in the elite circle. 
Moreover, their differences in approach also reflect the long-standing debates between 
the essentialists and modernists in the nationalism literature. 
 Beyond the primordial and instrumental camps, some scholars view the national 
identity from the perspective of liberalism tradition.  Jiang Yi-huah, for example, 
proposes a new direction of national identity development, that is, from liberalism’s point 
of view, a shared national-institutional identity that can facilitate the formation of a civic 
culture in which individuals participate in public affairs as citizens and not as members of 
ethnic groups. In his view, Taiwan is capable of moving away from an ethnic nationalism 
and toward a unified society similar to those found in the West.
6.
  In contrast to Jiang's 
optimism, other scholars are concerned with the gap between idealism and reality. For 
example, Wang Hung-jen pointed out that newly developed Taiwanese nationalism in the 
1990s was not compatible with the liberalism democracy, as serious conflicts were 
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 See Shih Chengfeng, zuqun yu minzu zhuyi (Ethnicity and Nationalism), Avanguard Publishing House, 
1998. Chang Maukuei ed., Zuqun guanxi yu guojia rentong (Ethnic Relations and National Identity) , 
Chang Yung-Fa Foundation, 1993. Also see Karl K.Y. Shaw, "The Idea of Community: A Historical 
Review," and Wang Fu-chang, "Consensus Mobilization of Political Opposition in Taiwan," and Wu 
Naiteh, "Liberalism, Ethnic Identity, and Taiwanese Nationalism," in Taiwanese Political Science Review, 
No. 1, July 1996. 
6
 See Jiang Yi-huah, "Is Taiwan a Nation? On the Current Debate over Taiwanese National Identity and 
National Recognition," in Sechin Y.S. Chien and John Fitzgerald, eds., The Dignity of Nations: Equality, 
Competition, and Honor in East Asian Nationalism, Hong Kong University Press, 2006. pp. 141-164.  See 
Jiang Yi-huah, Ziyou zhuyi, minzhu zhuyi yu guojia rentong (Liberalism, Nationalism and National 




witnessed over the issues of national identity between political parties with different 
national orientations.
7
   
 Regarding the national identity dilemma and conflict, Taiwan scholars also 
disagree on the solutions; for instances, Hu Fo claimed to return to ROC constitution
8
; 
Chang Maukuei maintained that the equality of four ethnic groups and encourage them 
integrate into a new Taiwanese
9
; Shih Chengfeng would like Taiwan to pursue a 




As Taiwanese nationalism is a late comer, it serves naturally as a good case to 
revisit the long-standing debates in nationalism literature. However, scholars tend to 
apply their favored theoretical approaches to study the case of Taiwan without providing 
consistent conceptualization of the subject in their researches.
11
  Two problems arise out 
of different definition on the nature of Taiwanese nationalism. First, disagreement on the 
nature of Taiwanese nationalism makes it difficult to come up with one common 
acceptable definition.  Moreover, when the concept of national identity is differently 
defined, and individual scholars adopt various approaches to capture the nature of 
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 For more discussion of this point, see Wang Hung-jen, "Liberalist Variation in Taiwan: Four 
Democratization Orientations," Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 3/2012. pp. 93-116. 
8
 Hu Fo, Zhengzhixue de kexue tanjiu (Scientific Investigation on Political Science) 1-5, Taipei: Sanmin 
Publisher. 1998. 
9
 Chang Maukuei, "Shengji wenti yu minzu zhuyi" (Provincial Issues and National Identity" in Chang 
Maukuei eds., Zuqun guanxi yu guojia rentong (Ethnic Relations and National  Identity), Taipei: Chang 
Yung-Fa Foundation, 1993, pp. 233-278.  
10
 Shih Chengfeng ed., Guojia rentong zhi wenhua lunshu (Cultural Discourse of National Identity), Taipei: 
Taiwan International Studies Association, 1994, pp. 43-82. 
11
 Chen Kuang-hui, "A Study of Taiwan People's National Identity," Master's thesis, National Chengchi 
University, 1997. Lin Chia-lung, "The Political Formation of Taiwanese Nationalism," in Stephane 
Corchff, ed., Memories of the Future: National Identity Issues and the Search for a New Taiwan, New 
York: M. D. Sharpe Inc., 2002, pp. 219-241. Liu I-chou and Ho Szu-yin, " The Taiwanese/Chinese Identity 




Taiwanese nationalism, their interpretations become difficult to communicate through the 
results of their researches.    
Measurement is another issue. As many scholars have pointed out, ‘national 
identity’ is quite a vague term, with different meanings under different contexts and for 
different purposes
12
.  From most of the existing empirical studies in Taiwan, the concept 
of national identity has often been reduced to one-dimensional categories such as 
reunification, independence, and preserving the status quo -- the so-called reunification 
(tong)-independence (du) attitude.  Based on the distributions and changes in figures of 
these categories through pubic polls, conclusions were made to demonstrate the relative 
development of Chinese nationalism and the rise of Taiwanese nationalism.
13
 It is of no 
doubt that the ‘tong-du attitude’ serves as an important dimension in Taiwan people’s 
nationalistic identification, however, it is too simplistic, even misleading, to equate the 
nationalistic identification with the only attitude toward the status of Taiwan, since the 
Tong-du attitude does not capture the other fundamental dimension—the national 
consciousness, i.e., the sense of national belonging to the collective Self.   
 
Definition of Nation Identity 
 Nationalism literature does not provide a common definition of the term "national 
identity."  Anthony Smith, for example, defines nation and national identity through 
ethnic point of view.  In Smith's view, nation is “a named population sharing an historic 
territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common 
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 Chapter three and four will discuss the measurement issues in details and create a new measurement 
regarding the statehood preferences.  
13
 See Wu Naiteh, " Bread and Love: A preliminary study of changes in the national identity of the people 




economy and common legal rights and duties for all members.”
14 
Benedict Anderson, on 
the other hand, treated the nation as an “imagined political community,” which stresses 
the invention or construction of a nation, rather than its irrefutable existence or 
rediscovery, grounded on ethnic perennialism.
15
 From Anderson’s point of view, national 
identity, strictly speaking, does not evolve from anything objectively (pre)-given in a 
human community. In a more synergetic view, Eric Hobsbawn argued that national 
identity is based on specific traditions or particular features taken for granted within such 
a community, but he also emphasized that national identity must be seen as established 
by the discourse of influential and powerful elites or by state-sponsored nationalism.
16
 
 As Lowell Barrington has pointed out, some scholarly definitions of nation have 
often compounded the concept with ‘ethnic group’ or ‘ethnicity’
17
, and therefore made 
the concept less useful in the analysis.  For example, Yael Tamir defines nation as a 
“community whose members share feelings of fraternity, substantial distinctiveness, and 
exclusivity, as well as beliefs in common ancestry and continuous genealogy.”
18
  It is an 
improvement for not mixing the definitions with causal arguments
19
, Tamir’s definition 
however fails to differentiate a nation from an ethnic group.  Likewise, Walter Connor’s 
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ideas about the nation showed no clear distinction with the definition of ethnic group, 
except that a nation must be “self-defined” while an ethnic group can be “other defined”
20
. 
 Indeed, nation and ethnic group share almost the same defining cultural elements, 
but ethnic groups do not require the idea of political autonomy over a certain territory for 
their existence.  The ethnic politics and nationalist movements are actually referring to 
quite different political phenomena.  For the purpose of empirical studies, I would like to 
stress that the distinction between them is necessary and crucial.  As far as this study is 
concerned, it is the ‘national’ identification that is to be examined and not ethnic one. 
 Since the nature of national identity covers many broad human dispositions - 
cultural, political, and social - it is difficult to attain one single definition suitable to all 
different researches.  For the purpose of this study, I would like to emphasize two major 
characteristics of national identity when I use the term in the following analysis, instead 
of seeking a commonly agreed upon definition. First, nation identification is a subjective, 
self-defined matter.  National identification exists when people think of themselves in a 
‘national’ term.  For example, “I am Taiwanese”, or “I am  Chinese”.  Indeed, what 
‘Taiwanese’ or ‘Chinese’ meant might be different to different people; but the differences 
do not invalidate the self-defined national identity.  Second, as a modern phenomenon 
closely associated with the development of nation-states, national identification has also 
involved political implications for the establishment of sovereign statehood or political 
autonomy for the nation.  The political demand of a nation serves as a key feature in 
differentiating the "nation" from the "ethnic group".  Both share almost all the same 
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defining features except “nation” carries political implications that “ethnic group” does 
not.  
 Specifically, the term "nation" in this thesis refers to a collection of people, who 
are linked by unifying traits (often self-defined) and with demanding political autonomy 
over a specific territory that is thought of as theirs
21
.  As nation is so defined, the term 
“national identity” is conceptualized with two dimensions.  First, it refers to the sense of 
national belonging felt by the members of nation as a result of certain self-defined 
unifying traits (e.g., same cultural features, race, common historical experiences, etc.).  
Note that the unifying traits of a nation are not a fixed set of cultural features and often 
are “self-defined” by the national members; in other words, they are not necessarily ‘true’ 
in accordance with history and reality.  What really matters is that they are believed to be 
true by the national members themselves who therefore have the shared sense of national 
belonging (national consciousness).  Secondly, with the autonomous demand over a 
certain territory, national identity involves a political connotation that some scholars 
interpret as the desire to create or maintain one’s own statehood
22
.  While there is no 
agreement in the nationalism literature that a nation must pursue its own state, the 
political demand of the ‘territorial autonomy’ is a central dimension in the definition of 
nation and national identity, not only because it is crucial to understand the modern sense 
of nation and nationalism literature; more importantly, it provides a fundamental criterion 
for differentiating between nations and other similar collectives of people (such as, race, 
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religious groups, language groups, and, at particular, the ‘ethnic’ communities) for the 
purpose of empirical studies.   
 National identity so defined in this thesis that I can differentiate between the 
"organizing principles" (be it linage, race, common history, spoken languages, socio-
cultural differences among ethnic groups, and stated values... etc.) and the "defining 
elements" of national identity. The former addresses the issues of why and how people 
organize themselves or imagine themselves to be a nation and generate a sense of 
national belonging attached to the collective identity; the latter demonstrate the 
fundamental elements of national identity and help to understand what national identity is 
about.  Most literature studying Taiwan national identity tends to conflate these two 
concepts as to make their empirical researches and interpretations difficult to understand, 
even though they are researching the same phenomenon. 
 Either from primordial essentialists or modern constructivists, the concept of 
national identification remains attached to the political principle which requires that “the 
political and the national unit should be congruent.”
23
 Whatever the ingredients of a 
particular nationalism are, its predominant objective is the establishment of a sovereign 
nation-state, which is understood as the achievement of a “unique” people striving for 
independent statehood. When the political and national unit becomes congruent, it proves 
the existence of a nation. 
 Theories of nationalism propose two ideal-type variants: civic nationalism and 
ethnic nationalism. Civic nationalism defines a nation primarily in terms of territory and 
the individual's voluntary identification with the common institutions and political norms 
and values, while the ethnic nationalism perceives the nation as a historical community 
                                                     
23




based on objective biological, ethnic and cultural factors. Traditional nationalism 
assumes that ethnic nationalism only happens in the Eastern society, while the civic 
nationalism can only happen in the West.
24
 According to the theory, Taiwan should 
reconstruct another ethnic nationalism based on Minnan Taiwanese and Hakka 
Taiwanese, but it turned out that Taiwan has gradually developed a civic-territorial type 
of nationalism that includes Mainlanders. The "new Taiwanese" identity, proposed by 
Lee Teng-hui and later accepted by both James Soong and Ma Ying-jeou in the 1990s, is 
inclusive and territory-based, not the ethnicity based identity.  Therefore, Taiwan 
experience provides an empirical challenge of the dichotomy and theoretical prediction.  
 Kymlicka criticizes the dichotomous claim, as he believes that cultural 
nationalism is as much at home in the West as it is in the East.
25
  Whether states should 
be defined as civic or ethnic, in Kohn's terms, has less to do with the absence or existence 
of cultural criteria, but if everybody "can be integrated into the community regardless of 
race or color."
26
  Like Kohn, Smith, and Kymlicka, this dissertation challenges the 
West/Civic versus East/ethnic dichotomy on the path toward people’s national 
imagination, and but would consider the ethnic-civic typology as an ideal framework to 
analyze and compare the experiences of national identity transformation in Taiwan. And, 
it is argued that the choices of organization principles between ethnic and civic elements 
underlying the national identification require political explanation, as the choice is not 
inborn and does not naturally grow out of ethno-cultural factors. 
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 This thesis is organized into three major parts. The first part includes this 
introductory chapter and Chapter Two which conducts a critical review of national 
discourses in contemporary Taiwan. Both Chinese nationalist discourses and the variants 
of Taiwanese nationalist discourses will be discussed in Chapter Two. The second part 
turns to empirical studies of national identity in Taiwan: Chapter Three provides both 
descriptive and cross tabulation analysis on the trend and socio-demographic association 
with national identity transformation among Taiwan public. Chapter Four focuses on a 
dynamic analysis and examines various internal change patterns of national identification 
underlying the general trend.  The third part comes to explain the above massive changes 
and the newly emerged civic-territorial transformation of national identification in the 
past two decades. Chapter Five focuses on the democratization practices; the dynamics of 
cross-Strait exchanges as well as international dimensions, in particular, the rise of China 
in the international society, will be addressed in Chapter Six. 
 
Nationalist Discourses: A Critical Review 
  
 While most of the political debates focus on the relationship between Taiwan and 
mainland China—whether Taiwan should be re-unified with the mainland China or 
become an independent state of its own, Chapter Two attempts to analyze the nationalist 
discourses underlying various political positions.  The main objective is not just to review 




positions that either support or oppose  official viewpoints, but to critically analyze the 
thoughts of political elites when they come to face a set of "national" questions: How is a 
national community defined, and how is the national membership distributed among 
people in the community? Where is the national homeland, and how is the nation-state 
boundary determined? What is the relationship between nation and state—in the forms of 
"one nation- one state', or "one nation- two states", or multinational state? With emphasis 
on ethnic and/or civic elements, political elites tend to address these questions using 
different approaches that focus on racial, historical, cultural, or political dimensions. In a 
way, these different approaches are linked to the debates between primordial essentialists 
and modern constructivist perspectives in the nation formation.   
 As Miroslav Hroch (1993) has pointed out in his empirical study of European 
nationalist movements, national identity formation was never a mere project of ambitious 
intellectuals.  Between the starting-point of any given national movement and its 
successful conclusion, he differentiated three phases of development: from first purely 
intellectual inquiry into national attributes without pressing specially national demands 
(which he called Phase A), through active political mobilization to awakening national 
consciousness is Phase B, and moving to the third stage Phase C where the major part of 
the population comes to accept national identity and finally a mass movement is 
formed.
27
 The construction or transformation of national identity is not complete unless it 
has been perceived and accepted by the mass of people -- the subject of nation and 
national identity.  This three-stage framework helps illuminate how the appearance, 
organization, and diffusion of nationalistic consciousness were established.  And, more 
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importantly, it highlights the necessity of empirical investigation into the public’s 
subjective recognitions.  
 Indeed, nationalist discourses help us understand how Chinese and Taiwanese 
'nation' are constructed through various organization principles and further differentiate 
Taiwanese from Chinese. Nationalist discourses, however, do not automatically transfer 
to the mass self-identification, and do not necessarily represent what Taiwanese people 
actually think of themselves. The existing literature does not pay enough attention to the 
gap.  For example, many discussions of the rising “Taiwanese nation” in the past two 
decades are mainly from the studies of nationalist discourses developed by political and 
cultural elite, implying the equation of the elite discourses with the mass self-
identification.  As Walker Connor has pointed out, “the essence of the nation is a 
psychological bond that joins a people and differentiates it, in the subconscious 
conviction of its members, from all nonmembers in a most vital way.”  In order to prove 
the existence of “Taiwanese nation,” it is necessary to examine what the residents of 
Taiwan think of themselves through empirical studies.  
 
National Surveys in Taiwan: A Revisit 
 
 The existing empirical studies of national identity in Taiwan tends to focus on the 
general trends of changes at the aggregate level -- such as, the number of Chinese 
identifiers decreased dramatically in the past two decades, while Taiwanese identifiers 
increased to a record high in history, yet people holding dual identities - that is, both 
Chinese and Taiwanese -- have continued to remain steadily the majority over time. 




select fourteen national surveys in the past twenty years to re-examine the national 
identification through revised measurement and analytical approach to identify new 
changing patterns that have not been revealed in the previous empirical studies. The 
original survey datasets come from two main sources in Taiwan: first, the "Election 
Study Center" of National Chengchi University; second, the "Taiwan Social Change 
Survey" administered by the Institute of Ethnology, the Academia Sinica. These 
empirical surveys are chosen because of their structural compatibility and scientific 
undertaking.  The questionnaires in each survey include both the defining elements of 
national identity --the national consciousness (Chinese identity vs. Taiwanese identity) 
and the statehood preferences (China reunification vs. Taiwan independence), as well as 
the same socio-demographic factors. All respondents (20 years old and above) in the 
above surveys were randomly sampled from the whole Taiwan area including Taipei city 
and Kaohsiung city, and each survey was conducted through face-to-face interviews. 
 The secondary analysis of the existing survey datasets is to review the general 
trends and find out if any social profiles are associated with the national identity changes 
in the past two decades. More importantly, through revised measurement of statehood 
preferences and new panel survey data, several new findings of internal changing patterns 




 Liah Greenfeld and a number of prominent students of nation and nationalism 






 On the one hand, they split into new, internally cohesive ethnic groups; on the 
other hand, they sometimes join other ethnic groups to form larger, unified political 
entities with a formal sovereign status.  In essence, as Liah Greenfeld has argued, 
nationalism might best be understood not as the natural development of some primordial 
ethnic identity, but as the outgrowth of complex historical relationships and political 
possibilities. A. D. Smith also points out, nationalism needs to be understood as both 
ideology and political movement in which the people of a specific locality are given to 
believe that they form an ethnicity and aspire to establish their own nation-state.
29
  
 This thesis takes up a similar constructivist view and argues that, no matter how 
national identity is defined, both the objective and subjective characteristics of a given 
nationality are formed in context and, therefore, are subject to transformations, mutations, 
and various forms of convergence or divergence. More importantly, this thesis attempts 
to explain how these transformations, mutations, and forms of convergence or divergence 
are occurred in a broad context that Taiwan has experienced in the past twenty years. 
Specifically, three important contexts are included in the analysis of national 
identification in contemporary Taiwan: First, democratic transitions since the mid-1980s; 
second, the opening exchanges across the Taiwan Straits and new dynamics of 
interactions in the last decade; and third, the changes in the international society, in 
particular, the rise of China in the international society. Taiwan’s national identity has 
been discussed, debated, constructed, and reconstructed within these special historical 
contexts, through which the paradox phenomenon can be better understood and explained.  
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 This thesis challenges the West/Civic and East/Ethnic dichotomous viewpoints 
proposed by the Hans Kohn, but consider the dichotomy as a useful framework to 
analyze national identity transformation in the case of Taiwan. It argues that both ethnic 
and civic elements of organization principles through which people choose to determine 
their national orientations. During the process, primordial attributes are important, but by 
themselves cannot explain why people choose and change their national orientations.  It 
is through a broad context in Taiwan has experienced in the past two decades -- 
democratization, new dynamics of cross-strait exchanges, and international dimensions, 
in particular, the rise of China in the international society -- that better explain the change 
of moving toward a civic-territorial type of development. These three contextual forces 
are chosen because they represent three different stages of national identity 
transformation-- identity crisis, transformation, consolidation 
  Chapter five explores the dynamic relationship between democracy and civic 
nationalism, and discusses how three vital mechanisms have linked democratization 
practices and Taiwan’s national identity transformation in the last two decades. The focus 
is put on how a civic-territorial collective consciousness has been gradually formed out of 
a series of democratic transitions in Taiwan. However, democratization itself cannot fully 
explain why a convergent, not a divergent, identification would definitely occur. It also 
raises another important question: How does the newly developed national consciousness, 
with its civic nature, interact with the long-existing ethnicity-based Chinese national 
identification?  In theory, the newly formed Taiwan-oriented identification does not 
necessarily bring about conflict with the existing Chinese identity; but in reality, the latter 




 To answer these questions, chapter six examines two inter-related contextual 
factors—the cross-strait dynamics since the late 1980s, and the changes in international 
society— on the transformation of Taiwanese identity, and explain how these two 
contextual forces work together to consolidate the civic nature of the newly developed 
collective consciousness, and further push away the traditional Chinese national identity.  
Indeed, democratization by itself does not guarantee a convergent national identification, 
but the hostile cross-Strait interactions would facilitate and strengthen the sense of "We 
group" versus "Others", and consequently help to bring about a common identification. 
As a result of historical development and continuing political conflicts between the two 
sides across the Taiwan Straits, Taiwanese people, regardless of their original ethnic 
origins and historical experiences, have gradually come to identify with the experiences 
of a common destiny.  
 Following the discussion of the cross-Strait interactions and their impacts, the 
second half of chapter six examines the linkage between some international factors and 
Taiwan’s national identity imagination and transformation.  Instead of the scholarly 
prediction of the end of nation and nationalism under the globalization era
30
, I would 
argue that international institutions and certain forms of globalization have helped to 
strengthen, rather than weaken, aspirations for the pursuit of nationhood.  As Wu Yushan 
has pointed out, “Beijing’s monopolization of the 'China' identity on international 
occasions has forced Taiwan to cast off its pretensions to represent the only legitimate 
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government of China. Westerners also generally fail to appreciate the ROC’s effort to 
keep its Chinese identity, and refer to it simply as Taiwan."
31
 Under these circumstances, 
Taiwan has been forced to seek an alternative identity.  Many scholars further pointed out 
that a democratic Taiwan seems better to promote herself as a distinctive identity and 
easier to be accepted by the international society.
32
   
 Recognizing the importance of international dimensions does not mean to 
decrease the significance of domestic politics and cross-Strait interactions on the national 
identity transformation; rather, it is to suggest that the escalation of nationalist politics— 
the gradual decline of Chinese identity and the increasing appeal of Taiwanese 
nationalism to the public—are not solely attributed to the domestic and bilateral politics 
across the Taiwan Strait.  Some exogenous factors should be added to present a whole 
picture.  From the point of international dimension, just as Partha Chatterjee has argued 
that nationalism outside Europe is necessarily a “derivative discourse,”
33
 the recent 
national identity transformation in Taiwan could be partially seen as a reflection of, as 
well as being derived from, Taiwan’s accelerated engagement with the international 
institutions and globalization processes.  
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Chapter 2:  National Identity Discourses in Contemporary Taiwan 
  
 This chapter analyzes the arguments that underlie and diversify the various 
nationalist discourses in contemporary Taiwan. The main interest is not to review the 
political statements in the official policies or the opposing political positions, but to 
examine the thoughts from political elites when they come to face a set of national 
questions, including how a national community is defined, how national membership is 
distributed among people in the community, where the national homeland is, how state 
boundary is determined, and what the relationship between nation and state should be. 
With different emphasis on ethnic and/or civic elements and mechanisms, political elites 
address these questions using approaches that focus on racial, historical, cultural, or 
political dimensions. In a way, these different approaches are closely linked to the 
debates between primordial essentialists and modern constructivist perspectives in the 
nation formation.   
 
Statehood Preferences and National Identity Discourses 
 
 To the purpose of analysis, it is first necessary to make a distinction between 
the so-called reunification /independence issue (or "tong-du") and national identity 
("guozhu reng tong") discourses. Although the two concepts are closely related to each 
other, they are actually pointing to different notions and levels of analysis.  
The issue between reunification and independence in Taiwan refers to political 




Taiwan should be re-unified with the mainland China and integrated into a single nation-
state and, if yes, in what forms; if not, should Taiwan maintain the status-quo or become 
a sovereign state of its own? In essence, the issue deals with the question of integration 
between two political entities (Republic of China on Taiwan and People’s Republic of 
China on the mainland). Like other divided nations after the WWII, such as the former 
East and West Germany or South and North Korea, Taiwan’s unification/independence 
issue came out of a particular set of historical contingencies, such as China's civil war 
and the international balance of power at the time, and when in 1949 the CCP established 
a communist regime in the mainland and the ROC government moved to Taiwan.  Since 
then, the cross-strait relationship has evolved from an earlier military confrontation to the 
current political stalemate on the “One China” principle. Up to date, a wide range of 
positions and attitudes on the issue can be found in Taiwan society; however, the reasons 
of why one comes to specific position are much more complex and sometimes remain 
unclear.   
In contrast, nationalist discourses intend to construct a line of reasoning that 
constitutes a foundation upon which the self-defined members can form a common 
national identity.  To the purpose, two constitutive elements are involved. First, 
nationalist discourse defines, at least roughly, the membership boundary of the 
population that makes up the nation. With the membership construction, either by 
objective classification or subjective imagination, people would be able to answer the 
collective identity questions: Who are we? What nation do we belong to? Who are our 




The second constitutive element of nationalist discourse defines the territorial 
boundary that the nation has a right to control—that is, the national homeland to be self-
determined by the people. The belief in the right of territorial control is central in 
distinguishing a nation from other collectives, such as ethnicity, religious groups, or race. 
Indeed, many collective groups of people might hold common myths, values, and 
symbols, but a nation is not just unified by these features, it is unified by a sense of 
purpose - autonomous control of a territory that the members of the nation believe to be 
theirs. Therefore, nationalist discourses mean to pursue the congruence between national 
community and political community.   
In so defined, nationalist discourses, on the one hand, concern the boundary of 
national community and address the questions of national membership distribution 
among people. On the other hand, nationalists also discuss the relationship between 
national unit and political unit.  In the case of Taiwan, the second element of nationalist 
discourses involves whether or not Taiwan and China should be reunited as one nation-
state, or become two separate nation-states; in other words, it refers to the issue of "tong-
du" (statehood) preferences (China reunification vs. Taiwan independence).  
The following sections analyze and differentiate various types of  nationalist 
discourses according to the approaches nationalist elites use to address the questions of 
national boundary, membership distribution, as well as the nation-state relationship. Note 
that the distinction between Taiwanese and Chinese nationalist discourses not only lies at 
the opposite political assertions to the reunification/independence issue, with the former 
advocating an independent statehood for the Taiwanese “nation” and the latter preferring 




kinds of nationalist discourses also display different organizing principles in drawing 
national boundaries and distributing membership in national construction.  
 
Ethnic Nation versus Civic Nation: Different Organizing Principles at Work 
 In the existing nationalism literature, many scholars tend to conceptualize 
“nation” in a dichotomous category— ethnic nation or civic nation. Generally speaking, 
from the ethnic perspective, nations are seen as primordial social entities. Human beings 
are naturally divided into discrete nations, among which everyone belongs to a specific 
nation. In the language of ethnic nationalists, nations assume the imagery of quasi-
organic communities, offering individuals a sense of unconditional belonging akin to that 
characteristic of pre-industrial local communities.
34
 Individuals do not have to fulfill any 
qualifications for membership other than having a specific ancestry and culture 
supposedly shared by all members of the nation.
 
 In contrast to ethnic conceptions, civic definition views the nation as a community 
of people who inhabit a common territory and are citizens of the same state – with 
identical political, legal and social rights, as well as obligations. The civic nation is 
constituted through allegiance to specific political institutions and values, rather than 
through a sense of belonging to an organic, quasi-kinship group.
35
 Individuals do not 
have to adhere to specific cultural norms or share a specific ancestry in order to attain 
membership status. In other words, in ethnic nations, the organizing principle guiding the 
processes of national boundary construction is ethnicity; in civic nations, national 
boundaries are defined through territory and politics. According to the relationship 
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between nation and state, ethnic nations are perceived as social groups that exist prior to 
particular states, while in civic definition, civic nations emerge within particular political 
structures.
36
 That is, ethnic nations are the basis for creating states, while civic nations are 
produced by states.   
While the conceptual distinction between ethnic and civic nations has informed 
much of social science discourse on nations and nationalism, it however does not fully 
account for some existing types of nations or for specific forms of national boundary 
construction. Since World War II, the ethnic nationalist assertion has faced serious attack. 
From instrumentalist perspective, many scholars have come to view nations as a 
distinctly modern phenomenon emerging from specific historical conditions, such as 
industrialization (Gellner 1983), print capitalism and imagination (Anderson 1983, 1991), 
the role of modern state (Breuilly 1994), or political invention (Hobsbawn 1992).
37
 In 
their views, nations are perceived not as organic entities but as social constructs, a project 
engineered by socio-political elites. Most notably, in Anderson’s words, a nation is in fact 
an “imagined political community.”  
Anthony Smith, a leading scholar in the field of nationalism, takes a more 
balanced view on the nature of nation formation, and attempted to bridge the gap between 
the primordialist and instrumentalist perspectives.
38
 Conceding the modern nature of 
nations, he however maintains that the phenomenon of nations and nationalisms can only 
be adequately understood if one takes into account the fact that they have emerged from a 
previously existing ethno-symbolic order comprising collective myths and memories. In 
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consideration of the ethnic origins of nations, Smith argued that nations cannot be 
imagined or invented out of nothing. In his view, nationalists can be described as 
“archaeologists” engaged in an enterprise of rediscovering and reinterpreting “ethnic 
history” and regenerating ethnic communities, rather than as inventors of nations, self-
conscious image-makers or manipulators of the masses.
39
 Smith concludes that in order 
to create a nation, the population of a specific country needs common ethnic roots to 
integrate socially and culturally diverse groups; civic elements of nationhood are 
insufficient to achieve this goal. Therefore, Smith goes for a definition of the nation that 
conflates both civic and ethnic elements; nation is a “named human population sharing an 
historic territory, common myths, and historical memories, a mass public culture, a 
common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members”
40
.   
While Smith’s criticism casts serious doubt on the analytical usefulness of 
distinguishing between ethnic and civic nations, his approach has several shortcomings. 
First, given that nations are historically contingent phenomena, Calhoun challenged 
Smith on whether conflating different types of nations into one single, overarching 
concept is an analytically fruitful exercise.
41
 Second, as Yael Tamir has pointed out in a 
review article, Smith has mixed together reasons for the emergence of a nation (a shared 
historic territory, a common economy, and a common legal system) with the results (that 
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is, sharing myths and historical memories)
42
. In addition, Lowell Barrington pointed out 
that the emphasis on common economy in the definition of nation is problematic, since 
"it would exclude members of a Diaspora community from being considered part of the 
nation, given that émigrés usually consider themselves part of the larger nation and that 
they are often the most “nationalistic” members of this nation."
43
 
Although there is no simple answer to the debates between the primordialist and 
instrumentalist perspectives, the pertinent arguments in each side help to illustrate one 
key point: Nations, whether organic entities or social constructs, do not correspond to the 
pure forms of the dichotomous ethnic/civic categories. In the real world, nations are 
defined through varying objective criteria, and not all of these have to be present to 
define a specific nation. Within the broad conception of ethnic or civic nation, there are 
many diverse organizing principles at work in national membership construction, such as 
lineage, race, culture, politics, territory, or some combinations among them. In so 
understanding, the organizing principles at work in the construction of national 
community should be taken more seriously and examined in a systemic fashion, in order 
to better understand and analyze the similarities and differences of nation formation and 
nationalist discourses.   
Indeed, as Tim Nieguth has pointed out, focusing on the organizing principles 
allows us to analytically accommodate the fact that the processes of national boundary 
construction are usually heterogeneous (combining different organizing principles), 
particular (different segments of the population may hold diverging views of the nation 
and national membership) and specific (prerequisites for membership may differ among 
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 Moreover, this understanding of nationalist discourses also calls 
attention to the fact that the various organizing principles utilized for national boundary 
construction are themselves socially constructed, and therefore, highly contingent. For 
these reasons, I would like to follow the line of organizing principles to analyze the 
nationalist discourses in contemporary Taiwan—including Chinese nationalism and 
Taiwanese nationalism. 
 
Chinese Nationalism versus Taiwanese Nationalism 
  
 The political debates on the issues of Taiwan’s national identity in the 1990s 
focused on the relationship between Taiwan and the mainland China -- whether Taiwan 
should be reunified with China or become an independent state of its own.  Within the 
traditional Chinese nationalism, the reunification supporters often take an ethno-cultural 
perspective and emphasize the common blood lineage, culture, and ethnicity to “prove” 
the national linkage between Taiwanese and Chinese people in the mainland, and thus 
justify the course of reunification. In contrast, the proponents of Taiwanese independence 
stressed Taiwan’s unique history over the past four hundred years and the evolution of a 
new Taiwanese culture to “prove” the existence of a Taiwanese “nation” that is 
independent of Chinese nation. The two nationalisms stand against each other, and there 
seems to be no feasible resolutions for reconciliation.  
 However, if we take a closer look at these different positions, what really 
underlies the debates on Taiwan’s national identity is a complex and controversial 
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national construction process that attempts to build a common ground for all people 
living on Taiwan to stand on.  As discussed above, the discourses on national identity, 
either Chinese nationalism or Taiwanese nationalism should not be seen as universal, 
one-dimensional, permanent constructs that remain homogeneous and fixed after their 
existence. When one comes to examine the underlying organizing principles at work in 
the processes of construction, it becomes clear that nationalist discourses fluctuate in 
different stages in correspondence to contingent environments and specific political 
purposes.  
 
Chinese Nationalism: A Traditional View 
 
 Historians have traditionally defined the boundary of Chinese community on the 
ground of Chinese ethics and principles (zhong guo li jiao)— with ethnic Han in the core 
and centered around the Confucianism. In this view, as historian Wang Zhen-tsai has 
noted, the line between Chinese and non-Chinese (yi xia zhi bian) was not differentiated 
by lineage or race, but by culture — in other words, those who accepted Chinese culture 
and Confucianism were recognized as “Chinese” in the sense of civilized people, while 
others were “Barbarians.”
45
 From the cultural point of view, Chinese tended to treat 
“Barbarians” as uncivilized people who had different mind sets from “We Chinese” (fei 
wo zu lei, qi xin bi yi). In the political arena, under the cultural perspective, the historical 
Chinese empires were established not along a specific territorial boundary, but seemingly 
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located at the center of the whole world (in the name of the “central kingdom” (zhong 
guo); Chinese emperors thus appointed themselves as the “Son of Heaven” ("tian zi") and 
the territory was called “All Under Heaven” (tian xia), although the actual territorial 
boundary was limited to East Asia, at most. As early as the Chou dynasty (770-221 B.C.), 
Chinese had formed the outlook “We are the world” (for example, pu tian zhi xia mo fei 
wang tu, shuai tu zhi bin mo fei wang chen). The nature of such a worldview, as 
sociologist Chen Qinan has argued, was not equivalent to the political world in the 
modern sense, but more like an ethnic-cultural world.
46 
 However, since Chinese ethics and principles were a broad and general notion, the 
cultural terms have been applied elusively in differentiating “Chinese” from “non-
Chinese” and, most of the time, they were subject to arbitrary interpretations. Employing 
cultural criteria to define the Chinese community became problematic in the case when 
the minority people (such as the Mongolians and Manchu’s) coming from the periphery 
conquered the Han Chinese regime and took over the heart land of Chinese territory. The 
political debates in the late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 centuries among some reform-minded 
intellectuals and political elites over the question of whether or not the Qing court could 
be seen as a “Chinese” regime serve a good example.  
 Like traditional historians, Liang Qichao maintained that the Han people and the 
Manchu’s (man ren) belonged to one nation, since the Manchu had already been 
acculturated into Han Chinese culture: Both Manchu and Han spoke the same language, 
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followed the same customs, had the same religion, and lived in a common territory.
47
 
Following the earlier Han scholar officials
48
, Liang and his teacher Kang Yuwei  claimed 
that the Qing court had ruled China and Chinese people with the authentic Confucianism 
and therefore should be seen as a Chinese regime. At that time, from their point of view, 
the true aliens were not the Manchu people but those from the Western imperialist 
countries. To save China and Chinese culture from being ruined and even destroyed in 
competition with the aliens, they argued that China should conduct political reforms and 
cultural transformations, on both the material level and the institutional level.   
 It was under this historical background that Liang Qichao proposed the so-called 
“Greater Nationalism” (da minzu zhuyi), aimed at transforming Chinese people from the 
primordial ethnicity (bu min) to the modern citizenship (guo min) and proceeded to an 
integrative state-building in China.
49
 Liang opposed those who hold the ‘small 
nationalism’ (xiao minzu zhuyi) that attempted to deny the Manchus as a part of the 
Chinese nation for specific political purposes — that is, to overturn the Manchu-
dominated Qing regime.  
 While holding a similar view of reform, Zhang Binglin and Cai Yuanpei, among 
many other leading intellectuals, disagreed with Liang’s conservative view toward the 
Qing court, especially after the Boxer Rebellion. Zhang Binglin and Cai Yuanpei strongly 
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asserted that the corrupted Qing regime must be overthrown in order to save China from 
losing its independence.
50
  Zhang Binglin further argued that the Manchus had not 
acculturated into Chinese culture through a consensual way, but more like a “forced 
marriage,” which cannot be said to be a true cultural assimilation.
51
 In the early 1900s, he 
even convened a meeting in Tokyo to commemorate the bicentennial of the demise of the 
Chinese nation under the Qing court. For some Han nationalist extremists, the Chinese 
nation had been destroyed twice in history, one was in the year 1129 when the 
Mongolians established the Yuan Dynasty in China, the other was when the Manchus 
entered into the Chinese heartland in 1644.
52 
 
The disagreement over whether or not the Manchu-led Qing regime was an 
authentic Chinese dynasty illuminates that the traditional cultural viewpoint on the 
national membership was unable to provide a helpful guide for differentiating Chinese 
from non-Chinese, especially when the majority Han were ruled by non-Han minorities, 
even though the latter had considerably acculturated into the Han-centered Chinese 
culture after more than two hundred years of accommodation in the Chinese heartland.  
However, it should be noted that the disputes among those reform-minded intellectuals 
were not on the validity of traditional cultural terms, but on how they should be applied 
to the specific case—the Qing regime. Obviously, different political strategies and 
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motivations played a role in the dispute. For example, when the radical Han nationalists, 
such as Zhang and Cai, claimed that the Manchu regime should be overthrown, they were 
concerned not only with cultural but also political matters. Moreover, the political 
considerations dominated the early stage of Sun Yat-sen’s revolution when he and other 
revolutionists pledged that all Han-Chinese should unite together to expel the Manchus 
(qu chu da lu) and re-establish the Chinese (hui fu zhong hua). In essence, Sun’s political 
campaign put the traditional cultural perspective aside and turned to racial Han 
nationalism to define the Chinese national boundary.   
 However, after overturning the Qing regime and establishing the Republic of 
China, Sun Yet-sen modified his assertion and then mobilized a project promoting the 
“coexistence of five nations—Han, Manchu, Mongolian, Moslem, and Tibetan” (wu zu 
gong he)
53
.  Later on, Sun further proposed that all nations within the Republic of China 
should be integrated into a new “Chinese nation” (zhong hua min zu) by following the 
American model.
54
  At this point, Sun’s idea of “Chinese nation” was quite close to the 
earlier Liang’s “Greater Nationalism,” but Sun still emphasized the assimilation of all 
other minority groups into the majority Han nation.
55
 As Fei Xiaotong pointed out, 
despite the fact that the Chinese nation and its many constitutive “nations” are all called 
“nations,” they actually point to different notions: the former, Chinese nation, is a 
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collective term referring to the people who live within the territory of China, while the 
latter are more like ethnic groups or sub-national groups.
56
 Conceptually, the “Chinese 
nation” transcends all other constituent minority nations (shao shu min zu). In other 
words, the Chinese nation is a “supra-nation” with a combination of many “nations” 
within the territory of the Chinese state.   
 The above debates and consequent evolution have made clear that Chinese 
nationalists did not hold a clear-cut perspective on national definition, and the organizing 
principles employed for the distribution of national membership were neither 
homogeneous nor one-dimensional in determining the national boundary. The traditional 
culture-oriented nationalism was challenged by both the reform-minded intellectuals and 
radical revolutionists in the late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 centuries, while the latter had 
evidently turned to a racial type of nationalistic thought in order to overturn the Qing 
regime, because it was “non-Chinese.” However, right after the establishment of the 
Republic of China, another sharp turn occurred, as Sun Yet-sen had shown: from Han 
racial nationalism to a type of supra-national construction of Chinese nation within the 
territory of Republic of China. Along with the shifting of organizing principles, the 
meaning of “Chinese nation” also changed — from a cultural entity, to a racial Han group, 
to a collective supra-nation comprising many minority “nations.”   
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Chinese Nationalist Discourses in Taiwan  
 
In the late 1940s when the KMT regime lost the civil war in the mainland and 
retreated to Taiwan, it faced a totally new political situation, an intensified cross-strait 
relationship, and a serious military threat from the PRC. Moreover, at the time, Taiwan 
was a society that had been colonized by Japanese for over fifty years. Under the 
circumstances, it was not surprising that the KMT party-state adopted a dominant top-
down approach to consolidate its ruling authority in Taiwan. To restore the China-
centered governing structure and maintain its ruling legitimacy, the mainlander-controlled 
KMT party-state also played a hegemonic role in almost every aspect of society—
including political, military, socio-economic, and cultural.
57
 
Regarding the issue of national identity, the KMT attempted to impose on the 
people of Taiwan a standard discourse on Chinese nation.
58
 The official viewpoint is 
well-addressed by historian Wang Cengcai, who characterized the KMT approach as an 
essentialist type of nationalism by focusing on Chinese’s common racial-cultural 
origins.
59
 According to the official viewpoint, China had became a united and 
homogeneous nation-state as early as 221 B.C. when the Qin dynasty brought the 
"Warring States" (zhan guo) period to an end and unified the whole China for the first 
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time. Even if the ethnic components of the population were quite complex from the very 
beginning, the Chinese nation cannot be seen as a “multi-nation” state, as the many 
minority groups are nothing but different branches of one single nation sharing the same 
lineage.
60
 More importantly, as a result of a long history, the Han Chinese culture has 
been accepted as the common culture by most of these minority groups, and all Chinese 
have agreed on a unified Chinese nation. The official view under the KMT concludes that 
Taiwanese people are doubtless a part of Han Chinese community and share a common 
culture and long history with the mainland Chinese. In their eyes, the Taiwan 
independence movement does not have any ground to call for Taiwanese self-
determination or a public referendum on the issue. 
 Note that this line of thought was very prominent in the public school curricula 
and is officially endorsed by the KMT.  It is even supported by a broad range of pro-
unification intellectuals, including well-known liberals and socialists in the political arena. 
Liberalism and socialism are apparently not incompatible with essentialist Chinese 
nationalism when Taiwanese national identity is on the agenda.  For instance, Hu Fo, a 
well-respected political science professor at the National Taiwan University, made clear 
in one article that native Taiwanese and the Mainlanders belong to one lineage, and that 
any theoretical attempt to differentiate between Taiwanese and Chinese ethnicity or race 
must be deficient.
61
  On the other hand, one of Taiwan’s leading leftist intellectuals, Chen 
Yingzen, never put a doubt at his conviction that socialism and Chinese nationalism 
belong together.  According to Chen, Taiwan’s anti-Japanese struggle and the Taiwan 
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language movement in the colonial era, the Feb. 28 riots in 1947, the Zhongli incident in 
1971 and the debate on native literature in 1978 were as much an anti-colonial fight and 
anti-assimilation movement as they were a movement to uphold Chinese nationality.  In 
his view, the efforts by pro-independence advocates to split Taiwan from its racial and 
cultural origin are fundamentally contrary to the true spirit of ‘localization’ (ben tu hua), 
and it is not only insensible but also infeasible in the reality.
62
 
 The belief that all Chinese share a common racial origin (yan huang zi sun) reflect 
in the widely-shared notion that Chinese are the descendants of dragon—a symbol 
representing their ancient ancestor. A very popular folk song, "long de chuan ren", wrote 
by Hou Dejian, serves a good depiction: 
In the far and remote Orient, there is a large river called the Yangtze River; 
In the far and remote Orient, there is a large river called the Yellow River; 
Without seeing the beauty of Yangtze River, my heart travels around in the dream; 
Without hearing the grandeur of the Yellow River, the roaring of billows appears 
in my dreams; 
In the ancient Orient, there is a Dragon, it is called China; and, 
In the ancient Orient, there is a group of people who are the descendants of the 
Dragon: 
Black eyes, Black hair, and Yellow skin, we are forever the descendants of the 
Dragon 
It is worth noting that at the time when the song was written, Hou Dejian himself, 
a second-generation Mainlander who was born in Taiwan, had never been to the 
mainland— the remote homeland could only have been imagined in dreams. However, as 
the lyric demonstrates, the belief that Chinese shared the same racial origin is quite 
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deeply rooted in the minds of younger people at his time, even if the Dragon symbol is 
simply a myth.   
These examples show that the supporters of Chinese nationalism and reunification 
rely on an essentialist point of view, taking for granted a comprehension of the Chinese 
nation and its relation to Taiwan. For the KMT and other Chinese nationalists, the 
common blood lineage, history, and culture prohibit any political attempt to differentiate 
between Taiwanese and Chinese, especially if such attempts are intended to construct a 
separate Taiwanese identity in terms of national uniqueness and consciousness.   
However, the top-down approach employed by the mainlander-dominated KMT 
regime in Taiwan did not fully prevent resistance and cultural conflicts in a society that 
comprises different groups of people with different living experiences in history. As Alan 
Wachman has argued, by favoring Chinese culture, "the KMT intended to promote what 
it took to be the genuine culture of the Chinese nation but ended up imposing a 'high 
culture' on a society where previously low cultures had taken up the lives of the majority, 
and in some cases the totality, of the population."
63
 Indeed, KMT leaders did not believe 
that they had imposed a foreign culture on Taiwan; but, ironically, the regime also made 
clear that the Taiwanese differed from the cultural standard the authority has endorsed. 
By reinforcing Taiwanese notions of distinctiveness, the KMT inadvertently boosted their 
identity as Taiwanese rather than fostering a deeper identity as Chinese.
64
 In Wachman's 
view, Taiwanese indeed recognize the Chinese origin in their culture, but also sense that 
beyond sharing the national culture manifested by the Mainlander elite, they have ties to 
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a more compelling, more immediate set of cultural impulses.  It is the manner they share 
with other Taiwanese that differentiates them from the Mainlanders.  
 Below, I will discuss the development of Taiwanese nationalist discourses in the 
post-war period and demonstrate how Taiwanese elites differed from Chinese nationalists 
on the issues of Taiwan’s status and national identity. 
 
Taiwanese Nationalist Discourses 
  
 In general, Taiwanese nationalist discourses intend to instill a sense of belonging 
and solidarity among the Taiwanese people, and limit the boundary of national identity to 
Taiwan only. Since the sense of belonging and solidarity are determined in large by how 
nations construct their boundaries, Taiwanese nationalists also put emphasis on the 
questions of how the Taiwanese nation is defined and what organizing principles should 
be used for membership distribution. Like Chinese nationalism took different forms in 
different historical stages, Taiwanese nationalist discourses were not uniform in the 
contents over time. There have been many variants of Taiwanese nationalist discourses 




 In view of the organizing principles at work in the construction of  a Taiwanese 
nation, five major sub-types of Taiwanese nationalist discourses can be identified: first, 
the essentialist discourse that focused on the distinctive lineage features of Taiwanese 
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nation; second, the historical-cultural nationalist discourse that emphasized the unique 
historical experiences and cultural heritage of Taiwanese nation developed in the past 
four hundred years; third, the future-oriented nationalist discourses that stressed the 
Taiwanese “common interest” in the nation formation; fourth, the multi-ethnic type of 
discourses on Taiwanese identity; and fifth, the territorial-civic nationalist discourses that 
looked at the citizenship rights and institutions as the hard core of Taiwanese nation. 
 
 As it will be shown in the following analysis, with different organizing principles 
employed in the construction of Taiwanese nation, the meaning and boundary of the 
putative Taiwanese nation is not static or fixed, but varies significantly among these five 
types of nationalist discourses.  For some elites holding the essentialist and historical-
cultural perspectives, the Taiwanese nation includes only the Fulao (Minnan) and/or 
Hakka who came to Taiwan prior to 1945; for others who take the territorial-civic and 
future-orientated viewpoints, the boundary of Taiwanese is broader and includes all the 
people living in Taiwan—Fulao, Hakka, Mainlanders who moved to Taiwan after 1945 
and their offspring, as well as the Aborigines (yuan zhu min).   
 The shifting of Taiwanese boundaries reflects two things. First, Taiwanese 
nationalists have differed in their perspective on how the national membership should be 
distributed among people. Second, like Chinese nationalism discussed above, the ideas of 
national construction are highly related to and influenced by changes in the political 
contexts.   
 Despite the differences underlying the Taiwanese nationalist discourses, one 
shared feature has however linked them together: that is, the rejection of Chinese 




nationalism are the major opposition objects in all of these Taiwanese nationalist 
discourses. The ultimate political goal for all kinds of Taiwanese nationalism is to 
establish an independent sovereign state for the people of Taiwan.  It is the political goal, 
rather than the underlying organizing principles at work in the construction process, that 
make Taiwanese nationalist discourses different from Chinese nationalism.  In other 
words, both Chinese and Taiwanese nationalist discourses employ similar organizing 
principles in their national construction, but come to opposite conclusions.  
  
Essentialism in Taiwanese nationalist discourses 
  
 In the 1950s and 1960s, the earlier Taiwanese nationalists firmly held  an 
essentialist perspective on the concept of nation, and they had intended to assume that a 
nation is a human organism with a unique, unchangeable national essence, represented by 
a set of objective features such as cultural homogeneity, common lineage, language, 
customs, and value systems. In their views, the formation of a Taiwanese nation is an 
inevitable consequence in the development of history, and the construction work through 
a series of social engineering projects is simply to “awaken” the long-existent national 
spirit.   
One typical representative of this thought was LiaoWenyi, who actively promoted 
the concept of “Formosan nation” and organized the “Provincial Republic of Taiwan” in 
Tokyo in the year 1956. As to Liao, Taiwanese people had to, after four hundred years of 
development, become a new Formosan nation, which was different from their ancestor 




different racial groups including the Aborigines, Han, Japanese, Indonesian, Portuguese, 
Dutch, and Spanish as a result of historical contingencies.
66
 According to another 
Taiwanese nationalist, Huang Zhaotang, the reason why Liao went that far as to 
emphasize the lineage part of Taiwanese nation was twofold.  First, at his time, the nation 
was commonly understood as a similar concept of race, which takes in lineage as the 
essential component. In order to differentiate the Taiwanese from the Chinese nation, it 
was necessary for Liao to stress the lineage. The second reason was a practical one. In the 
1950s, Liao was forced to depart Taiwan for Japan when he organized a Taiwan 
independence movement in Japan; the most clear and simple way to prove to the 
Japanese that Taiwanese are not Chinese and get the support from the Japanese was to 
emphasize the lineage-relationship difference between Taiwanese and Chinese.
67
  
However, given the fact that the majority Taiwanese are emigrants from the 
mainland China and speak the same languages as those Chinese in their hometowns, 
Liao’s mixed-lineage argument (tai wan min zu hun xue lun) did not get wide support 
among other Taiwanese nationalists at the time.  For example, another leading Taiwanese 
nationalist, Wang Yude, while holding the similar essentialist view, disagreed with Liao’s 
overstated interpretation on the nature of Taiwanese nation; instead, he argued that 
Taiwanese folk, Fulao and Hakka, were originally a part of the Chinese, but they have 
gradually developed into an independent nation as a result of its unique geographic and 
historical circumstances. According to Wang, Japanese colonization played a significant 
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role in forging a modern Taiwanese consciousness, and the February 28 incident further 
separated the Taiwanese nation from the Chinese nation.
68
   
Note that in the essentialist arguments, despite the difference between Liao Wenyi 
and Wang Yute on the relative emphasis in lineage and historical development in the 
nation formation, the boundary of Taiwan was clearly set along the line of the Chinese 
and Taiwanese.  Both Liao and Wang agreed that the Taiwanese nation include only the 
Fulao, Hakka, and Aborigines, with the Mainlanders in Taiwan being excluded. It is 
understandable that, from their point of view, Chinese on the mainland and the 
Mainlanders in Taiwan were alien people, since the Taiwanese nation must acquire its 
essential uniqueness
69
and be treated as a parallel concept to the Chinese nation in order to 
have an independent space for development. However, as Huang Zhaotang and other later 
Taiwanese nationalists have pointed out, the extreme racial type of nationalist discourse 
that overly focused on the mixed-lineage-relationship in the construction of Taiwanese 
nation does not correspond to the fact that the majority of Taiwanese are closely related 
to their Han origin. As far as the lineage is concerned, the real lineage difference only 
exists between the Aborigines and the Han, not between the Taiwanese and the Han. 
Since the Aborigines were not Taiwanese ancestors, the emphasis on lineage can only 
lead to legitimize an independent statehood for the Aborigines, but not for Taiwanese. 
Therefore, since the 1960s and 1970s, Taiwanese nationalist discourses had gradually 
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turned to historical circumstances and cultural transformation for the construction of a 
Taiwanese nation. 
 
History and culture factors in Taiwanese nationalism discourses 
 
As the deficiencies in the racial or lineage nationalist discourses had been 
critically reviewed in the 1960s, the most popular nationalistic approach in the 
independence camp turned to historical-cultural arguments to promote Taiwanese 
nationalism, and claimed the existence of a Taiwanese nation in its own right. Instead of 
emphasizing the race or lineage origins, Taiwanese nationalists in this camp and a broad 
range of intellectuals began to focus on Taiwan’s history and its special cultural heritage 
in order to justify the concept of a distinct Taiwanese nation. In general, their argument 
can be summarized as the following: For more than four hundred years, the people of 
Taiwan have been governed by external regimes, including the Portuguese, the Spaniards, 
the Dutch, the Qing, the Japanese, and the KMT; through the common experiences in a 
series of anti-foreign colonial movements in history, Taiwanese people have developed a 
distinct island culture ( hai dao wen hua) that is very much different from the mainland’s 
continental civilization; therefore, despite similarities between Taiwanese and Chinese in 
terms of lineage, Taiwanese had gradually formed an independent economic and political 
community with a shared common fate among people.
70
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Shih Ming articulated this line of thought in his books, The Formation and 
Development of the Nation in Taiwan (1968) and  Taiwan's 400 Years of History (1980). 
He argued that, as a result of unique geographic factors and historical contingencies (that 
is, the colonization experiences) in the past four hundred years, Taiwan people had 
transcended the Han lineage relationship by the turn of this century and developed into a 
modern nation on its own.  In his view, both the physical and social environments in 
Taiwan, on the one hand, had provided the material foundation for Taiwanese nation to 
develop; on the other hand, the February 28 massacre by the Mainlander KMT regime 
had eliminated any residual Chinese consciousness in the minds of Taiwanese people and 
completely cut the linkage between Taiwan and China.  In this sense, the meaning of 
Taiwanese and the boundary of the Taiwanese nation was limited to those who had lived 
in Taiwan before 1945; the Mainlanders who moved to Taiwan after 1945 with the KMT 
regime were not included as a part of the Taiwanese nation.
 
Note that Shih Ming’s historical perspective has originated a strong anti-China 
intention and a deep-rooted socialist ideology emphasizing the role played by the farmers 
in the history of anti-colonization and liberalization movements. Therefore, his 
interpretation of Taiwanese history was quite different from other right-wing perspectives 
that emphasized the development of capitalism and the intellectuals’ role during the 
Japanese colonization period—such as the Taiwanese congress petition movement, 
cultural movement, and self-governance movement.
71
 Chen Fangming, a prominent 
Taiwanese intellectual in the younger generation, pointed out that Shih Ming’s Taiwan-
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centered historicism viewpoint has inspired many later Taiwanese nationalists and 
intellectuals.
72
   
 Lee Qiao is another example. Lee argued that, since the re-construction of 
Taiwan-four-hundred-year historicism, the earlier Han immigrants in Taiwan have been 
transformed from “descendents of the Yellow Emperor” (yan huang zi sun) to be 
Taiwanese forebears, and the Taiwanese national history should start from the time when 
they first moved to Taiwan.
73
   According to Lee Qiao, the Han tradition is only one part 
of modern Taiwanese culture that has been influenced as much by the island aborigines’ 
cultural values as by the Japanese and Western cultures.  As a Han emigrant society, 
Taiwan has developed its own emigrant spirit that is characterized by courageous risk-
taking and passionate solidarity, and it adheres among others to religious pluralism, 
democracy, rationalism, the rule of law, and a scientific outlook on life.
74
  As much as 
national culture is concerned, Taiwan has already built up its own organizational system 
that justifies opinions about a unique nation that is different from, and parallel to, China 
and Chinese culture. With regard to the goal of Taiwanese nationalism, Lee suggested 
that under the historical conditions, Taiwanese people should work together to construct a 
cultural identity, national identity, and a modern state identity at the same time, to be 
followed by the independence movement in the present-day Taiwan.
75 
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Among those who emphasized the unique Taiwan history and cultural features as 
the major organizing principles in the Taiwanese national identity formation, Wu Naide 
placed a special emphasis on the history of tragedy and suffering: Taiwan’s secession to 
Japan in 1895, its defeat in the anti-Japanese struggle thereafter, the February 28 incident 
of 1947, and the White Terror (bai se kong bu) under the KMT authoritarianism—all of 
these had contributed to this tragic Taiwan history, which, he argued, would arouse the 
sense of belonging to a national community and create national cohesiveness and identity, 




 Clearly, Wu based his argument on Ernest Renan’s point: Where national 
memories are concerned, grieves are of more valuable than triumphs, for they impose 
duties and require a common effort, and having suffered together unifies more than joy 
does.
77
  However, we should note that Renan also emphasized the importance of the 
present.  Wu said that there are two things that constitute the national soul or spiritual 
principle—one lies in the past, one in the present; the former is the possession in common 
of a rich legacy of memories, the latter is present-day consent, the desire to live together, 
the will to perpetuate the value of the heritage that one has received in an undivided form.     
 In sum, the above essentialist discourses (e.g., Liao Wenyi and Wang Yude) and 
historical-cultural Taiwanese nationalism have tended to focus on the objective bases of 
nation formation, with emphasis on the lineage and cultural heritage in history.  However, 
as Renan has pointed out, the racial or historical conditions do not necessarily lead to the 
formation of national consciousness—the subjective component of the nation.  Moreover, 
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regarding Wu Nai-te’s emphasis on past memories, it is not surprising that the younger 
generations in Taiwan, especially young DPP members, might not be able to comprehend 
a historic sorrow that they have never personally experienced.  At this point, I shall 
discuss a more pragmatic perspective on the meaning of Taiwanese nationalism 
developed by Hsu Xingliang, the former DPP chairman.  
 
Common interest in Taiwanese nationalist discourses 
 
 In the mid-1990s, a group of new generations within the DPP turned to a future-
oriented perspective on national identity issues and declared that Taiwanese 
independence was not a sacred mission but a pragmatic political attitude.
78
  In their view, 
the old generations pursued Taiwanese independence on the basis of cultural heritage and 
a past history of oppression and sorrow.  The new generations, however, advocated the 
same goal—Taiwanese independence— for the purpose of future, hope, and 
democracy.
79
  A systemic discourse on this view derives from Hsu Hsin-liang and his 
1995 book, The Rising People (Xin Xing Min Zu)
80
.   
 In the book, Hsu pointed out that Taiwanese – like the Mongolians in the 13
th
, the 
Manchurians in the 17
th









and the Americans and Japanese in the 20
th
 century—will be a new rising nation because 
of their economic dynamism and entrepreneurial internationalism (1995:13-36).  He 
emphasized that it is not blood, lineage, nor history and culture, but the “common 
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interest” that defines the nation’s normative basis and creates social solidarity in Taiwan 
(1995:350-58).  Although Hsu explicitly speaks of Taiwan as a maritime culture, he 
focuses on the openness, adaptability, creativeness, and expansionism that have been 
embedded in the Taiwan society (1995: 181-205).  Note that Hsu Hsin-liang’s emphasis 
on common interest as the foundation of a new Taiwanese nation is quite different from 
Lee Chiao and Wu Nei-teh’s focus on common culture and historical tragedies, and even 
further away from the earlier Liao Wen-i’s stress on the blood lineage.  In his view, the 
common interest—especially Taiwan’s trading relationship with the outside world—is 
the major driving force that links Taiwanese people together.  Given that mainland China 
is growing as the most important market in the world, Hsu argued that Taiwan must 
establish a stable and long-term economic relationship with China.  He seems optimistic 
that, in so doing, Taiwanese would not abandon their homeland, as some traditional 
independence activists fear. (1995: 350-58)   
 Critics have pointed out that a collective identity based purely on present 
considerations lacks a basis for values, and this is why nationalism cannot be seen merely 
as a form of rational self-interest or in purely instrumental terms.  More important, this 
would not be able to explain how the national identity came into being, or why a 
particular form of identity was chosen.  In the following, I will address other Taiwan 
nationalist discourses conducted in different approaches—that is, multi-ethnic and 
territorial-civic nationalist discourses.  
 





Many new generation Taiwanese nationalists and intellectuals in the 1990s came 
to realize that the construction of a Taiwanese nation could not simply leave out 
Mainlanders and Aborigines who also have lived in Taiwan. They began to make use of 
what can be called the “ethnical turn” in the discourse on Taiwanese national identity by 
purposely deconstructing the Taiwanese into the Fulao (or Minnan) and Hakka two sub-
groups, the Mainlanders (da lu ren or wai shen ren), and aborigines (yuan zhu min) with 
each a separate ethnic identity. Among these new generation Taiwanese nationalists, I 
would like to use Zhang Maogui as an example to introduce the new line of nationalist 
discourse.  
Scholar Chang Maukuei pointed out that the invention of above “four major 
ethnic groups” in the early 1990s marked the beginning of a new conceptualization of the 
Taiwanese nation – a nation with different ethnic groups marked by harmony and 
democratic tolerance.  Fulao, Hakka, Mainlanders, and Aborigines each were 
acknowledged in their own historical and cultural uniqueness as much as in their political 
equality
81
. In his analysis, the “ethnical turn” has resulted from the political developments 
in Taiwan, in particular the democratic transitions since the mid-1980s. On the one hand, 
the old ‘provincial conflict’ (shen ji chong tu) was sharply questioned by Taiwan 
Mainlanders and newly organized aborigines who would only sympathize with the 
movement if they had sufficient “identity space” therein. On the other hand, some 
moderate forces within the DPP, such as xxx, have gradually acknowledged the necessity 
to build up a broader social consensus to get more domestic support for an independent 
Taiwanese nation against the Chinese nationalism camp as represented by the KMT, the 
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New Party, and the mainland PRC.
82
 On the other hand, since the “provincial complex” 
(shen ji qing jie) was closely attached to historical memories of violent oppression and 
political discrimination under the KMT authoritarian rule, the concept of four ethnic 
groups was a good invention to construct a political community without the 
disadvantages of homogenization along the lines of the old provincial complex. In that 
sense, the “four ethnic groups” concept iimplicitly promotes multi-culturalism, but still 
sticks to ethnicity as the basis of national identity formation. 
To promote this line of thought, Chang Maokuei attempted to provide a 
theoretical ground for this: Taiwanese nationalism is primarily based on a general need of 
the individuals to be represented collectively; that is, to have a self-assertive collective 
identity that is represented in a national state.  The meaning of a collective identity 
symbol is similar to what Harold Issacs has called “Idols of the Tribe”, or Durkheim’s 
“Totemism”, through which the individuals and the collectivity can be linked together 
with a strong sense of solidarity.
83
  However, pursuing such a collective symbol and 
identity for the Taiwanese people cannot be achieved by pure imagination.  As the 
existing China-centered image is no longer able to provide a meaningful representation, 
Zhang suggests focusing instead on Taiwan’s own history and common living 
experiences, such as the characteristics of Han immigrant society, long-term separation 
from the mainland, Japanese colonization, KMT’s authoritarianism, rapid 
industrialization, urbanization, economic development, and recent democratization.
84
  
During this process, the demand for a “rectification of names” becomes important in the 
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society, and it can only be achieved by abandoning the old political symbols and values 
attached to them.  Taiwanese nationalism and the Taiwan independence movement, in 
this sense, are just the effort in search for such a new collective identity.  Zhang 
concluded his argument in his contribution to the DPP’s White Paper of Ethnic and 
Cultural Policies, in which he outlines his understanding of a new Taiwanese nationalism 
and how it should correspond to society’s needs. This understanding recognizes the need 
to protect the particularities of each ethnic group and to use citizen rights as the basis for 
the construction of the nation’s cohesiveness.
85
   
Note that Zhang does not ignore the fact that ethnicity is an essential feature of 
human identity formation. However, he emphasizes that the contextual fluidity and 
historical conditions would shape the form of ethnicity and predicts, in his most recent 
writings, that its future importance would be very much reduced by society’s growing 
complexity and ethnicity’s inadequacy to solve the urgent questions of real life.
86
 In other 
words, Zhang suggests that the ethnic factor would gradually disappear when a 
modernizing Taiwan society becomes more rational and secular.  
As a matter of fact, by promoting the concept of citizenship rights, Zhang is just 
one step away from political nationalism, which opts for citizenship as the central 
element in the formation of Taiwanese national identity. Here we see a turn from the 
multi-ethnic type of Taiwanese nationalism to the focus of liberal constitutionalism as the 
core organizing principle to instill the sense of belonging and solidarity among 
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Taiwanese people; as such, the boundary of the Taiwanese nation is set clearly along a 
civic, not ethnic, line. 
 
Civic-Territorial Taiwanese nationalist discourses 
 
In 1964, Peng Ming-min, Xie Chong-ming, and Wei Ting-chao drafted the 
“Taiwanese people self-salvation manifesto” (taiwan renmin zijiu xuanyan), in which 
they appealed to the sense of victimhood among both native Taiwanese and the 
Mainlanders in Taiwan under the KMT’s authoritarian oppression and, based on that, to 
generate a territorial consciousness that Taiwan is a community of people sharing the 
same fate (min yun gong tong ti).
87
 This document is said to be the earliest territorial-
civic nationalism proposed by Taiwanese at the time, and had a significant influence on 
the later development of the Taiwanese independence movement.
88 
In their view, the formation and development of modern states are not based on 
the same race, language, culture, or religion; instead, it is the consciousness among 
people who share the same destiny that links them together as a nation-state. Additionally, 
such a consciousness must emerge from the common experiences in history; and, in the 
case of Taiwan, the consciousness of common fate did not exist between Taiwanese 
people (both native Taiwanese and the Mainlanders) and the Chinese people in the 
mainland, let alone the Chinese Community Party, CCP, in the mainland. They clearly 
pointed out that the slogan “Take back the mainland” (fan gong da lu) was simply a 
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political deception that the KMT regime under Chiang employed so that it could continue 
its authoritarian rule over the people in Taiwan; and taking back the mainland was, in fact, 
impossible.  The undeniable fact, in their eyes, was that there has been “one China and 
one Taiwan” in the world. Therefore, Taiwanese people should unite together to overturn 
the KMT regime and re-formulate a new constitution under democratic principles for the 
Taiwan state.  
However, at the time when they proposed the territorial-civic type of nationalism, 
the common consciousness among different groups of people in Taiwan had not yet 
formed. Two reasons are worth noting. First, the common historical experiences that 
were necessary for both native Taiwanese and the Mainlanders to form a common sense 
of destiny were not strong and solid enough at the time. Following the KMT regime to 
Taiwan in the 1940s, the Mainlanders still had a strong mutual reliance relationship with 
the KMT regime, even though most Mainlanders, like most native Taiwanese, enjoyed no 
substantial political resources. Second, in less than twenty years, the tragedy of the 
February 28 incident still shadowed the Fulao and Hakka groups, who gradually formed a 
“we group” sense against the Mainlanders, “the outsider-group.”  In addition, the Fulao 
and Hakka people, especially the older generations, did not care about taking back the 
mainland, unlike the Mainlanders who saw the mainland as their homeland. In short, 
while there was some degree of social integration between the locals and the Mainlanders 
via inter-marriage, the political alienation between the native Taiwanese and the 
Mainlanders in the 1960s did not bring them together as a community that shared the 




But the limitation does not outdate their far-sighted viewpoint that attempted to 
link up the past historical experiences (objectivity) and the present consciousness 
(subjectivity) as a common ground in construction of a new Taiwanese national identity. 
The territorial-civic nationalist discourse based in Taiwan has inspired many later 
Taiwanese nationalists and politicians when they come to the sovereignty issues of 
Taiwan. For example, in the late 1980s, a key DPP member, Xie Changting, formally 
proposed a “new Taiwanese consciousness” in the face of the PRC’s pro-reunification 
pressure
89
. Xie emphasized that the new Taiwanese consciousness is different from the 
earlier version that excluded the Mainlanders; instead, it is a natural growth out of all 
Taiwan residents who shared a common fate in the territory. For this reason, Xie argued 
that Taiwan has formed a modern national community and should be entitled the right of 
self-determination for its own future.  
Holding a similar perspective like Xie Changting, another Taiwanese political 
scientist, Shih Cheng-feng, further proposes a “trans-ethnic Taiwanese identity” in 
constitutional terms
90
. Like Zhang Maogui, Shi recognizes the role of ethnicity as a 
rallying point for nationalism, as the psychological need for ethnic identity cannot be 
neglected; but he criticizes the homogenizing and oppressive effects that exist in either 
Chinese or Taiwanese essentialist ethno-nationalism. Shi argued that in a multi-ethnic 
and multi-cultural society such as Taiwan, a nation’s constitution must protect minority 
rights and ethnic and cultural identity, even the right for each individual to change his 
ethnic identity, if one chooses to, should be protected. In his view, a modern Taiwanese 
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nationalism must be based on liberal multiculturalism and citizenship, and the national 
consciousness must be built on the affection of each Taiwanese for his country, and not 
on ethnicity in the first place. The common collective identity should ground on each 
individual’s citizenship rights, the memory of their common history, and, more 
importantly, the common desire to shape the political, economic, and cultural systems of 
the island. 
Similarly, Taiwanese nationalist Lin Cho-shui also emphasized the “institutional” 
factor in the process of nation formation. Lin, however, based his argument on the 
legitimacy of de-linkage from China.
91
 First, Lin challenges that the so-called “Chinese 
nation” (zhong hua min zu - yan huang zi sun, xue mai xian lian, tong wen tong zhong) is 
in fact a false construction—not only are Chinese not coming from the same ancestry, for 
example, Mongolians, Tibetans and Moslems, also they had not shared the same culture, 
take the variations of language usage in China. Secondly, in the historical perspective, 
Lin also challenges the argument that Taiwan has been a part of China since ancient 
times. He pointed out that Taiwan had never been considered a part of China and the 
people in Taiwan were long treated as “Barbarians” by them. Finally, Lin argued that a 
unified China does not necessarily do any good for China, since China has occupied a 
large territory that is hard to manage efficiently; even worse, it could destroy the cultural 
diversity and therefore impede progress and innovation. He cited a prominent historian, 
Yu Yingshi, who stated that the Waring Period (zhan guo shi qi) was not a degenerative 
period; instead, it was one of most progressive and prosperous time in Chinese history, in 
terms of cultural and economic perspectives. 
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Lin followed on Hobsbawn’s argument that the nation cannot be formed out of 
purely subjective desire or choice, it must include contextual conditions
92
. In addition, as 
Anderson has defined nation as a political imagined community with limited boundary 
and sovereignty, Lin argued that, despite the trend of globalization and fragmentation, 
national boundary is still limited to certain territory. As to the relationship between nation 
and state, Lin himself therefore recognizes Taiwanese as hua ren in a cultural sense, but 
not "zhong guo ren" in terms of citizenship status; moreover, their political identity is 
limited to the territory within the Taiwanese state.  Like Singapore where people 
recognized themselves as hua ren and xin jia po ren, but not zhong guo ren, the traditional 
Chinese nation should be detangled by cultural and political terms. 
As far as the membership distribution is concerned, it is clear that the above civic-
territorial nationalist discourses have substantially transformed the meaning of Taiwanese 
from previous essentialist perspectives that treated Taiwan as a primordial given, neither 
is the same as historical-cultural nationalism or multi-ethnic discourses, which hold 
ethnicity as the central element of Taiwanese nation. The boundary of Taiwanese, as a 
logical consequence under territorial-civic line, expands to include all different groups of 
residents in Taiwan.  This is why Peng Mingmin, in a recent article, uses the term Taiwan 
Citizen-ism (tai wan guo min zhu yi) instead of Taiwanese nationalism (tai wan min zu 
zhu yi).  In so doing, he aimed to avoid the controversy over the concepts, “nation” and 
“Taiwanese nation,” as there was no agreement on the meanings. Under this conceptual 
framework, Taiwan citizenship needs not exclude the Mainlanders in Taiwan, since both 
native Taiwanese and the Mainlanders were the victims under the KMT’s oppressive 
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authoritarianism. That is to say, under the Taiwan Citizen-ism, all those who identify 
with Taiwan and shared a consciousness of the same fate are defined as Taiwan citizens 




National Boundary and Nation-state Relationship: A Summary 
 
 In terms of national boundary, the membership distribution in the above five 
types of Taiwanese nationalist discourses are summarized in the Table 2.1. In comparison, 
the differences among Chinese nationalist discourses are shown in the Table 2.2.  It is 
important to point out that the line between organizing principles/mechanisms is not 
clear-cut, as some types of discourses would employ multiple criteria in the national 
construction. Therefore, the boundary and meaning of Taiwanese and Chinese are not 
homogeneous or one-dimensional. 
 As to the relationship between nation and state, many theoretical forms can be 
identified -- such as "one nation-one state", "one nation-many states", and "multi-national 
states".  In the real world, some forms might not exist, and each form might have several 
variants.  As to the relationship between Taiwan and China, as articulated in the 
nationalist discourses, is briefly summarized in Table 2.3. It should be noted that the 
types of nationalist discourses have been assigned to the cell-positions by following the 
logic and the degree of congruence between political and national boundaries in their 
major arguments.  It does not necessarily mean that each type of nationalist would agree 
with the allocation.  
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Table 2. 1  Discourses on Taiwanese National Identity and Membership Boundary 
 























Four major ethnic 




People who take 
Taiwan as their 
homeland 
New Taiwanese = 
People who 
identify with 
Taiwan as a 
modern state 
 
Table 2. 2 Discourses on Chinese National Identity and Membership Boundary 
 
Organizing Principles in Chinese Nationalist Discourses 
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Chinese = those who 
accept Chinese 
culture 
Chinese = mainly 
Han community 
Chinese = those who 
reside in the Chinese 
state 
Chinese = all 
ethnicities in China 
 
Table 2. 3 The Relationship between Nation and State in Nationalist Discourses 
Boundary of National 
Community 
Boundary of Political community 
China including Taiwan Taiwan excluding China 

















Type II Taiwan 
Independentists--  ROC on 
Taiwan 
獨台論 
Both Chinese and 
Taiwanese 
China as a multi-ethnic 
nation state* 
「大中國民族論」 
Taiwan as a multi-ethnic 
state* 
「台灣多族群國家」 
The Pragmatist – ROC on 
Taiwan 
「不急統不急獨派」 
Note: * refers to those nation-state relationship that have been discussed in this chapter, the rest of will be 








The five types of Taiwanese nationalist discourses base their arguments on 
different organizing principles—lineage, history, culture, ethnicity, and territory— to 
define the Taiwanese nation.  With different organizing principle, the boundary of the 
Taiwanese nation would vary along with the criteria employed in the membership 
distribution and the meaning of Taiwanese differs consequently.  Despite the variations 
among them, one common feature that links all of these discourses together is the 
rejection of Chinese nationalism that attempts to incorporate Taiwan as a part.  In all 
types of Taiwanese nationalist discourses, Taiwan is seen as the homeland of Taiwanese 
people who believed that they are entitled to claim the territory with sovereignty.  
The conflicts between Chinese nationalism and Taiwanese nationalism are not 
located in the organizing principles employed in the construction of national identity, 
since both ideologies could have employed similar criteria in defining the nation and 
membership distribution among the people.  Rather, the conflicts arise from the disputes 
over Taiwan’s sovereign status and national belonging—the so-called the Tong-Du 
confrontation.  The two camps used the same means but arrive at the opposite positions 
on the statehood issue. 
However, the conflict between these two opposing nationalist discourses seems 
not irreconcilable. First, the political positions on the reunification/independence issue 
are often pre-determined by nationalist elites, then they worked to justify their positions 




Take history and culture: Reunification advocates argue that Taiwan has been a part of 
China since ancient times and the Taiwanese are undoubtedly the Han Chinese; in 
contrast, Taiwan independence supporters argue that Taiwan has developed a unique 
culture as a result of historical contingencies in the past 400 years, and the Taiwanese, 
with their distinctive cultural features, are no longer Chinese. However, just as Hobsbawn 
has pointed out, traditions are invented in nature
94
, these so-called “historical rightness” 
and “distinctive features” of Chinese nation and Taiwanese nation are actually artificial 
contrivances erected by nationalist elites; the meanings and boundaries of the Taiwanese 
nation or Chinese nation are also subject to change to fit specific political purposes.   
Hobsbawn's  point also applies to the territorial-civic type of Taiwanese 
nationalists, such as Peng Ming-min, Shih Cheng-feng, and Lin Cho-shui, who stressed 
the socio-economic system and democratic values as the rational bases for Taiwanese 
independence.  One might reasonably ask: Will reunification be a desirable goal if 
mainland China transforms into a similar socio-economic system like Taiwan and 
becomes a democracy?  Because liberalism and constitutional democracy are essentially 
universalistic in nature, the concept itself does not easily lead to the particularistic 
construction of national identity or state integration; otherwise, it becomes hard to 
explain why the United States and Canada, among many democracies, are not integrated 
into one country.  This is to suggest that whatever nationalists draw on to articulate the 
national formation, these “objective features” or democratic values/principles alone do 
not necessarily lead to a definite conclusion, be it reunification or independence. 
Taiwanese or Chinese nationalist discourses and the consequent political relationship 
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between Taiwan and China, in a large degree, are the subjective construction of 
nationalists who are motivated by their own political goals, and reunification with China 
or Taiwan independence should not be mistaken as an objective necessity.    
Finally, I want to point out that the nationalist discourses at the elite level do not 
automatically win the mass allegiance. Like Gellner said, nationalism is both an ideology 
and political movement.  While elites play the most significant role in the former, the 
perception and support of the masses are indispensable for the success of any nationalist 
movement. This chapter reviewed the nationalist discourses at the elite level in 
contemporary Taiwan. Next, chapter Three and Four will examine the complex 




Chapter 3:   Empirical Analysis of National Identification in Contemporary Taiwan 
---- General Trends and Socio-demographic Analysis 
 
 Chapter 2 discussed the meaning of "Taiwanese consciousness" (whether or not it 
is a 'nationalistic' identification), reviewed its historical development in three stages, and 
analyzed several nationalist discourses.  As the changes of national identity orientations 
not only occurred in the elite circles, but also among the general public, this chapter 
focuses on how the Taiwanese people, in contrast to the cultural-political elites, see 
themselves in national terms.   
 To the purpose, this chapter focuses on empirical surveys conducted in the last 
two decades to examine the variations of national identification and analyzes how these 
variations associated with relevant socio-demographic attributes -- such as age, ethnic 
background, education level, inter-marriage, and party identification.  Specifically, 
several empirical questions/issues are of central concerns: What do Taiwanese people see 
themselves in national terms, i.e., the sense of national belonging (Chinese identity vs. 
Taiwanese identity) and the political position toward the Taiwan-China relationship 
(Unification vs. Independence)? What is the trend of changes in the past two decades, and 
to what direction? Are there particular socio-demographic attributes linked to the changes 
of national orientations?  
 To answer these questions, this chapter is divided into two  major sections. The 
first section will present a descriptive analysis of national orientations focusing on the 
two dimensions of national identity - national identity and statehood preference-- at the 




second section further analyzes whether there are certain social profiles linked to the 
variations of different national identification.  Finally, in comparison to the socio-
demographic factors, two sets of attitude questions regarding the Taiwan's democracy 
and economic status will be added in cross-tabulation to examine if the changes were 
associated with these attitude factors.  
   
Survey Data, Variables, and Re-codification 
 The fourteen empirical survey data sets used for analysis in this chapter come 
from two sources in Taiwan: One is the Election Study Center of National Chengchi 
University, which includes the years of 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, TEDS 2001, TEDS2004, 
TEDS 2008, and TEDS2012
95
. The other source is the “Taiwan Social Change Survey” 
which includes the years of 1990, 1991, 1992, and 1995, administered by the Institute of 
Ethnology, the Academia Sinica. Among many other survey sources in the 1990s, these 
fourteen surveys were selected because of their structural compatibility: First, the 
questionnaires in each survey include both the dimensions of nationalistic identification--
the self-defined national consciousness (national identity) and the political attitude 
toward the relationship between Taiwan and the mainland China, the so-called 
reunification (tong)-independence (du) issue (or statehood preferences), as well as 
respondents’ socio-demographic attributes, all of these issues were designed with similar 
questionnaire format. Second, the respondents (from 20 years old and above) were all 
randomly sampled from the whole Taiwan area including Taipei city and Kaohusing city, 
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and each survey was administered through the face-to-face interviewing method.  With 
the same survey questionnaire structure, sampling coverage, and interviewing methods in 
each survey, I am able to compare the results for each surveys and look for the trend of 
changes in the last two decades.   
 
Sampling Method and Process 
 Through the method of probability sampling, the respondents were selected in the 
following procedure: First, all xiang (townships), xian (counties) and qu (districts) under 
the jurisdiction of Taiwan province were divided into different tiers according to their 
demographic characteristics and level of economic development.  After the numbers of 
samples were allotted according to the population proportion of these tiers, samples of 
townships, counties, and districts were drawn.  Next, after sequencing the cun (villages) 
and li (neighborhoods) of these townships, counties, and districts by the size of their 
population, samples of villages and neighborhoods were drawn equidistantly.  Finally, 
from the name lists of voters of each of these villages and neighborhoods, the equidistant 
sampling method was again applied to select individuals for interviews.  In the process, 




Variables and Re-codification 
 
1. National Identity 
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 In the surveys conducted by the Election Study Center in 1993, 1994, 1995, and 
1996, the question wording of national consciousness was: “In our society, some people 
identify themselves as ‘Taiwanese’, some people identify themselves as ‘Chinese’, still 
others identify themselves as ‘both Chinese and Taiwanese’. What do you identify 
yourself as?”  The "national identity" question was asked a little differently in the 1992 
and 1995 ‘Taiwan Social Change Survey’ conducted by the Institute of Ethnology: 
“There are several national identity claims in our society, which is your preference? (1) I 
am Taiwanese, (2) I am Chinese, (3) I am Taiwanese and also Chinese, (4) I am Chinese 
and also Taiwanese, and (5) other.”  For the purpose of consistency, the categories in the 
‘Taiwan Social Change Surveys’ are re-coded as: (1) Taiwanese identity, (2) dual 
identification, including ‘I am Taiwanese also Chinese’ and ‘I am Chinese and also 
Taiwanese’, and (3) Chinese identity. For the years of 1990 and 1991 “Social Change 
Survey”, respondents were asked whether they strongly agreed, agreed, disagreed, or 
strongly disagreed with the statement: “You are a Taiwanese, not a Chinese.”  I recoded 
the respondents into two categories: “Taiwanese identity’” (those who agree or strongly 
agree with the statement), and “Chinese identity’” (those who disagree or strongly 
disagree with the statement).  The option of dual identification was therefore not 
available in these two years.   
 
2. Statehood preferences 
 The Election Study Center asked the respondents of their preference toward the 
Taiwan-China relationship in 1993, 1994, 1995, and 1996 with the same wordings: 




viewpoints-- (1) China’s reunification as soon as possible, (2) maintaining the status quo 
now and pursue reunification later, (3) Taiwan independence as soon as possible, (4) 
maintaining the status quo now and pursue Taiwan independence later, (5) maintain the 
status quo now, whether reunification or independence, it depends, and, (6) maintain the 
status quo forever. What is your preference?”      
In the 1995 "Taiwan Social Change Survey," the question was asked: “As to the 
relationship between Taiwan and Mainland China, do you prefer Taiwan independence, 
China’s reunification, or the status quo?” In the year of 1990, 1991, and 1992, the 
preference of Taiwan-Mainland relationship was asked by two separate questions: first, 
“Do you agree that Taiwan should be independent from China and become a new state of 
its own?” and second, “Do you agree that Taiwan should be a part of China?” 
Respondents’ preferences were measured on a scale of five degrees: (1) strongly agree, (2) 
agree, (3) no opinion, (4) disagree, and (5) strongly disagree. 
Again, for the sake of consistency, I recode above response categories through 
cross tabulation methods into three common answers: (1) prefer Taiwan independence to 
either reunification or the status quo, (2) prefer the status quo to either independence or 
reunification, and (3) prefer reunification to either independence or the status quo. 
 
3. Socio-demographic variables 
 To better understand the variances of national identification at the individual level 
during the study periods, I chose three personal attributes among many other socio-
economic and socio-demographic variables in this research: ethnic background (i.e., the 




analysis, because they are important elements of social structure in Taiwan under its 
historical-political context.  These socio-demographic variables help to see whether or 
not, and to what extent, different national identifications correspond to certain social 
profiles. 
According to respondents’ provincial origins, three ethnic groups are identified in 
the analysis: First, “Minnan” (also known as “Fulao”) refers to those who migrated to 
Taiwan from the Fuchien province before 1945 and their offspring.  Second, same as 
Minnan, “Hakka” (literally the ‘Guest People’) migrated to Taiwan before 1945, but they 
came from mainly the Kaungtong province.  Third, the Mainlanders refer to those who 
entered into Taiwan society after 1949 and their next generations.  The first two ethnic 
groups (Minnan and Hakka) are also called “Ben-shen jen” (residents in Taiwan province) 
in comparison to the "Wai-shen jen" (coming from all other provinces in the mainland), 
or the Mainlanders.  These three ethnic groups constitute 98% of the total population in 
Taiwan.  Besides these three ethnic groups, approximate 2% of Taiwan’s population fare 
indigenous peoples, who can be further divided into nine sub-ethnic groups. Aborigines 
are excluded in the analysis, since the sample size was too small.  
As to the education level, the “Taiwan Social Change Survey” (1990, 1991, 1992 
and 1995), Institute of Ethnology, gave the respondents nineteen different categories  
from no schooling to graduate school.  Moreover, in the surveys conducted by the 
Election Study Center, in 1993, 1994, 1995, and 1996, respondents were given seven 
categories to match their education level: (1) no school, (2) elementary school, (3) junior 
high school, (4) high school and equivalent, (5) junior college, (6) college, and (7) 




recoded education levels into three broad categories: (1) lower education level (schooling 
years ≦ 6), (2) middle education level (6 ＜ schooling years ≦ 12), and (3) higher 
education level (schooling years ≧13).   
 Respondents’ ages were coded by their birth year (according to the Republic of 
China calendar) in all the questionnaires.  In this analysis, respondents’ ages were re-
coded into five generations: (1) 20-29, (2) 30-39, (3) 40-49, (4) 50-59, and (6) 60 and 
above.  As Taiwan was returned to the Republic of China in 1945, respondents under the 
age of 50 have no experience of Japanese colonial rule.   
 
National Identification Changes at the Aggregate Level 
 
The following empirical analysis demonstrates the status of national identification 
among the Taiwan public, in terms of their "national identity" (the senses of national 
belonging) and the statehood preferences (political attitudes toward the relationship 
between Taiwan and the mainland China) in the past two decades.   
 
National Identity: A General Trend  
 
Table 3.1 shows the distributions and changes of the sense of national belonging 
among the respondents in 1990s. Table 3.2 demonstrates the changes in the 2000s.  The 
following phenomena are worth noting: 
First, when the national identity was grouped into three self-defined categories --




the frequency distributions among them demonstrated a clear division of national 
orientations in the 1990s. For example, in 1992, about a quarter of respondents identified 
themselves as “Taiwanese” (23.7 percent), an equivalent portion (23.4 percent) identified 
themselves as “Chinese”, and about half of the respondents (49.7 percent) claiming a dual 
identities of both Chinese and Taiwanese.  From 1992 to 1996, the general distribution 
pattern of "dual identities" holders sustained, but there were opposite direction of 
variations in the first two groups, that is, Taiwanese identifiers increased from 23.7% to 
33.9%, while Chinese identifiers dropped from 23.4% to 16.8%. The exceptionally high 
percentages of Chinese identity in the year of 1990 and 1991, 79.9 percent and 75.2 
percent respectively, indicated a simple dichotomous Taiwanese/Chinese identification 
question when the “dual identification” (both Chinese and Taiwan) was not available to 
choose.  As the “dual identification” became available in the surveys from 1992 to 1996, 
we find that the actual Chinese identity percentages dropped sharply to less than 30%.  It 
suggests that the high percentages of Chinese identity in 1990 and 1991 were mixed with 
a certain amount of dual identity people.   
Table 3. 1  Changes of National Identity (1990-1996) 
National Identity 90/b 91/b 92/b 93/a 94/a 95/a 95/b 96/a 
Taiwanese    % 8.2 14.6 23.7 19.8 31.4 27.3 30.3 33.9 
Both             % n/a n/a 49.7 45.5 40.1 45.7 45.1 44.0 
Chinese        % 79.9 75.2 23.4 29.0 22.8 21.3 18.9 16.8 
No Opinion  % 11.8 10.2 3.1 5.7 5.7 5.6 5.8 5.4 
Total             n 2421 1139 1408 1523 1394 1083 2093 1396 
Notes: 1. Data sources are from the Election Study Center, National Chengchi University (marked as "a"); 
and "Taiwan Social Change Survey" project conducted by the Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica 





Second, while the distributions of dual identification remained relatively stable 
(around 45 percent of the respondents) in the 1990s, the percentages of Taiwanese 
identifiers and Chinese identifiers however changed significantly in the opposite direction.  
Respondents identifying with Taiwanese increased from 8.2 percent in 1990 to 33.9 
percent in 1996, at a rate of 75.8 percent [=(33.9 – 8.2)/ 33.9]; and, from 1992 to 1996, 
those who identified with Chinese dropped from 23.4 percent to 16.8 percent, at a rate of 
28.2 percent [=(23.4 – 16.8) / 23.4].  In the year 1992, the percentage distributions 
between these two groups were about the same, but four years later, the number of 
respondents who considered themselves Taiwanese (33.9 percent) increased up to two 
times over those who considered themselves Chinese (16.8 percent) in 1996.  The change 
clearly suggests that the number of people identifying themselves as Taiwanese is 
increasing, while the percentage of Chinese identifiers is declining in Taiwan.
97
  
Besides the three types of national identity, Table 3.1 also shows around 10 
percent of people who did not respond to the national identity question and thus were not 
able to categorize into the three existing types of national identity.  While these people 
are a minority in the society, this phenomenon suggests that the three types of national 
identity (national consciousness) —Taiwanese, Chinese, or both do not exhaust all the 
identity choices.   
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Table 3.2 shows a different trend of national identity from 2001 to 2012, in which 
Chinese identifiers have dropped to single digit, as low as 4.1 percent in 2012, while 
Taiwanese identifiers have increased from 37.8% (2001) to 58.2% (2012) and since 2004 
they become the majority in the society.  Like the Chinese identifiers, the number of dual 
identity holders also dropped in the past decade, and the percentages, for the first time, 
became lower than the Taiwanese identity since 2004, although the size of dual identities 
still remained as a significant portion, fluctuated between 37.7 to 53.4%, in the 
population.  The results represent a departure from the previous empirical surveys, in 
which the dual identities were the stable majority in the 1990s.  
 
Table 3. 2  Changes of National Identity (2001-2012) 
 2001 2004 2008 2012 
Chinese identity 8.8% 6.6% 5.0% 4.1% 
Dual Identity 53.4 46.4 40.7 37.7 
Taiwanese Identity 37.8 47.0 54.3 58.2 
Total n (Valid) 1957 1776 1863 1775 
Notes: 1. Data source is from "Taiwan Election and Democratization Study" (TEDS) Project conducted by 
the Election Study Center, National Chengchi University.2. The statistics are from author's own recoding 
and calculation.  
 
Statehood Preferences: A General Trend 
 
As it is shown in the Table 3.3 (the next page), from 1992 to 1996, the majority of 
respondents felt uncertain about Taiwan’s future and preferred the status quo to either 
reunification or independence (ranging from 40.6 percent to 59.2 percent).  As the ‘status 
quo’ of Taiwan does not have a clear meaning under the current historical-political 




great discrepancies of political, economic, and social systems between these two societies, 
on the one hand, and military threat of PRC toward the Taiwan independence on the other.  
Second, while the pro-status quo attitude remained  the stable majority over time, 
the relative development between independence-oriented and reunification-oriented 
attitudes in the first half of 1990s were significantly different.  The former had grown 
from as little as 3.4 percent in the 1990 to 17.7 percent in 1996, while the latter decreased 
from 70.7 percent in 1990 to only 21.5 percent in 1996.    
Third, the proportion of those who were unwilling to speak out or had no opinion 
toward the issue of statehood preferences, which fluctuated between 6.1 percent to 20.2 
percent, were relatively high in comparison to the national consciousness question, which 
hovered around five percent since 1992 (see Table 3.1).  It suggests that the preference 
toward the Taiwan-Mainland China relationship was a harder question than the self-
defined national identity for the respondents to answer. 
Table 3. 3  Statehood Preferences, 1990-1996 
Types of Attitudes 
Year of Survey 
90/b 91/b 92/b 93/a 
94/a 
95/a 95/b 96/a 
Pro-Unification 70.7 70.1 37.1 17.1 26.2 27.0 15.6 21.5 
Pro-Status Quo  18.3 18.2 40.6 59.2 43.6 42.2 53.6 44.6 
Pro-Independence 3.4 5.5 7.6 7.0 10.0 13.1 16.8 17.7 
No Opinion            7.6 6.1 14.6 16.7 20.2 17.7 14.0 16.3 
Total     n 2531 1139 1408 1523 1394 1083 2093 1396 






New Measurement of Statehood Preference under Favorable Conditions 
  
 Starting from 2001, the "Taiwan Election and Democratization Study" (TEDS) 
series surveys conducted by the "Election Study Center" at national Chengchi University 
modified the traditional "Unification vs. Independence" question (used in the 1990s) by 
adding two separate conditions on the unification vs. independence questions to disclose 
a truer preference on the statehood issue. Two new questions are: 
Preferable condition to Taiwan Independence:  Do you agree that if peace can 
be maintained, Taiwan should be an independent country? 1. Strongly agree; 2. 
agree; 3. disagree; 4. Strongly disagree; 96."depends";97. "no opinions"; 98. 
"don't know,"; 95. "refuse to answer".  
 
Preferable condition to China Unification: If Mainland China and Taiwan 
become politically, economically and socially compatible, do you agree that the 
two sides should unite? 1. Strongly agree; 2. Agree; 3. Disagree; 4. Strongly 




Table 3. 4  Four Types of Statehood Preferences under Favorable Conditions 
 Unification if no disparity 
Independence if peace can be 
maintained 
(Strongly) agree (Strongly) disagree Others* 
(Strongly) agree Both acceptable Independence only III 
(Strongly) disagree Unification only Neither acceptable VI 
Others* VII VIII IX 
Note: * includes "depends,", "no opinions," "don't know" and "refuse to answer" 
 I recoded the above two questions into a 3-categories answer (Agree, Disagree, 
and Others) and, through cross-tabulation, generate a new four types of statehood 




Independence acceptable; 3) Independence only, and 4) Neither Unification or 
Independence acceptable, as is shown in the Table 3.4. 
 Under the new measurement of statehood preferences, the results from the Table 
3.5 represent a significant departure from the previous one-dimenional 6 -category 
measurement used in the 1990s.  First, under the one-dimensional assumption, the 
sizeable statehood preference of "Both Unification and Independence Acceptable" 
(between 23.4% to 30.2% in the past decade) were not covered in most of the empirical 
surveys.  Second, like the national identity (Chinese vs. Taiwanese), the significant size 
of "Both Unification and Independence Acceptable" proves the traditional categories of 
statehood preferences (Unification vs. Independence) are not exclusive to each other.  
Moreover, this revised measurement can help to further delineate the "Status Quo" 
attitude from the previous studies into the "Both Unification and Independence 
Acceptable" and "Neither Unification nor Independence Acceptable" and lead to a truer 
attitude toward the "Unification" and "Independence".   
 
Table 3. 5  Four Types of Statehood Preferences (Unification vs. Independence) (2001-
2012) 





































Total N 1489 1456 1566 1530 




 Overall, the empirical observations from the above survey data in the last two 
decades are remarkable. It suggests a point of departure from the past during which the 
society was "believed" to be made up by only one nationality—Chinese. In addition, the 
results also suggest a big gap between the public preferences and the official nationalist 
ideology asserting Taiwan and China should be eventually reunified if not now. The next 
section will proceed to analyze the variations to learn more of how socio-demographic 
attributes are related to national identification changes.    
 
National Identity and Socio-demographic Attributes 
 
This section further examines further variations to see whether or not national 
orientations correspond to certain social profiles. Six national surveys in the 1990s and 
three socio-demographic variables are selected for analysis – ethnic background, age, and 
education level.   Table 3.9 to Table 3.16 demonstrates the results of cross-tabulation 
analysis between respondents’ socio-demographic backgrounds, national identity 
(Chinese vs. Taiwanese), and statehood preference (i.e., "Tong-Du" attitude) from 1992 
to 1996.  The same empirical analyses between 2001-12 are shown in Table 3.17 and 
Table 3.18. 
 
1. Ethnicity and National Identity 
 
 Table 3.6 shows the relationship between respondents’ ethnic background and 




Minnan group tended to identify more with “Taiwanese”, Mainlanders leaned to the 
“Chinese” identity, while the Hakka group stayed in the middle, i.e., less in the Chinese 
identity and higher in Taiwanese identity than the Mainlanders, on the one hand; and 
higher in Chinese identity and less in Taiwanese identity than the Minnan group in the 
two categories.  For example, in 1992, there were 30.5 percent Minnan respondents who 
identified with Taiwanese, the percentage among the Hakka group was 11.4 percent, and 
only 5.4 percent in the Mainlander group.  In contrast, the percentages of Chinese identity 
among the Minnan, Hakka, and Mainlanders were 17.2 percent, 34.7 percent, and 52.7 
percent respectively.  During the study periods, the relative distribution of national 
identity orientation among the three ethnic groups was quite similar.   
 





Year of Survey 
92/b 93/a 94/a 95/a 95/b 96/a 
Minnan* 
 
Taiwanese % 30.5% 26.5% 37.8% 32.8% 38.0% 41.2% 
Both % 52.3 50.3 44.5 51.3 48.0 46.6 
Chinese % 17.2 23.2 17.6 15.9 14.0 12.2 




Taiwanese % 11.4 15.8 30.1 31.1 29.1 32.0 
Both % 54.0 48.0 36.4 44.3 50.9 43.8 
Chinese % 34.7 36.3 33.6 24.5 20.0 24.2 
Mainlander* 
 
Taiwanese % 5.4 1.1 4.5 5.2 8.1 8.4 
Both % 41.9 38.5 38.3 36.6 43.1 48.5 
Chinese %   52.7 60.4 57.1 58.2 48.8 43.1 
 Total n 1358 1421 1296 1006 1928 1313 
Note: * Pearson Chi-square significance level less than 0.05 
Source: a) Election Study Center, National Chengchi University, b) ‘Social Change Survey’ conducted by 
the Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica. The statistics are calculated by the author. 
 
Two other interesting findings: First, from 1992 to 1996, the growth of Taiwanese 




percent in 1992 to 32 percent in 1996); in contrast, the respondents in the Minnan group 
increased about 11 percent towards Taiwanese identity, and the Mainlanders had only 3 
percent increase in the same category.   Also, the Hakka group had the most significant 
change (from 34.7 percent in 1992 to 24.2 percent in 1996) in the Chinese identity.  It 
suggests that the Hakka group were less stable, relative to the Mainlanders and the 
Minnan group, in their national identity orientation.     
Second, dual identity was claimed by the majority of respondents in the Minnan 
and Hakka groups (more or less around 50 percent), while the portion of dual identity 
was lower to the Chinese identity among the Mainlanders, except in the 1996 research 
year.  As the dual identification in this analysis was recorded by the combination of those 
who think “I am Taiwanese and also Chinese” and those who think “I am Chinese and 
also Taiwanese,” distinguishing the relative weight between Taiwanese identity and 
Chinese identity for the respondents in the recoded category is difficult.  However, if we 
look at the relative distribution between Taiwanese identity and Chinese identity for each 
ethnic group, it seems not unreasonable to say that the Minnan respondents with dual 
identification tended to put more weight on the Taiwanese identity part, the Mainlanders 
with dual identification more on the Chinese identity part.   The results in the Hakka 
group were somewhat mixed, since the relative distribution between Taiwanese identity 
and Chinese identity reversed over the years studied.  
Over all, the cross-tabulation analysis of ethnicity and national identity suggests 
that national identity orientations among the Taiwan public were divided along ethnic 
lines.  The statistical measure, that is, the Pearson Chi-square value, confirms the 




2. Ethnicity and Statehood Preferences 
 
 The results in the Table 3.7 also suggest a clear distinction in statehood 
preferences along the ethnic lines.  Respondents in the Minnan group were more 
independence-oriented than the Hakka group and Mainlanders.  Mainlanders were more 
likely to take reunification-oriented position, and the Hakka group stayed in the middle.  
From 1992 to 1996, the portions of pro-independence attitudes among the respondents in 
the Minnan group were always higher than those in the Hakka group and Mainlanders.  
Over time, the gap became even bigger with high growing rate of the pro-independence 
position among the Minnan and Hakka groups: in 1992, the percentages of pro-
independence attitude among the Minnan, Hakka and Mainlanders were 10.9 percent, 4.4 
percent, and 3.2 percent respectively; four years later, the Minnan group increased up to 
24.7 percent in the pro-independence position (with 14 percent increase), the Hakka 
increased up to 16.3 percent (with 12 percent increase), but the Mainlanders grew only up 
to 8.6 percent (with 5.4 percent increase).  In other words, the overall increase of pro-
independence attitude in the society (see Table 2) came mostly from the Minnan and 
Hakka groups.   
Although pro-reunification attitude fluctuated over the years in all three ethnic 
groups, the majority of Mainlanders (58 percent on average) still preferred reunification 
to either the status quo or independence position.  By contrast, the pro-reunification 
position gained less than a quarter support (22.9 percent on average) in the Minnan group 
and less than one third (29.6 percent on average) in the Hakka group.  Over time, the 




In 1992, 48.6 percent of Hakka respondents supported reunification.  The portion dropped 
by 20.3 percent in 1996, with 28.3 percent of them having pro-reunification position.  
During the same period, the Minnan group and Mainlanders decreased their pro-
reunification support by 17.6 percent and 17 percent, respectively. 
 
Table 3. 7  Ethnicity and Statehood Preferences, 1990-1996 
Ethnicity  Tong/Du 
Attitude 
Year of Survey 
90/b 91/b 92/b 93/a 94/a 95/a 95/b 96/a 
Minnan* Pro-Du 3.9% 7.4% 10.9% 10.5% 14.9% 18.0% 23.0% 24.7% 
Status Quo 22.2 21.4 52.3 74.9 56.5 57.3 63.3 56.2 
Pro-Tong 73.9 71.2 36.8 14.6 28.6 24.7 13.7 19.2 
          
Hakka* Pro-Du 4.7 1.6 4.4 5.7 8.7 16.7 19.0 16.3 
Status Quo 17.4 17.1 47.0 74.2 66.1 44.4 64.6 55.4 
Pro-Tong 77.9 81.4 48.6 20.1 25.2 38.9 16.4 28.3 
          
Mainland* Pro-Du 0.3 1.5 3.2 2.9 4.1 5.3 5.6 8.6 
Status Quo 8.6 9.8 22.8 48.6 33.6 26.0 57.2 34.4 
Pro-Tong 91.0 88.7 74.1 48.6 62.3 68.7 37.2 57.1 
Total   N 2317 1050 1196 1255 1099 876 1761 1164 
 43.65* 25.31* 81.92* 109.1* 74.32* 98.33* 108.2* 107.8* 
Note: * Pearson Chi-square significance level less than 0.05 
 
On the other hand, the pro-status quo position gained most support from the 
Minnan and Hakka groups—on average, there were more than 60 percent of Minnan and 
58 percent of Hakka respondents preferred the status quo to either reunification or 
independence.  The portion of pro-status quo position among Mainlanders was far less 
than the above two ethnic groups, with only 37.1 percent on average from 1992 to 1996.   
Another interesting finding is that Mainlanders in Taiwan were more likely to 
support reunification with China than were Minnan and Hakka respondents to support 




Mainlanders is higher than that of supporting independence among the Minnan and 
Hakka group. 
 
3. Age Groups and National Identity  
 
 Table 3.8 shows the results of cross-tabulation analysis between three types of 
national identity orientation and five different age groups.  According to the statistical 
measure, that is, Pearson Chi-square test, national identity orientations among the 
respondents were significantly differentiated by their age.  During the study periods, the 
following observations are worth noting:  
 First, the portion of Taiwanese identity was found higher in the older age groups 
than the younger generations.  Take the year 1992, the percentages of Taiwanese identity’ 
among the five age groups were 10.8 percent (age 20-29), 25.6 percent (age 30-39), 24.5 
percent (age 40-49), 36.2 percent (age 50-59), and 36.8 percent (age 60 and above).  Over 
the years, a similar pattern remained along with the relative distribution of Taiwanese 
identity among the five age groups.  However, it should be noted that, while the older 
generations tended to identify more as ‘Taiwanese’ than the younger ones, the growth 
rate of ‘Taiwanese identity’ was higher in the younger age groups.  For example, from 
1992 to 1996, the portion of people with “Taiwanese identity” increased 13.3 percent (= 
24.1% - 10.8%) in the 20-29 age group and 18.9 percent (= 43.4% - 24.5%) in the 40-49 
age group, while there were only 6.3 percent and 4.3 percent increase in the 50-59 age 






Table 3. 8  Age Groups and National Consciousness, 1992-1996 
Age Group  National 
Identity 
Year of Survey 
92/b 93/a 94/a 95/a 95/b 96/a 
20-29* Taiwanese     
         
10.8 14.8 22.9 24.4 24.9 24.1 
Both 
               
58.4 58.7 55.2 51.3 51.7 59.0 
Chinese 
                 
30.8 26.5 21.9 24.4 23.5 16.9 
30-39* Taiwanese         




                          
51.3 54.3 44.9 60.0 53.6 49.8 
Chinese     
               
23.1 25.9 24.0 15.2 17.8 18.4 
40-49* Taiwanese      
            
24.5 29.5 35.5 35.0 36.4 43.4 
Both   
                    
52.1 36.9 43.8 45.1 49.8 44.5 
Chinese 
                         
23.4 33.6 20.8 19.9 13.8 12.1 
50-59* 
 
Taiwanese   
                  
36.2 22.8 36.8 24.0 44.4 42.5 
Both     
                    
43.2 45.1 41.7 49.0 39.3 43.0 
Chinese   
                     
20.5 32.0 21.5 26.9 16.4 14.5 
60 +* Taiwanese  
                  
36.8 19.5 39.8 34.0 31.9 41.1 
Both      
                      
45.3 41.0 28.4 32.5 34.2 32.9 
Chinese    
                     
17.9 39.5 31.8 33.5 33.9 26.0 
Total n............                                1364 1436 1315 1022 1970 1321 
Note: * Pearson Chi-square significance level less than 0.05 
 
 Second, the generational difference towards the Chinese identity’ among the five 
age groups was different from that of ‘Taiwanese identity’ shown above, and it was not 
as consistent as the latter.  On the one hand, the portion of Chinese identity in the first 
four age groups decreased over time, except for the eldest age group in which ‘Chinese 
identity’ increased.  On the other hand, as the Chinese identity percentages varied 
irregularly over the years studied, it is hard to conclude a definite pattern.  Having that 




a general trend that younger generations tended to identify themselves more with Chinese 
than their older counterparts, especially when we take the portion of dual identity (both 
Taiwanese and Chinese) into account – in which category the younger age groups had a 
higher percentage.  
 Third, it is interesting to find that the eldest age group had the most divided 
national orientations.  For instance, as it is shown in the 1994, 1995, and 1996 surveys, 
the three types of national identity were distributed in a relatively equal portion among 
the respondents who were sixty years and older.  The reason for this might be related to 
the ethnicity and their growing experiences.   I will further examine the issues through 
double cross-tabulation between age and ethnicity to national identification. (see Table 
3.15 and Table 3.16) 
 
4. Age and Statehood Preferences 
 
 The distributions of statehood preferences (Tong-Du attitude) among five 
different age groups are shown in Table 3.9.  While the majorities in each age group were 
those who preferred the status quo to either reunification or independence, there were 
some generational gaps that should be noted:  
 First, the pro-independence position gained more strength among respondents in 
the middle age groups (from age 40 to 59) than the younger generation (from age 20-39) 
and the eldest age group (age 60 and above).  The percentage growth of pro-
independence attitude was also found higher in the middle age groups.  For example, 
from 1992 to 1996, the respondents in the 40-49 age group who took pro-independence 




the percentage growth in the youngest and the eldest age groups were 12.7 percent and 
6.2 percent, respectively. 
 Second, the pro-unification position was found higher in both the younger and the 
eldest respondents, but lower in the middle age groups. Why did this come about? One 
might speculate that it is a natural result of life-cycle phenomena.  For example, before 
one gets sufficient experience, one’s attitudes are still subject to change.  The youngest 
group may thus still carry values they had learned in school.  Taiwan schools do not 
provide information encouraging Taiwan independence; on the contrary, most of the 
material circulated among teenagers emphasizes the value of reunification.  Therefore, 
the value of unification instilled by schools may still dominate the younger generation’s 
attitudes.  
 
Table 3. 9  Age and Statehood Preferences, 1990-1996 
Age Group Tong / Du 
Attitude 
Year of Survey 
90/b 91/b 92/b 93/a 94/a 95/a 95/b 96/a 
20-29* Pro-Du 3.1% 3.2% 6.2% 6.4% 9.9% 15.5% 15.6% 18.9% 
Status Quo 16.0 17.7 42.0 72.5 47.0 57.4 68.4 56.3 
Pro-Tong 80.9 79.1 51.8 21.1 43.1 27.1 15.9 24.8 
30-39* Pro-Du 4.1 7.5 8.0 9.9 11.6 15.5 18.2 19.7 
Status Quo 19.5 21.9 53.3 73.6 57.7 54.2 64.7 51.6 
Pro-Tong 76.4 70.6 38.7 16.5 30.7 30.3 17.1 28.6 
40-49* Pro-Du 3.8 8.3 8.2 10.0 14.0 17.9 21.8 24.1 
Status Quo 24.8 17.6 44.5 70.0 61.2 54.5 62.2 60.6 
Pro-Tong 71.4 74.1 47.3 20.0 24.8 27.7 16.0 15.3 
50-59* Pro-Du 2.7 3.4 15.4 8.7 19.8 18.3 26.8 28.9 
Status Quo 22.7 21.5 53.3 73.3 52.3 48.8 59.1 52.8 
Pro-Tong 74.6 75.2 31.3 18.0 27.9 32.9 14.1 18.3 
60 +* Pro-Du 5.2 9.8 10.8 6.3 10.3 13.0 17.6 17.0 
Status Quo 19.4 14.8 40.9 63.5 46.7 35.6 52.2 41.5 
Pro-Tong 75.4 75.4 48.4 30.2 43.0 51.4 30.2 41.5 
Total n..... 2338 970 1202 1269 1113 891 1799 1169 





5. Education and National Identity 
 
 The relationship between respondents’ educational level and national identity, 
shown in the Table 3.10 (see next page), demonstrates the following points:   
 First, from 1992 to 1996, the percentages of Taiwanese identity were found higher 
in the group with lower educational level—more than two times as much as that in the 
higher educational group.  For example, in 1992, the Taiwanese identity distribution 
among the lower, middle, and higher education groups was 40.2 percent, 17.8 percent, 
and 10.2  percent, respectively.  Four years later, in 1996, the Taiwanese identity portion 
of the lower education group rose to 50 percent, while there was only 25 percent 
Taiwanese identity in the higher educational group.  That is to say, the lower the 
educational level, the higher the Taiwanese identification.   
 On the other hand, the trend of Chinese identity distribution was precisely the 
opposite: the lower the educational level, the lower the Chinese identification.  For 
example, in 1992, the distribution of Chinese identity among the three education groups 
was: 13.8 percent in the lower education group, 27.4 percent in the middle group, and 
36.2 percent in the higher education group.  The distribution pattern sustained over the 
years, as it is shown in Table 7b, which compares the subgroup means in terms of 
national identity—the lower the educational level, the lower the scores of national 
identity (closer to Taiwanese identity); the higher the education level, the higher the 
scores of national identity (closer to Chinese identification).  In other words, the 




Taiwanese identity and low Chinese identity, and that the higher educational groups had a 
higher percentage of Chinese identity and lower Taiwanese identity. 
 Third, for the respondents with the middle educational level, the percentages 
between Taiwanese identity and Chinese identity were distributed more closely; however, 
there existed some changes across years: in 1992 and 1993, the Taiwanese identity 
portion was lower than Chinese identity portion in this group; since 1994, the former 
became higher than the latter by 1.7 percent in 1994 to 9.6 percent in 1996. 
 





Year of Survey 























































































































Total N.......... 1363 1429 1307 1011 1969 1313 
Note: * Pearson Chi-square significance level less than 0.05 
 
Over time, the gap between Taiwanese identity and Chinese identity in the lower 
education group became larger. For example, in 1992, Taiwanese identity portion was 




35.1 percent in 1996.  By contrast, the gap between these two identities in the higher 
education group decreased over time; and, up to 1996, the Chinese identity portion 
became even lower than Taiwanese identity.  Taiwanese identity grew more significantly 
in the higher education, with 14.6 percent growth, than the other two education groups, 
which increased around 10 to 12 percent.  In addition, the higher education group also 
dropped more heavily in the Chinese identity: from 36.2 percent in 1992 to 17.3 percent 
in 1996, with near 20 percent decrease in four years.  Compared to lower and middle 
education groups, the respondents in the higher education level seemed to account for the 
most variations of national orientation over the years.   
 
6. Education and Statehood Preferences 
 
 The results in the Table 3.11 show the distributions among respondents from three 
different education levels.  According to the Pearson Chi-square measure, the differences 
among three education groups in the Tong-Du attitude were significant only in the years 
of 1992 and 1994.  Still, there are some distinctions that can be identified.  
 First, the reunification-oriented attitude gained more support from the respondents 
with a higher education level.  For example, in 1992, the portion of pro-Tong attitude 
among lower, middle, and higher education groups was 31.7 percent, 41.9 percent, and 
64.3 percent respectively.  The trend of relative distribution sustained over the years—
from 1992 to 1996, the higher the education level was, the higher the pro-Tong attitude.  
By contrast, the lower education groups tended to have higher a percentage of pro-status 




in the lower and middle education groups was 60.1 percent and 57.9 percent, while the 
higher education group had only 49.1 percent on average.  While the majority in each 
education group preferred the status quo, the relative higher percentage in the lower and 
middle education groups suggests that respondents with lower education level were less 
certain about their attitude toward the relationship between Taiwan and Mainland.  
 





Year Of Survey 
90/b 91/b 92/b* 93/a 94/a* 95/a 95/b 96/a 
Lower Pro-Du 3.1% 6.4% 12.1% 8.5% 12.9% 16.7% 20.5% 21.9% 
Status Quo 28.5 23.9 56.2 72.5 60.9 53.9 60.9 56.2 
Pro-Tong 68.4 69.7 31.7 19.0 26.1 29.5 18.6 21.9 
Middle Pro-Du 4.0 5.4 8.4 8.0 10.5 17.1 19.1 19.5 
Status Quo 18.1 17.8 49.7 73.4 56.0 51.9 62.3 54.2 
Pro-Tong 77.9 76.8 41.9 18.6 33.5 31.0 18.5 26.2 
Higher Pro-Du 3.9 6.9 5.1 9.5 16.9 12.8 19.2 23.2 
Status Quo 11.8 17.2 30.7 63.5 40.9 47.3 64.4 48.1 
Pro-Tong 84.4 76.0 64.3 27.0 42.2 39.9 16.4 28.7 
Total n..... 2338 1053 1201 1264 1109 883 1796 1165 
   73.9* 10.1 27.2* 7.08 1.68 6.55 
Note: * Pearson Chi-square significance level less than 0.05 
 
 On the other hand, we see a different trend of changes in the Tong-Du attitudes 
along the education levels over time: (1) The pro-independence attitude gained support 
by 9.8 percent in the lower education group, 11.1 percent in the middle education group, 
and 18.1 percent in the higher education group, (2) the pro-reunification attitude was 




significantly---from 64.3 percent in the 1992 to 28.7 percent in 1996.  Taken together, it 
seems that the higher education group accounted most for the overall variations of Tong-
Du attitude during the years studied.  
 In sum, the empirical surveys helped to depict a general social profile for the 
various national orientations and political attitudes: Taiwanese identity was found higher 
in the groups with Minnan ethnic background, older generations, and lower education 
level.  In contrast, Chinese identity was associated more with the higher education groups, 
younger generations, and Mainlanders.  As to the attitude towards the political 
relationship between Taiwan and the Mainland, the pro-reunification position gained 
more support from Mainlanders, younger generations, and higher education groups, while 
the pro-independence position gained more support from people with Minnan ethnic 
background, older generations, and lower education groups. 
 However, the social configuration in the national orientations is not fixed; from 
1992 to 1996, we have seen some changes.  For example, Taiwanese identity grew 
significantly in the younger generations; higher education groups increasingly polarized 
their views on the Tong-Du issue; the percentage change from Chinese identity to 
Taiwanese identity was found higher in the Hakka group than in others.   There are more 
changes to be found if we further take the interaction effect among the three socio-
demographic variables into account.  In the following, I would like to further analyze the 
interaction effect between ethnicity and age on national identity orientation and Tong-Du 
attitude to answer two questions: Do younger Mainlanders differ from older Mainlanders 
on their national identity orientation?  Are there any differences between younger 




 It is worth noting that the ethnic background is most significant in the older 
generations who had extremely different experiences in their life.  As the older Minnan 
and Hakka groups had different living experiences from that of older Mainlanders—the 
former had experienced Japanese colonial ruling while the latter had not—it could be 
argued that they tend to have different national identity orientations.  In addition, it is also 
interesting to know whether there were differences toward national identity orientation 
among younger generations with different ethnic backgrounds. Table 3.12 compares the 
results between 1992 and 1996.  
 
7. Cross-Tabulation: Ethnicity, Generation, and National Identity 
 
 Three comparisons are made: (1) generational differences in national identity 
orientation for each ethnic group; (2) generational differences across ethnic groups; and 
(3) the differences over the years studied.  Taking together all three comparisons, I would 
like to emphasize the following observations. 
 First, the most significant generational differences toward the self-defined 
national identity were found in the Minnan group, in which the younger generations had a 
clearly lower percentage in Taiwanese identity and higher in Chinese identity than the 
older generations.  For example, in 1992, the youngest Minnan respondents (age 20-29) 
had only 12.8 percent of Taiwanese identity, while there was more than 50 percent of the 
eldest (age 60 and above) who identified with Taiwanese.  On the other hand, the eldest 
Minnan group had only 3.6 percent of Chinese identity, but there was nearly a quarter 




Second, across different ethnic groups, the older generations tended to have most 
opposite national identity orientations.  For example, among the respondents with age 60 
and above, there was 51.2 percent of the Minnan group identifying with Taiwanese, but 
there was none of them identifying with Taiwanese in the Hakka and Mainlander groups.  
And, while there was 66.7 percent Chinese identity from the Mainlanders aged 60 and 
above, the percentage from the Minnan group in the same age category was only 3.6 
percent. 
 Third, over time, the national identity orientation changed mostly in the younger 
generations.  For example, from 1992 to 1996, the portion of Taiwanese identity among 
the youngest Minnan group increased from 12.8 percent to 26.8 percent; during the same 
period, Chinese identity dropped from 24.8 percent to 12.7 percent.  Since the dual 
identity decreased slightly less than 2 percent, the variations suggest that there was 
around 12 percent of the youngest Minnan group changed their national identity from 
Chinese to Taiwanese.  At the same time, there was about 18 percent of the youngest 
Hakka group changed from Chinese identity to Taiwanese identity.  However, the most 



















Table 3. 12  Ethnicity, Generation, and National Consciousness: 1992/b 
Ethnicity Generation National Identity N 
n 
 
Taiwanese Both Chinese 
Minnan 20-29 12.8 62.4 24.8 242 
 30-39 31.6 50.7 17.7 282 
 40-49 30.7 52.7 16.6 205 
 50-59 43.2 43.8 13.1 176 
 60 + 51.2 45.2 3.6 84 
Hakka 20-29 4.9 53.7 41.5 41 
 30-39 12.3 56.9 30.8 65 
 40-49 14.3 46.9 38.8 49 
 50-59 17.1 54.3 28.6 35 
 60 + 0 66.7 33.3 12 
Mainland 20-29 6.0 42.0 52.0 50 
 30-39 9.8 47.1 43.1 51 
 40-49 0 54.8 45.2 31 
 50-59 7.1 7.1 85.7 14 
 60 + 0 33.3 66.7 21 
Entire population 24.5 51.3 24.2 1364 
 
 
Ethnicity, Generation, and National Consciousness: 1996/a 
Minnan 20-29 26.8 60.6 12.7 213 
 30-39 37.4 49.8 12.8 227 
 40-49 47.8 42.6 9.6 209 
 50-59 45.0 43.8 11.3 160 
 60 + 53.5 31.4 15.1 159 
Hakka 20-29 23.3 53.5 23.3 43 
 30-39 26.8 43.9 29.3 41 
 40-49 38.2 44.1 17.6 34 
 50-59 34.5 44.8 20.7 29 
 60 + 41.9 29.0 29.0 31 
Mainland 20-29 9.1 57.6 33.3 33 
 30-39 6.8 54.5 38.6 44 
 40-49 5.0 65.0 30.0 20 
 50-59 0 0 100 4 
 60 + 10.6 37.9 51.5 66 








8. Cross-Tabulation: Ethnicity, Generation, and Statehood Preferences 
  
 The cross-relationship between ethnicity and age generation on the statehood 
preferences in the Table 3.13 shows the generational differences in the Tong-Du attitude 
were most considerable in the Minnan group, in which younger generations were more 
likely to take a pro-reunification position, the pro-independence position gained more 
support from the older generations, and the pro-status quo attitude was quite evenly 
distributed among all generations.  In comparison, there were not many consistent 
generational differences in the Hakka group and Mainlanders toward the pro-
independence or pro-reunification position. 
 Second, the older generations seemed to have most differentiated viewpoints 
toward the reunification/independence issue along the ethnic line.  The sharp difference 
was between the older Minnan and Mainlanders, while the Hakka stayed in the middle.  
For example, in 1992, the older Minnan respondents (age 50 and above) had only around 
30 percent of pro-unification attitude, but more than 90 percent of older Mainlanders (age 
50 and above) took the position.  The pro-status quo position gained more than 50 percent 
support from the former group, but the portion in the older Mainlanders was only 10 
percent.   
 Over time, the variations of Tong-Du attitude in the five generations display 
another picture along the ethnic line: (1) From 1992 to 1996, the portion of pro-
unification attitude among the youngest Minnan respondents dropped by 24.6 percent--- 
about half of them changing to a pro-independence position, the other half to a pro-status 




the pro-status quo position and only a few changed to a pro-independence position.  (2) 
Unlike the younger generations, a greater percentage of the older Minnan respondents 
(aged 50 and above) changed their attitude toward the pro-independence position from 
pro-reunification in four years.  Most of the older Mainlander respondents, however, 
changed to the pro-status quo instead of the pro-independence position during the same 
period.  (3) The Hakka respondents in the middle age group changed with a high 
proportion to the pro-status quo position, while the younger and the eldest age groups 
changed more to the pro-independence position. 
 Overall, it is interesting to note that the younger generations in all three ethnic 
groups decreased their support for unification by a similar percentage (more or less 
around 25 percent) in four years.  However, the Minnan respondents distributed the 
change evenly to pro-independence and pro-status quo positions, the Hakka respondents 
heavily leaned to the pro-independence position, while the younger Mainlanders chose 













Table 3. 13 Ethnicity, Generation, and Statehood Preferences 1992/b 
Ethnicity Generation 
Statehood Preferences (Tong-Du Attitude) Sample 
n 
 Pro-Du Pro-Status Quo Pro-Tong 
Minnan 20-29 6.8 46.4 46.8 220 
 30-39 9.4 56.5 34.1 255 
 40-49 11.4 48.0 40.6 175 
 50-59 17.0 59.6 23.4 141 
 60 + 15.6 51.6 32.8 64 
Hakka 20-29 2.5 47.5 50.0 40 
 30-39 3.3 53.3 43.3 60 
 40-49 2.1 45.8 52.1 48 
 50-59 15.4 38.5 46.2 26 
 60 + 0 33.3 66.7 9 
Mainland 20-29 4.3 17.4 78.3 46 
 30-39 6.1 36.7 57.1 49 
 40-49 0 21.9 78.1 32 
 50-59 0 9.1 90.9 11 
 60 + 0 10.0 90.0 20 
 
 
Ethnicity, Generation, and Statehood Preferences: 1996/a 
Minnan 20-29 19.8 58.0 22.2 212 
 30-39 23.4 55.5 21.1 218 
 40-49 27.4 58.9 13.7 197 
 50-59 31.8 52.7 15.5 110 
 60 + 24.5 52.0 23.5 98 
Hakka 20-29 19.0 57.1 23.8 42 
 30-39 15.0 47.5 37.5 40 
 40-49 10.0 73.3 16.7 28 
 50-59 21.4 57.1 21.4 28 
 60 + 15.4 42.3 42.3 26 
Mainland 20-29 12.9 41.9 45.2 31 
 30-39 6.8 34.1 59.1 44 
 40-49 15.0 55.0 30.0 20 
 50-59 0 25.0 75.0 4 
 60 + 6.3 25.0 68.8 64 
Note: ‘Sample n’ column shows valid cases in each category. 
Source: (a) refers to data source from Election Study Center, National Chengchi University;  (b) refers to 
data source from Taiwan Social Change Survey conducted by the Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica. 









Table 3. 14  National Identity and Socio-demographic Factors, 2001-2012 
  National Identity (2001) 





























































  National Identity (2004) 





























































  National Identity (2008) 





















































































































































Table 3. 15  Statehood Preferences and Socio-demographic Variables: 2001-2012 
  New Statehood Preference  in 2001 





































































  New Statehood Preference in 2004 






































































  New Statehood preference in 2008  









































































  New Statehood Preference in 2012  















































































The empirical surveys in the first half of 1990s suggest that the Taiwanese public 
was divided along with the two constituting dimensions of national identification – the 
sense of national belonging ("national identity") and the attitude toward China unification 
versus Taiwanese independence ("statehood preferences). On each dimension, Taiwanese 
people's national orientations changed over time and varied along with three important 
individual socio-demographic variables -- ethnic origins, education level, and age 
generation. Through the cross tabulation analysis, a broad social profile for the various 




with Minnan ethnic background, older generations, and lower education level. In contrast, 
Chinese identity was associated more with the higher education group, younger 
generations, and Mainlanders. As to the attitude towards the political relationship 
between Taiwan and Mainland China, the pro-reunification position gained more support 
from Mainlanders, younger generations, and higher education groups, while the pro-
independence position had more support from people who were from Minnan ethnic 
background, in older generations, and the lower education level. 
Among the three socio-demographic variables, the individual ethnic background 
serves as the key attribute and is highly related to people’s national orientation. The 
impact of education on individual’s national identification and attitude toward the 
Taiwan-China relationship is relatively minor. The result seems to confirm with the 
development of ethnic nationalism stressing the important role played by the ethnie.
98
 
(See Smith 1991, 1992) Nonetheless, as the empirical surveys also demonstrated that 
national orientations vary among respondents across different ethnic backgrounds, 
education levels and age generations, it suggests that the changes of national orientations 
among the public can only be partially explained by these socio-demographic variables.     
 Here it is suffice to say, the re-conceptualization of national identity has allowed 
to see a more comprehensive picture of national identification among Taiwan populace 
and helps to demonstrate a complicated change patterns that cannot be revealed in the 
previous one-dimensional studies. More importantly, several new empirical findings on 
the changing patterns and contradictory results between aggregate and individual levels 
open a new theoretical possibility for us to explore the direction of changes. 
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Chapter 4:  National Identification in Contemporary Taiwan  -- Internal Dynamics 
and Change Patterns 
  
 Chapter 3 illustrates the transformation of Taiwan people’s national identification 
at the aggregate level and conducts cross tabulation analysis that demonstrates the socio-
demographic profiles under the massive changes. There are however several puzzling 
phenomena left unexplored in the earlier studies, such as the rise and fall of "Dual 
identities" (people identified themselves as "both Chinese and Taiwanese"), the divergent 
rationales behind the national identity and statehood preferences, and the various national 
identity change patterns (such as the stability and consistency between national identity 
and statehood preferences) in the past two decades.  This chapter further addresses these 
issues by focusing on the internal dynamics of national identity changes during the 
transition periods, especially at the individual level, which were not paid enough attention 
in previous studies.    
 Specifically, three aspects of internal dynamics of national identification changes 
are to be explored in this chapter:  first, two stages of Chinese identity decline through 
the change analysis of the "Dual identities"; second, the relative stability and consistency 
between national identity and statehood preferences at the individual level; third, the 
dynamic changes between national identity and statehood preferences -- various changing 
patterns and directions --  which were hidden under the general trends of change in the 





Two-stage decline of Chinese identity 
 
 Many studies have presented the general trends of national identity changes in the 
past two decades, but the dynamics of internal changes and various change patterns 
underlying the general trends are not paid enough attention.  Unlike previous researches, 
this research assumes that ethnic and civic national identification are not mutually 
exclusive concepts; instead, they can work together to define and redefine people's 
national identity.  During the transition periods, through different considerations people 
defined themselves between these two mechanisms, therefore we would expect to see 
various forms and changing patterns of national identification.  
 This section revisits four sets of independent survey data as well as TEDS 2012 
panel data used in the Chapter 3 to further explore the internal dynamics of national 
identity changes.  Focusing on the changes of "dual identities", it is argued that the rise of 
one type of identity (e.g., Taiwanese identity) does not necessarily lead to the decline of 
the other type of identity (e.g., Chinese identity).  Depending on how people reconciled 
the two different underlying identity formation mechanisms, ethnic vs. civic, we expect 
to see some people, at least in the early transition period, embraced new identity 
(Taiwanese identity) while still kept the existing identity (Chinese identity), other people 
dropped the old identity and changed directly to a new identity. 
  In Chapter 3, we see the general trends of rising Taiwanese identity and decline 
Chinese identity in the past two decades.  The percentages of respondents who claimed 




the Chinese identity percentages decreased from 79.9% in 1990 to a single digit (4.1%) in 
2012. (See Table 4.1 below)  Indeed, the sharp contrast of percentage changes between 
Chinese identity and Taiwanese identity is the principal trend that illustrates the changes 
of national identity in Taiwan; however, we also noticed that there are a significant part 
of people who claimed "both Chinese and Taiwanese identities" (Dual identities) during 
the same periods.  In the 1990s, the percentages of people who claimed the "Dual 
identities" increased to nearly half of the population, fluctuated between 40.1 to 49.7%, 
and reached the highest point of 53.4% in 2001.  Since then, "Dual identities" began to 
decrease in the past decade.  The result in the Table 1 shows the size of the Dual 
identities has dropped to only 37.7% in 2012.  
 As the "Dual identities" refer to people who consider themselves as both Chinese 
and Taiwanese, a closer look of their fluctuations in the past decade would help to 
understand better the dynamic changes of "Chinese" identity.  Table 4.2 (see below) uses 
the TEDS 2012 original panel data to compare the four-year changes of "dual identities" 
from the same respondents between 2008 and 2012. 
Table 4. 1  National Identity (Chinese identity vs. Taiwanese identity) (2001-2012) 




























Total N (Valid) 1957 1776 1863 1775 
Data Source: TEDS 2001-12 from the Election Study Center, National Chengchi University. The statistics 
are author's own recording and calculation. 
 
 The results of Table 4.2 (see below) present two types of decreases of the 




(2008) to Taiwanese (2012) indicate that there are 26.2% of respondents with Dual 
identities in 2008 dropped the "Chinese" component and turned into Taiwanese identity 
only.  Second, there are 20% of respondents with Chinese identity in 2008 changed 
directly to Taiwanese identity in 2012, meaning these respondents dropped completely 
their Chinese identity when they embraced the new Taiwanese identity.  Table 4.2 also 
shows that there are 37.5% of respondents changing from "Chinese identity" to become 
"Dual identities", which suggest when a new Taiwanese identity added into their national 
identity, these respondents still kept the existing Chinese identity.  
 On the other hand, from the Table 4.2, we see 22.5% of respondents who changed 
from Taiwanese identity to dual identities and 1.3% from Taiwanese to Chinese between 
2008 and 2012; that is to say, there are a quarter of Taiwanese identity respondents added 
the "Chinese identity" into their national identity from 2008 to 2012.   However, the 
dropping percentage of Chinese identity is higher than the adding percentages of 
Taiwanese identity.  Therefore, the overall percentage of Chinese identity decreases over 
time, as it is show in the Table 4.1.  
Table 4. 2  Consistency/Stability of National Identity - Panel Data (2008-12) 
 
National Identity (Chinese vs. Taiwanese) 2012 
N=990 






























-value (df=4): 360.36, contingency coefficient: .52, Kappa: .46 (*<.05) 
Data Source: TEDS 2008-12 Panel Data, from the Election Study Center, National Chengchi University. 
The statistics are author's own recording and calculation. 
  
 The dynamic changes of dual identities in the panel data Table 4.2 are important, 




in the transition process, but a gradual two-stage decline.  During the transition periods, 
there are both ups and downs of Chinese identity at the individual levels, although the 
general trend (Table 4.1) demonstrates 4% increase in the category of "Taiwanese 
identity only", 3 percent decrease of "Dual identities" , and one percent decrease of 
Chinese identity from 2008 to 2012.   
 Taken together the changes from "Chinese identity only" to "Taiwanese identity 
only" and from the "Dual identities" to "Taiwanese identity only" at the individual level, 
the results confirm the assumption that Chinese identity and Taiwanese identity are not 
mutually exclusive concepts, the rise of Taiwanese identity does not necessarily lead to 
the decline of Chinese identity.  
 
Stability and Consistency: National Identity vs. Statehood Preference 
 
 This section turns attention toward another aspect of internal change dynamics of 
national identification at the individual level.  Based on the TEDS 2008-12 panel data, I 
make two  comparisons to -- first, the relative stability/consistency of national identity 
and statehood preferences; second, the dispersion of change directions on the statehood 
preferences between respondents who changed national identity and those who did not.  
 Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 (see below) illustrate the relative stability between 
national identity and statehood preferences.  As the national identity and statehood 
preferences are categorical variables, the Kappa coefficients
99
 are used to compare the 
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consistency from the same respondents in two different years (2008 and 2012).  The 
results suggest that, at the individual level, national identity (Kappa value =.46) is more 
consistent and stable than the statehood preferences (Kappa value= .25).    
 One possible reason to explain the relatively higher stability/consistency of 
national identity than the statehood preferences is that the identity issue is about the 
question of "Who you are" and touches on the deeper layer of personal feeling.  As it is 
discussed in the personal interviews (see Chapter 5 and 6), many informants stated that 
the national identity (Chinese vs. Taiwanese) involves a deeper feeling and a stronger 
attachment to the territory where they were born and grew up, therefore, national identity 
is harder to change than the statehood preferences which are more likely to be influenced 
by pragmatic considerations and favorable situations. The results also suggest divergent 
rationales behind the two components of national identification.   
 In Table 4.2, we found that there are 67.4% (dual identities) and 76.3% 
(Taiwanese identity) of people remained their same national identity between 2008 and 
2012.  In contrast, there are only 42.5% of people who identified themselves as Chinese 
in 2008 still remained the same Chinese identity in 2012.  Among the three categories of 
national identity, the results suggest that respondents with the Dual identities and 
Taiwanese identity are more stable and consistent in their national identity than those 
with the Chinese identity.    
 As to the relative stability among the four different statehood preferences, Table 
4.3 shows that the "Independence" preference (59.5%) is more stable than the other three 
statehood preferences. If we take a closer look at the Table 4.3, we found that there are 
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nearly 40% of respondents maintained the "Both Unification and Independence" and 
32.5% maintain the same "Neither Unification nor Independence" preferences between 
2008 and 2012.  It is worth noting that, within both of these two categories of statehood 
preferences, we however see a common trend -- there are higher percentages (36.9% and 
29.9%) moving toward the "Independence", although the rest one third of respondents 
changing their statehood preferences to the "Unification" and the "Both Unification and 
Independence Acceptable".  In contrast, we see the change directions (2008-12) from the 
residents who favor "Unification" are quite evenly distributed among the other three 
categories of statehood preferences.  
  
Table 4. 3  Consistency/Stability of Statehood Preferences (2008-12) 
 
Statehood Preferences (Unification vs. Independence) 
2012 
N=765 














































-value (df=4): 168.72, contingency coefficient: .43, Kappa: .25 (*<.05) 
Data Source: TEDS 2008-12 Panel Data, from the Election Study Center, National Chengchi University. 
The statistics are author's own recording and calculation. 
 
Dispersion of Change Directions: National Identity vs. Statehood Preference  
  
 This section further explores the change directions of national identity and 
statehood preferences, and focus on the group of "dual identities".  The following two  




a. The results in Table 4.4 and Table 4.5 (see below) compare the respondents 
who maintained the "Dual identities" and those who changed their Dual 
identities to "Taiwanese identity only" between 2008 and 2012, and their 
stability and consistency of statehood preferences in 2012.  The Kappa value 
of the former group of respondents (no change) is .31, the Kappa value in the 
latter group is .2.  The result suggests that the respondents who remained the 
same Dual identities have a higher stability and consistency of their statehood 
preferences over time than those dual identities people who have changed to 
other category of national identity.   
b. Stability is one thing, change direction is another different story. What is more 
interesting from comparing the two groups of Dual identities is the changing 
directions of the statehood preferences when they changed from the Dual 
identities to "Taiwanese identity only", in other words, when they dropped 
their "Chinese" component in their national identity.  Table 4.4 and Table 4.5 
indicate a consistently higher percentage moving toward the "Neither 
Unification nor Independence" (20% /17.9% vs. 13.1%/8.0%) and 
"Independence Only" (40%/25%/47.1% vs.  9.8%/16%/20%) in the latter 
group (who dropped the Chinese component in national identity).  
  
 Taken both the consistency test and changing directions in the Table 4.4 and 
Table 4.5, the results reveal that when the respondents changed their national identity 
from the Dual identities to Taiwanese identity only (i.e., dropping the Chinese component 




direction of  Taiwan independence.  Although we learned the coefficient between these 
two attitudes is .37 (see Table 4 below) and many people changed their statehood 
preferences without changing their national identities, the results suggest that changes of 
national identity have significant impact on the changes of statehood preferences.  In the 
later part of personal interviews, two informants revealed their changes of national 
identification similar to the above patterns from the panel studies.  
 
Table 4 
Cross-tabulation between National Identity and Statehood Preferences (2012) 
 
Statehood Preferences (Unification vs. Independence)  
2012 
N=856 
Unification Both Neither Independence 





































-value: 131.49*, contingency coefficient: .37 (*<.05) 
Data Source: TEDS 2008-12 Panel Data, from the Election Study Center, National Chengchi University. 




















Table 4. 4  Cross-tabulation between Changes of Statehood Preferences (2008-12) with 
No Changes of National Identity (2008-12) 


























































































































































































-value (df=9): 26.86*, contingency coefficient: .28, Kappa: .12 
Data Source: TEDS 2008-12 Panel Data, from the Election Study Center, National Chengchi University. 






Table 4. 5  Cross-tabulation between Changes of Statehood Preferences (2008-12) and 
Changes of National Identity (2008-12) 

























































































































































































-value (df=9):10.5, contingency coefficient: .80, Kappa: .11 
Data Source: TEDS 2008-12 Panel Data, from the Election Study Center, National Chengchi University. 





National Identification Change Patterns: Socio-demographic Analysis 
  
This section further explores the socio-demographic factors that might affect the 
consistency and stability of one's national identity and statehood preferences.  Following 
the Table 4.2 and Table 4.3, I first grouped the national identity and statehood 
preferences into "change" or "no change" two categories between two panel study periods 
(2008-20120, and then generated a 4 x4 table to reveal four change patterns (Pattern I, II, 
III, and IV) over time. The empirical study results are shown in the Table 4.6 (see below).  
Table 4.6 indicates that one third of residents remained unchanged of both their 
national consciousness and statehood preference (i.e., Pattern I) during the study periods 
( 2008-12); nearly 40 percent of residents changed statehood preferences in 2012 without 
changing their national identity.  In contrast, there are around 10 percent of residents 
changed their national identity, but remained the same statehood preferences between 
2008-12.  The rest 20% of residents changed both their national identity and statehood 
preferences in four years.  In other words, the results suggest a high degree of instability 
and inconsistency existing among Taiwan public in terms of their national orientations. 
Table 4. 6 Cross-tabulation between National Identity and Statehood Preferences 
 
Statehood Preferences 




National identity  




















311 442 753 
χ
2 
value (df=1): 7.89*, Note: * p<.05 
contingency coefficient: .10 





Table 4.7 conducts cross-tabulation analysis to see if there exists relationship 
between the four change patterns and socio-demographic factors.  The results show the 
change patterns are not statistically related to the Age, Ethnic backgrounds, education 
level, but significantly related to the party affiliation. That is to say, the residents with 
Pan-Green affiliation have a higher stability in national identity and statehood 
preferences than the residents with Pan-Blue affiliation.     
What do these empirical findings mean to the theoretical debate between 
primordial essentialists and modern constructivists in the nationalism literature? How do 
we reconcile the differences between ethnic and civic types of national identity formation 
and transformation? Can we draw some insights from the empirical findings shown in the 
case of Taiwan? Chapter Five and Six would address the issues in details. Here it is 
suffice to say, if we assume the consistency and stability are favorable to the 
development of ethno-nationalism that requires the congruence between national unit and 
political unit, then the empirical evidence of high degree of inconsistency and instability 
between national and political dimensions in one's national identification would suggest 
national consciousness and statehood preferences can actually grow out of different 
organization principles between ethnic and civic elements for nation building and 
therefore open a possibility that Taiwan could move toward a different direction --i.e., 












Table 4. 7  Cross-tabulation between Four Types of National Identity Changes (2008-12) 
and Socio-demographic Factors 
 
Four Types of National Identity Changes (2008-12) 
 
Age Groups  
(SC2) 





















































value (df=12): 14.91, contingency coefficient: .139 
Ethnicity  
(SC3) 

































value (df=6): 3.23, contingency coefficient: .07 
Parents' Ethnicity  
(SC5) 























value (df=3): 1.34, contingency coefficient: .04 
Education Level  
(SC6) 

































value (df=6): 7.09, contingency coefficient: .10 
Party Affiliation  
(SC9) 























value (df=3): 24.15*, contingency coefficient: .20 




Multinomial Logit Regression Models  
  
 The cross-sectional analysis in Chapter 3 suggests several socio-demographic 
factors (such as Age, Ethnic backgrounds, Education, and political party affiliation) that 
are closely associated with the changes of respondents' national identification.  On the 
other hand, as it is revealed in the in-depth personal interviews (see the discussion in the 
later section), there are several contextual factors mentioned by the informants that have 
influenced their  national identity and statehood preferences, among which Taiwan's 
democracy and economic status were identified as the two most influential factors.  
Between the socio-demographic factors and democratic/economic attitudes, which set of 
factors has a higher explanatory power to explain the variances of national identification 
in Taiwan?  The answers to this question will help to further clarify the assumption of 
divergent rationales behind the national identification, and also help to address the 
primordial theory, which assumes an ethnic core of national identification.  
 This section conducts six Mutinomial Logit Regression (MLR) models to address 
the issue and further explore the relative impacts between these two sets of factors on the 
changes of national identification.  (The results are shown from Table 4.8 to Table 4.17) 
 
1. Socio-demographic Factors vs. Attitude Factors 
  
 There are four comparisons made in this section, and the results from Table 4.8 , 




a. Socio-demographic Factors: National Identity vs. Statehood Preferences: 
Table 4.8 uses the "Chinese identity" as the baseline category to compare the 
relative likelihood of being "Dual identities" and "Taiwanese identity" along 
the four  socio-demographic factors - Age, Ethnicity, Education, and Party 
affiliations.  The results indicate that the four socio-demographic factors 
together can explain 32% (Nagelkerke =.32) variance of national identity 
changes in 2012.  In comparison, Table 4.9 shows that the same set of socio-
demographic factors can explain only 20% (Nagelkerke =.2) of variance of 
statehood preferences.  The results suggest that socio-demographic factors 
have a higher explanatory power to explain the change of national identity 
than the statehood preferences.  
b. Democratic/Economic Attitude: National Identity vs. Statehood Preferences: 
Table 4.10 compares the relative likelihood probability of being "Dual 
identities" and "Taiwanese identity" (as opposed to Chinese identity) by 
respondents' opinions toward the democratic elections  (EV7) and overall 
Taiwan's economic status (EV15)
100
.  The Nagelkerke value in Table 4.10 
is .08, while in the Table 4.11, which tests the statehood preferences by the 
two same attitudes, the Nagelkerke value is .05.  The results suggest that the 
two attitude factors in both models are low, but, like the socio-demographic 
factors, the relative explanatory power of these two attitude factors is higher 
in explaining the changes of  national identity than that of the statehood 
preferences.  
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c. National Identity: Socio-demographic Factors vs. Democratic/Economic 
Attitude Factors: The results in the Table 4.8 and Table 4.10 suggest the 
socio-demographic factors have a bigger explanatory power (Nagelkerke 
value =.32) than the democratic/economic attitude factors (Nagelkerke value 
=.08) in explaining the relative likelihood probabilities between different 
categories of national identities.   
d. Statehood Preferences: Socio-demographic Factors vs. Democratic/Economic 
Attitude Factors: The results in the Table 4.9 and Table 4.11 show that the 
socio-demographic factors has a higher Nagelkerke value (.20) than the two 
democratic/economic attitudes (.05) on the relative probabilities among 
different categories of statehood preferences.  
  
 In short, the above results tell us it is the socio-demographic factors that have a 
better explanatory power than the two democratic/economic attitudes in explaining both 
the variances of national identity and statehood preferences.  The results are consistent 
with the earlier findings in Chapter 3 that national identification changes in Taiwan are 
closely associated with the age groups, ethnic backgrounds, educational levels, and party 
affiliation.   
 Table 4.12 and Table 4.13 demonstrate  these two sets of factors together can 
explain around 33% variances of the national identity and 22% variances of  the 
statehood preferences.  The six MLR models can be used to further explore the relative 
likelihood of each socio-demographic factor on the changes of national identification 




lowest education level has a statistically significant higher probability (β = 1.02, Exp.B= 
2.77) than the highest educational group in choosing the Independence (as opposed to 
Unification).  As to the party affiliation, we found the group of Pan-Blue (KMT, PFP, 
and NP) has a statistically significant lower probability (β = -.2.15, Exp. B = .12) than the 
Pan-Green groups (DPP, TSU) in choosing the "Independence" (as opposed to 
Unification). 
 The results in the Table 4.10 and Table 4.11 indicate the relative likelihood 
probabilities of choosing different categories of statehood preferences if we compare the 
two attitudes of democratic elections and the overall Taiwan's economic status.  The 
results suggest when people think the overall status of Taiwan's economy is worse, they 
tend to have a higher probability than those who have a better predication of Taiwan's 
economy to choose Independence (as opposed to Unification) and being a "Taiwanese 
identity" (as opposed to Chinese identity).   
 
2. National Identity vs. Statehood Preferences 
  
 In the above sections, we learned that national identity consistency is higher than 
the statehood preferences (refers to Table 4.2 and Table 4.3) and that the national identity 
and statehood preferences are also significantly related (see Table 4.14, contingency 
coefficient = .037, *<.05).  These two results help lead to a reasonable assumption that 
national identity influences one's statehood preferences.  In the following, I use two 
additional Multinomial Logit Regression models to test if the assumption is valid. The 




 Table 4.16 indicates the variances of national identity are all statistically 
significant related to different categories of statehood preferences by controlling four 
socio-demographic factors (age, ethnicity, education and party affiliation).  Comparing 
the relative likelihood probability between Independence and Unification (used as the 
baseline category), Table 4.16 shows that people with Chinese identity has a lower 
probability (β =-.300, Exp. B= .05) than people with Taiwanese identity to choose 
Independence (as opposed to Unification); "Dual identities" people also have a lower 
probability (β =-.1.39, Exp. B=.25) preferring Independence to Unification.  In other 
words, Taiwanese identity people have statistically significant higher probability to 
choose the Independence (as opposed to Unification) than those people with Chinese 
identity and Dual identities.  Again, the Taiwanese identity people have a higher 
probability to choose "Neither Unification and Independence" (as opposed to Unification) 
than the people with Chinese identity and dual identities.  
 Table 4.15 uses the panel data in TEDS 2012 to further test if the relationship 
(from the Table 4.16)  still hold at the individual level.  After controlling the possible 
interaction between 2008-12 statehood preferences, the results in Table 4.15 are 
consistent with the Table 4.16; that is, people with Taiwanese identity have a higher 
likelihood probability (β =1.65, Exp. B= 5.20)  than Chinese identity people to choose to 
choose Independence (as opposed to Unification).  Another interesting finding from the 
Table 4.15 is that people with Taiwanese identity in 2008 have a higher probability (β 
=1.77, Exp. B=5.86) than the Chinese identity people to choose "Neither Unification nor 
Independence" (as opposed to Unification) in 2012.  As there are four years time lag 




suggest a causal relationship between the national identity and statehood preferences at 
the individual levels
101
.  Overall, the results from the Table 4.15 and Table 4.16 have  led 




Many studies have presented the general trends of national identity changes in the 
past two decades, but the dynamics of internal changes and various change patterns 
underlying the general trends are not paid enough attention.  Unlike previous researches, 
this research assumes that ethnic and civic national identification are not mutually 
exclusive concepts; instead, they can work together to define and redefine people's 
national identity.  During the transition periods, through different considerations people 
defined themselves between these two mechanisms, therefore we would expect to see 
various forms and changing patterns of national identification.  
This chapter revisits the four sets of independent survey data as well as TEDS 
2012 panel data used in the Chapter 3 to further explore the internal dynamics of national 
identity changes.  Focusing on the changes of "dual identities", it is argued that the rise of 
one type of identity (e.g., Taiwanese identity) does not necessarily lead to the decline of 
the other type of identity (e.g., Chinese identity).  Depending on how people reconciled 
the two different underlying identity formation mechanisms, ethnic vs. civic, we expect 
to see some people, at least in the early transition period, embraced new identity 
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(Taiwanese identity) while still kept the existing identity (Chinese identity), other people 
dropped the old identity and changed directly to a new identity. 
The results from the analysis of  "Dual identities", the relative consistency and 
stability of national identity and statehood preferences, have confirmed the assumption 
and lead to several new findings of the changes that the general trends have not shown. 
More importantly, the Multinomial Logit Regression models help to delineate the relative 
impacts of socio-demographic factors on the national identification and help to 
understand the divergent rationales behind the national identification. 
Chapter 3 and 4 describe and analyze the changes of national identification in the 
past two decades, several trends and underlying dynamics are explored.  The next two 
chapters will proceed to explain why and how such changes occurred under the broader 















List of Multinomial Logit Regression Models  
 
Table 4. 8  Multinomial Logit Regression Model of Socio-demographic Factors on 
National Identity (2012)  
 
Dual Identities 
(compared to Chinese identity) 
Taiwanese identity 
(compared to Chinese identity) 
 β S.E.  Wald 
Exp 
(B) 
β S.E.  Wald 
Exp 
(B) 
Intercept 3.79 .76 * 25.09 .97 5.04 .77 * 43.05  
sc2 -.03 .01 * 8.64 1.13 -.04 .01 * 12.85 .96 
sc3=1 .12 .44  .08 1.88 .29 .46  .39 1.33 
sc3=2 .63 .35  3.21 . 1.24 .37 * 11.06 3.44 
sc3=3 0 .  . .59 0 .  . . 
sc8=1 -.53 .48  1.23 .97 .55 .49  1.25 1.72 
sc8=2 -.04 .35  .01 . .23 .36  .42 1.26 
sc8=3 0 .  . .71 0 .  . . 
sc9=1 -.34 .50  .45 . -2.40 .49 * 24.07 .09 
sc9=2 0 .  . .97 0 .  . . 
Notes: 
sc2 = age (recoded as actual ages) 
sc3= ethnicity (1= Hakka/ 2=Minnan /3=mainlander - baseline category) 
sc8= Educational Levels (1= Low/ 2=Middle/3=High) 




-2log likelihood: 1062.87 




Note: * <.05 
Data Source: TEDS 2012  from the Election Study Center, National Chengchi University. The statistics are 





Table 4. 9  Multinomial Logit Regression Model of Socio-demographic Factors on 
Statehood Preferences (2012)  
 
Both Unification and 
Independence 
(compared to Unification) 
Neither Unification nor 
Independence 
(compared to Unification) 
Independence 







































sc2 -.02 .01 * 7.36 .98 -.05 .01 * 
32.3
9 




sc3=1 -.36 .35  1.07 .69 -.67 .36  3.53 .51 .25 .36  .48 
1.2
8 
sc3=2 .25 .27  .88 
1.2
9 
-.20 .27  .57 .82 .48 .29  2.73 
1.6
2 
sc3=3 0 .  . . 0 .  . . 0 .  . . 
sc8=1 .98 .36 * 7.40 
2.6
8 





.36 * 7.87 
2.7
7 





.35 .24  2.17 
1.4
2 
.55 .23 * 5.80 
1.7
3 























sc9=2 0 .  . . 0 .  . . 0 .  . . 
Notes: 
sc2 = age (recoded as actual ages) 
sc3= ethnicity (1= Hakka/ 2=Minnan /3=mainlander - baseline category) 
sc8= Educational Levels (1= Low/ 2=Middle/3=High - baseline category) 




-2log likelihood: 1799.87 





Data Source: TEDS 2008-12 Panel Data, from the Election Study Center, National Chengchi University. 














Table 4. 10  Multinomial Logit Regression Model of Democracy/Economic Attitude 
Factors on National Identity (2012) 
 
Dual identities 
(compared to Chinese identity) 
Taiwanese identity 
(compared to Chinese identity) 
 β S.E.  Wald Exp(B) β S.E.  Wald Exp(B) 
Intercept 1.84 .49 * 13.89  3.43 .47 * 52.72  
ev7=1 .19 .52  .14 1.21 -.85 .51  2.80 .43 
ev7=2 .21 .55  .15 1.24 -.56 .53  1.12 .57 
ev7=3 0 .  . . 0 .  . . 
ev15=1 .08 .37  .04 1.08 -.90 .36 * 6.17 .40 
ev15=2 .68 .36  3.50 1.97 .24 .35  .48 1.28 
ev15=3 0 .  . . 0 .  . . 
Notes: 
Ev7 = Elections and democracy (1=promote democracy /2=no difference/ 3=weaken democracy - baseline 
reference) 





-2log likelihood: 85.24 





Data Source: TEDS 2008-12 Panel Data, from the Election Study Center, National Chengchi University. 






Table 4. 11  Multinomial Logit Regression Model of Democracy/Economic Attitudes on 
Statehood Preferences (2012)  
 
Both Unification and 
Independence 
(compared to Unification) 
Neither Unification nor 
Independence 
(compared to Unification) 
Independence 
(compared to Unification) 
 β S.E.  Wald 
Exp 
(B) 
β S.E.  Wald 
Exp 
(B) 
β S.E.  Wald 
Exp 
(B) 
Intercept 1.43 .34 * 17.43  1.09 .35 * 9.52  2.18 .32 * 45.43  
ev7=1 -.96 .35 * 7.39 .38 -.53 .37  2.10 .59 
-
1.21 
.34 * 13.05 .30 
ev7=2 -.59 .37  2.61 .55 -.38 .38  1.00 .68 -.87 .35 * 6.20 .42 
ev7=3 0 .  . . 0 .  . . 0 .  . . 
ev15=1 -.47 .26  3.32 .63 -.75 .26  8.13 .47 
-
1.08 
.25 * 19.03 .34 
ev15=2 -.10 .23  .19 .90 -.05 .23  .04 .95 -.17 .22  .57 .85 
ev15=3 0 .  . . 0 .  . . 0 .  . . 
Notes: 
Ev7 = Elections and democracy (1=promote democracy /2=no difference/ 3=weaken democracy - baseline 
reference) 





-2log likelihood: 129.92 





Data Source: TEDS 2008-12 Panel Data, from the Election Study Center, National Chengchi University. 






Table 4. 12  Multinomial Logit Regression Model of both Socio-demographic and 
Attitude Factors on National Identity (2012)  
 
Dual Identities 
(compared to Chinese identity) 
Taiwanese identity 
(compared to Chinese identity) 
 β S.E.  Wald 
Exp 
(B) 
β S.E.  Wald 
Exp 
(B) 
Intercept 4.20 1.09 * 14.78  6.10 1.10 * 30.64  
sc2 -.04 .01 * 8.59 .96 -.05 .01 * 15.94 .95 
sc3=1 -.22 .47  .23 .80 -.16 .50  .10 .85 
sc3=2 .41 .40  1.05 1.50 .91 .42 * 4.64 2.47 
sc3=3 0 .  . . 0 .  . . 
sc8=1 .03 .59  .00 1.03 1.18 .60 * 3.90 3.25 
sc8=2 -.03 .36  .01 .97 .30 .37  .65 1.35 
sc8=3 0 .  . . 0 .  . . 
sc9=1 .03 .55  .00 1.04 -1.99 .54 * 13.64 .14 
sc9=2 0 .  . . 0 .  . . 
ev7=1 -.61 .80  .58 .54 -1.07 .79  1.82 .34 
ev7=2 -.72 .82  .77 .49 -1.12 .82  1.87 .33 
ev7=3 0 .  . . 0 .  . . 
ev15=1 .00 .45  .00 1.00 -.03 .47  .01 .97 
ev15=2 .46 .44  1.09 1.59 .51 .45  1.28 1.66 
ev15=3 0 .  . . 0 .  . . 
Notes: 
sc2 = age (recoded as actual ages) 
sc3= ethnicity (1= Hakka/ 2=Minnan /3=mainlander - baseline category) 
sc8= Educational Levels (1= Low/ 2=Middle/3=High) 
sc9= Party Affiliation (1=Pan-blue/ 2= Pan-green) 
Ev7 = Elections and democracy (1=promote democracy /2=no difference/ 3=weaken democracy - baseline 
reference) 





-2log likelihood: 1257.81 
Cox & Snell: .26 /Nagelkerke: .33 /McFadden: .18 
N=1061 
Note: * <.05 
Data Source: TEDS 2008-12 Panel Data, from the Election Study Center, National Chengchi University. 





Table 4. 13  Multinomial Logit Regression Model of both Socio-demographic and 
Attitude Factors on Statehood Preferences (2012)  
 
Both Unification and 
Independence 
(compared to Unification) 
Neither Unification nor 
Independence 
(compared to Unification) 
Independence 







































sc2 -.02 .01 * 7.94 .98 -.05 .01 * 
28.5
2 




sc3=1 -.36 .37  .95 .70 -.81 .37 * 4.82 .44 .28 .38  .53 
1.3
2 
sc3=2 .24 .29  .72 
1.2
7 
-.31 .28  1.20 .74 .49 .32  2.38 
1.6
3 
sc3=3 0 .  . . 0 .  . . 0 .  . . 
sc8=1 .91 .42 * 4.81 
2.4
9 





.42 * 6.22 
2.8
3 





.27 .25  1.24 
1.3
2 
.45 .24  3.56 
1.5
7 
sc8=3 0 .  . . 0 .  . . 0 .  . . 

















.45 * 7.94 .28 
ev7=2 -.58 .49  1.41 .56 -.31 .51  .35 .74 -.93 .47 * 3.86 .39 
ev7=3 0 .  . . 0 .  . . 0 .  . . 
ev15=1 -.07 .31  .05 .93 -.44 .31  1.96 .64 -.53 .31  2.95 .59 
ev15=2 .00 .28  .00 
1.0
0 
.04 .28  .02 
1.0
4 
-.01 .27  .00 .99 
ev15=3 0 .  . . 0 .  . . 0 .  . . 
Notes: 
sc2 = age (recoded as actual ages) 
sc3= ethnicity (1= Hakka/ 2=Minnan /3=mainlander - baseline category) 
sc8= Educational Levels (1= Low/ 2=Middle/3=High) 
sc9= Party Affiliation (1=Pan-blue/ 2= Pan-green) 
Ev7 = Elections and democracy (1=promote democracy /2=no difference/ 3=weaken democracy - baseline 
reference) 





-2log likelihood: 2222.31 





Data Source: TEDS 2008-12 Panel Data, from the Election Study Center, National Chengchi University. 





Table 4. 14  Multinomial Logit Regression Model of National Identity (2008-12) on 
Statehood Preferences (2012)  
 
Both Unification and 
Independence 
(compared to Unification) 
Neither Unification nor 
Independence 
(compared to Unification) 
Independence 













































* 5.63  
sc2 -.02 .01  3.54 .98 -.02 .01  1.51 .98 .00 .01  .08 1.00 




.72 * 7.48 .14 -.98 .64  2.38 .37 
sc3=2 .35 .47  .56 
1.4
2 
-.20 .42  .22 .82 -.27 .47  .32 .77 
sc3=3 0 .  . . 0 .  . . 0 .  . . 
sc8=1 .12 .69  .03 
1.1
3 
.57 .67  .73 
1.7
7 
-.32 .64  .25 .72 
sc8=2 .20 .36  .31 
1.2
2 
.01 .37  .00 
1.0
1 
-.06 .36  .03 .94 
sc8=3 0 .  . . 0 .  . . 0 .  . . 





.52 * 7.04 
3.9
9 
-.23 .48  .24 .79 
sc9=2 0 .  . . 0 .  . . 0 .  . . 














.48 * 7.68 3.82 








































-.31 .50  .40 .73 
1.0
6 











0 .  . . 0 .  . . 0 .  . . 
dv1_2012=
1 
.59 .78  .57 
1.8
1 





.83 * 3.96 5.20 
dv1_2012=
2 
-.08 .68  .01 .92 -.53 .67  .64 .59 -.30 .75  .16 .74 
dv1_2012=
3 















.88  2.48 3.97 
dv1_2008=
2 










.84  2.00 3.30 
dv1_2008=
3 
0 .  . . 0 .  . . 0 .  . . 
Notes: 




sc3= ethnicity (1= Hakka/ 2=Minnan /3=mainlander - baseline category) 
sc8= Educational Levels (1= Low/ 2=Middle/3=High- baseline reference) 
sc9= Party Affiliation (1=Pan-blue/ 2= Pan-green- baseline reference) 
Ev15 = Overall evaluation of Taiwan's economic status (1=better/ 2=no difference/ 3=worse- baseline 
reference) 
dv3_2008=(1=independence /2=both /3=neither /4=unification- baseline reference) 
dv1_2012=(1=Taiwanese /2=both /3=Chinese- baseline reference) 




-2log likelihood: 1020.13 





Data Source: TEDS 2008-12 Panel Data, from the Election Study Center, National Chengchi University. 




































Table 4. 15  Multinomial Logit Regression Model of National Identity (2012) on 
Statehood Preferences (2012)  
 
Both Unification and 
Independence 
(compared to Unification) 
Neither Unification nor 
Independence 
(compared to Unification) 
Independence 







































sc2 -.02 .01 * 7.68 .98 -.05 .01 * 
29.3
3 











































 .  . . 0
b
 .  . . 0
b
 .  . . 
sc3=1 -.45 .36  1.53 .64 -.80 .37 * 4.61 .45 .16 .38  .19 
1.1
8 





 .  . . 0
b
 .  . . 0
b
 .  . . 
sc5=0 -.54 .30  3.27 .59 -.60 .30 * 3.96 .55 -.49 .30  2.68 .61 
sc5=1 0
b
 .  . . 0
b
 .  . . 0
b
 .  . . 
sc8=1 .90 .37 * 5.95 
2.4
6 
.30 .43  .49 
1.3
5 
.88 .38 * 5.43 
2.4
0 





.33 .24  1.83 
1.3
9 





 .  . . 0
b
 .  . . 0
b
 .  . . 










 .  . . 0
b
 .  . . 0
b
 .  . . 
Notes: 
DV1= National Identity (1= Chinese identity/2= Both/ 3= Taiwanese identity) 
sc2 = age (recoded as actual ages) 
sc3= ethnicity (1= mainlander/ 2=Hakka /3=Minnan - baseline category) 
sc5= Intermarriage (0= Same / 1= Different) 
sc8= Educational Levels (1= Low/ 2=Middle/3=High) 




-2log likelihood: 2122.05 
Cox & Snell: .23 /Nagelkerke: .24 /McFadden: .10 
N=1108 
*<.05 
Data Source: TEDS 2008-12 Panel Data, from the Election Study Center, National Chengchi University. 




Table 4. 16  Multinomial Logit Regression Model of Statehood Preferences (2008-12) on 
National Identity (2012)  
 
Dual identity 
(compared to Chinese identity) 
Taiwanese identity 
(compared to Chinese identity) 
 β S.E.  Wald Exp(B) β S.E.  Wald Exp(B) 
Intercept 2.55 1.49  2.94   .74 1.76  .18   
sc2 -.05 .02 * 6.65 .95 -.05 .02 * 5.17 .96 
sc3=1 1.01 1.18  .73 2.74 1.92 1.31  2.14 6.84 
sc3=2 .26 .57  .22 1.30 1.44 .72 * 3.98 4.23 
sc3=3 0 .  . . 0 .  . . 
sc8=1 .55 1.06  .27 1.73 1.29 1.13  1.30 3.64 
sc8=2 -.19 .54  .12 .83 -.19 .59  .10 .83 
sc8=3 0 .  . . 0 .  . . 
sc9=1 -.54 .95  .32 .58 -1.50 .97  2.39 .22 
sc9=2 0 .  . . 0 .  . . 
ev15=1 .08 .56  .02 1.08 -1.22 .62  3.82 .30 
ev15=2 .42 .80  .28 1.53 .35 .83  .18 1.42 
ev15=3 0 .  . . 0 .  . . 
dv3_2012=1 -.48 .78  .37 .62 1.55 .86  3.23 4.71 
dv3_2012=2 -.05 .73  .00 .95 .67 .83  .65 1.95 
dv3_2012=3 -.57 .69  .68 .57 .48 .80  .37 1.62 
dv3_2012=4 0 .  . . 0 .  . . 
dv1_2008=1 2.91 .83 * 12.20 18.35 4.31 1.02 * 17.67 74.10 
dv1_2008=2 2.59 .63 * 17.17 13.39 2.00 .88 * 5.10 7.36 
dv1_2008=3 0 .  . . 0 .  . . 
dv3_2008=1 -.17 .71  .06 .84 .04 .78  .00 1.04 
dv3_2008=2 .53 .71  .56 1.70 .69 .79  .76 1.99 
dv3_2008=3 .64 .72  .79 1.89 .31 .81  .14 1.36 
dv3_2008=4 0 .  . . 0 .  . . 
Notes: 
sc2 = age (recoded as actual ages) 
sc3= ethnicity (1= Hakka/ 2=Minnan /3=mainlander - baseline category) 
sc8= Educational Levels (1= Low/ 2=Middle/3=High- baseline reference) 
sc9= Party Affiliation (1=Pan-blue/ 2= Pan-green- baseline reference) 
Ev15 = Overall evaluation of Taiwan's economic status (1=better/ 2=no difference/ 3=worse- baseline 
reference) 
dv3_2012=(1=independence /2=both /3=neither /4=unification- baseline reference) 
dv1_2008=(1=Taiwanese /2=both /3=Chinese- baseline reference) 
dv3_2008=(1=independence /2=both /3=neither /4=unification- baseline reference) 
χ2-value(df=32): 349.94* 
-2log likelihood: 492.33 





Data Source: TEDS 2008-12 Panel Data, from the Election Study Center, National Chengchi University. 





Chapter 5: National Identity Transformation and Democratization 
  
This chapter, as well as Chapter Six, proceeds to explain the changes of national 
identification in the last two decades and the emergence of “civic-territory” based 
national identification in Taiwan. Three main contextual variables are included in the 
analyses -- the democratization practices, the cross-strait exchanges, and the international 
dimension, in particular, the rise of China in the world.  
This chapter focuses on the democratization and its impact on the national identity 
transformation; chapter Six will discuss the impacts of cross-Strait dynamics and 
international dimensions.    
 
Democratization and Civic Nationalism: A Dynamic Relationship 
 
Chapter Three and Four have presented the general trends, various internal change 
patterns , and an emerging Taiwan-centered national identification in the past two 
decades.  Why and how did the Taiwan-centered collective identification emerge in the 
last decade? Why did the newly emerged Taiwanese national identity acquire the civic-
territorial nature? Why and how did it move toward a convergent, not divergent, direction 
of civic collective identity given the fact that Taiwan society has various ethnic groups 
with different historical experiences and national imaginations?  
To answer these questions, some scholars assume the seed of "Taiwanese 
identity" that had already deeply buried during the Japanese colonial rule and the post-




democratic transition took out the "authoritarian lid" and released the long-suppressed 
Taiwanese identity.  Others look for external forces in international system since the late 
1970s, and argue that the changing international environment has precipitated the crisis 
of state legitimacy of Republic of China, and subsequently aroused the local aspiration 
for an independent statehood.
102 
Indeed, the historic experiences, ethnic roots, and international factors are 
important in the formation of Taiwanese national identity;  however, these factors by 
themselves alone cannot fully explain the dramatic national identity changes that have 
occurred in the past two decades. The historical or ethnic roots have long existed in 
Taiwan’s history, it is hard to make a case why they brought about a sudden change of 
the collective consciousness in the last two decades.  More importantly, it does not 
explain why the newly emerged national identification did not revive into Minnan- and 
Hakka- Taiwanese based ethnic nationalism, but instead moving toward a more inclusive 
civic-territorial type of development. Without denying the influence of historical and 
ethnic backgrounds in the formation of Taiwanese people’s nationalistic consciousness, I 
would suggest pay more attention to the political process to examine and explore how 
their impacts are actualized and channeled through the continuing democratization 
practices in Taiwan.   
As many constructivist scholars have pointed out, national identities are not 
inborn; instead they are socially and politically constructed sentiments that are subject to 
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 The important questions underlying the constructivist view that require further 
research are the process of how national identity changes were actually happened and 
why national identity moved toward ethnic or civic direction, or in between.  In the case 
of Taiwan, while it is natural to argue that people tend to develop a sense of collective 
consciousness after a long period social integration and territorial isolation, any sudden 
change of group identity, as shown in the Chapter 3 and 4,  nonetheless requires a 
political explanation.  
Paying attention to the political process that national identity changed in the past 
two decades, this chapter would examine three hypotheses on the relationship between 
democratization and national identity changes in Taiwan.  First, national identity 
transformation involves the underlying mechanisms or the organization principles that 
people used to construct or reconstruct the boundaries of both the nationhood and 
statehood. The choice between ethnic and civic principles are not automatic or naturally 
grown, but through political process of democratic practices, in which the elections and 
competition between political elites with different political interests and national identity 
orientations play a significant role. Second, by its nature, the change from ethnic to civic 
reflects the inclusion of other ethnic groups, in Taiwan's case the mainlanders, into the 
collective Us.  Therefore, the civic-inclusive type of national identity is more likely to 
happen when a broader identity definition is created to incorporate all different ethnic 
groups. In the earlier political liberalization stage, we witnessed many serious ethnic 
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conflicts (省籍衝突), but in the latter stage, when the concept of "New Taiwanese" was 
proposed by political elites, the Taiwanese-Minnan began to accept Mainlanders. Thirdly, 
the impacts of civic national identification and democratic transition are reciprocal; a 
more mature democracy can help consolidate an inclusive and convergent civic national 
identity which in turn will also help stabilize democratic consolidation.  
In the following section, I would like to discuss three vital mechanisms that I 
believe have linked democratization practices and Taiwan’s national identity 
transformation in the last decade. Along with the plausible mechanisms under democratic 
transition, several empirical survey results and personal interviews will be added to 
review the hypotheses and underlying causal explanation.  
   
Symbolic Mechanism: Constitutional Reforms Have Transformed the Underlying 
"One China" Principle and the Symbol of National Identity 
 
Taiwan’s first real nation-wide election was held in the 1991 when the National 
Assembly began its first all-seats re-election in nearly forty years. Before that, there was 
no true-meaning national re-election in the ROC central government in Taiwan. This 
election, as well as several consequent elections at different levels of government, 
marked the beginning of a new era in Taiwan’s democratization, which was made 
possible by some political liberalization measures-- the lift of martial law, the termination 
of the “Period of National Mobilization for the Suppression of Communist Rebellion” 




The constitutional reforms were first initiated by the KMT regime under Lee 
Teng-hui in the early 1990s. It is important to note that constitutional reforms were seen 
as inevitable because there was an intrinsic mismatch between the de jure state structure 
under ROC constitution and its actual practice of a sovereign state on Taiwan for more 
than four decades. Since the Nationalist government moved to Taipei in 1949, the KMT 
regime had essentially endowed Taiwan with de facto sovereign status. However, the 
simple fact that the KMT regime can only practice a functional sovereign state within 
Taiwan area had inevitably contradicted the official claim that the ROC government 
represents the whole of China.  Therefore, the constitutional reforms attempting to 
address the legitimacy crisis in the 1990s would unavoidably challenge the underlying 
principle of the constitution – the “one China” principle.   
Specifically, three revisions of the "Additional Articles" in the ROC Constitution 
had dramatically transformed the symbol of national identity. 
 
1. The End of "Millennium Congress" 
 Under the guideline of "One Organ (National Assembly), Two Stages", the 
ROC government launched its first effort of reforming the constitution in 1991. This 
round of reforms supplemented the Constitution with a total of 10 articles, officially 
known as the “Additional Articles of the Constitution of the Republic of China,” which 
were passed by the National Assembly in April, 1991. As the so-called "millennium 
congress" would soon be dismissed by the termination of the “Period of National 
Mobilization for the Suppression of Communist Rebellion,” the most imperative mission 




three representative bodies at the central government, that is, the National Assembly, the 
Legislative Yuan, and the Control Yuan.   
Articles 1 to 3 re-allocated the separate seats of the National Assembly, 
Legislative Yuan and Control Yuan to be completely re-elected in the Taiwan area, so the 
existing Articles 26, 64 and 91 of the Constitution were no longer applicable. Another 
amendment of the Additional Articles prescribed that the members representing Chinese 
citizens residing abroad (so-called "overseas Chinese") and those representing the nation-
wide constituency shall be elected by way of party-list proportional representation. 
 
2. Direct Presidential Election in Taiwan 
In 1992, the ruling party KMT initiated a second round of constitutional reforms. 
Its purpose was to re-adjust the “five-powers governing structure” (separation of powers 
among five governing branches), sketched by the ROC founding father Sun Yet-san. 
Despite a fervent debate of parliamentalism versus presidentialism, there was no 
consensus forged; in the end, some technical break-through instead of substantial 
settlement was achieved
104
. The most crucial and controversial change of this round of 
constitutional reform was in the Additional Article 12, Section 1, which prescribed that 
"effective from the 1996 election for the ninth-term President and Vice President, the 
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President and Vice President shall be elected by the entire electorate in the free area of 
the Republic of China (i.e. Taiwan)."  With compromise, "the entire electorate" included 
two assertions--- one is "direct vote via delegates," the other "direct vote by the people." 
Section 2 of the same Article further provided that the electoral method for the 
aforementioned election shall be formulated, according to the Additional Articles to the 
constitution at an extraordinary session of the National Assembly, convoked by the 
President by May 20, 1995.   
 
3. Minimization of the “Taiwan Province”  
While the KMT won the first direct President election in March 1996, it however 
lost the overwhelming majority status in the National Assembly, which is a requisite for 
dominating the constitutional amendment. Some coalition between KMT and the DPP 
(Democratic Progressive Party), then the major opposition party, was therefore necessary 
to push forward another run of Constitutional Reform. As the result of an ad hoc 
consultative meeting (the National Development Conference guo jia fa zhan hui yi 國家
發展會議), which was convened in the late December 1996 to nurture necessary 
consensus, the major focus was to review the necessity of five different levels of 
government in the Taiwan area. Among its conclusions, the most explosive move taken 
by this round of Additional Articles revision was to abolish the Taiwan province from the 
existing political structure --- commonly known as the "minimization of Taiwan 
province." According to the revision, starting from December 1998, the governor of 
Taiwan Province will be appointed by the President, a return to the previous practice 




The above three constitutional amendments had significant symbolic implications 
on the national identity in Taiwan. As for a long time since the KMT regime moved to 
Taiwan, the ROC government had strategically chosen to impose some extra-
constitutional arrangements (the so-called “Temporary Articles” (lin shi tiao kuan) under 
the “Period of Mobilization and Combating Communist Rebellion”
105
, in order not to 
abolish the 1947 Constitution. The main reason is that the Constitution is not only the 
quintessential legal embodiment, but also the symbol of the one-China principle, which 
sustained the claim that there is only one China, Taiwan is part of China, and the ROC 
government is the sole legitimate government representing the whole of China.  Now, 
with these constitutional amendments by the Additional Articles – in particular, the 
complete re-election of National Assembly, Legislative Yuan and Control Yuan, as well 
as the direct election of President by the people in Taiwan not only changed the legal 
orthodoxy and representation of ROC government
106
; more importantly, they  also 
transformed the underlying national identity.  As in the modern meaning for the national 
identity construction, those who are granted with the rights to vote are considered as 
citizen or “we” of a nation-state.  In this sense, the democratization and constitutional 
reforms in Taiwan evoke not only authoritarian transition and regime change, but also 
yielded an attempt to redefine the boundary of the ROC state and its citizenship. 
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Massive Political Participation -- A Daily Plebiscite for the Development of Civic 
Nationalism 
 
 Scholars of modernist nationalism, such as Benedict Anderson, Ernest Gellner, 
E.J. Hobsbawn,  have argued that “nation” is an imagined, invented, constructed 
product
107
. But, the question arises as to "how" and "to what direction" the nation is 
imaged, invested and constructed between the two ideal types of nation-building, ethnic 
versus civic nationalism. In other words, why do some nations tend to engage in one 
particular type of national self-imagination, but not the others? French nation is built in 
relation to the institutional and territorial frame of the state, and is highly devoted to 
assimilating minorities and immigrants, while the German perceive their nation as a 
linguistic, cultural, and racial community, rather than a simply political community
108
. In 
the case of Taiwan, in the past two decades, we witnessed the collective identification in 
the society that has transformed between traditional ethnicity-based national 
consciousness (Chinese identity) and civic-based development (Taiwanese identity) and 
gradually changed from the former to the latter.  The process and results of national 
identification transformation between ethnic and civic type of nationalism cannot assume 
a natural process, instead it requires further explanation.    
In his study of German and French nationalisms as well as the nationalistic 
movements in the former Soviet Union, Brubaker (1992, 1996) argued that the process 
and unique experiences of state-building (such as revolution, war, democratization, and 
constitution-making) had greatly influenced people’s imagination of their nation and 
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definition of citizen rights.  Drawing from the insights of Roger Baker, I would like to 
point out that one of the most relevant factors toward Taiwan’s civic type national 
identity construction and state building in the past two decades is the broad and intensive 
mass political participation—the elections. It is argued that through the intensive and 
frequent elections, the underlying identity formation mechanisms of national identity 
have gradually changed from primordial ethnicity to civic-territorial one in order to 
correspond to the logics of election.    
In the 1990s, Taiwan held important elections every year.
109
. Each election would 
get nearly six months of media coverage, from party nomination to campaigning and 
voting; the focus of the whole society was almost fixed to the same topic. Candidates 
from different political parties propose all sorts of issues and held various activities to 
attract voters; the media ran after candidates for interviews and media programs, 
especially the various call-in and commentary programs, discussed all kinds of election 
issues. Almost everywhere-- in school, at work, or at home--  we could hear people 
express their views on elections. 
As far as national identity construction is concerned, we can say that when the 
Taiwanese people periodically participate in the elections of the Congress, Governor, and 
President, they are in essence consenting to the existence of a political community to 
which they all belong, as well as accepting this island as the legitimate boundary for 
calculating majority votes.  In effect, these intensive political participations not only 
provide a public arena where people can communicate and solve disputes with a common 
                                                     
109
 For example, the first all-seat reelection of National Assembly was held in 1991, then reelection of 
Legislative Yuan in 1992, then Taipei and Kaoshiong mayor in 1993, first Taiwan Governor election in 
1994, Legislative Yuan in 1995, the first Presidential election in 1996, the second National Assembly 





set of rules, but also let the people accept the island of Taiwan as the legitimate boundary 
for deciding “national” affairs.  After years of continuing elections of local, provincial 
and national leaders, it is not surprising to find that most people started to view “Taiwan” 
not just a geographical or provincial term, but a political entity with state characteristics. 
It is also natural for people to see “Taiwanese” as more than a Ben Sheng ren (本省人), 
but a representation of political citizenship. Moreover, being autonomous in political, 
economic, and social lives, Taiwanese people have actually formed a rather clear 
consensus on what is “domestic” and what is “foreign”--- it has been quite clear that only 
those who live in Taiwan, not the 1.3 billion of people on the other side of the strait, have 
the right to participate in this political community and make decision for the political 
community. 
Scholars, for example, Chang Maukuei, maintain that the birth of a new nation 
must use certain rituals to symbolize and forge group consciousness. In the case of 
Taiwan, it can be argued that no other collective ritual is more impressive than the 
holding of elections, especially in terms of the frequencies, extensiveness, and intensity. 
A nation, as Benedict Anderson has put it, is an imagined community. We can say that 
the Taiwanese people are now imagining their political community through the practices 
of democratization, which have made the people gradually accustomed to participating in 
the deliberation and decision-making of “national” affairs, and made them implicitly or 
explicitly accept the island as the legitimate unit of governance.   
This democratization process not only helps forge a sense of belonging to a 
common community, but also offers various social groups an institutional channel to 




new collective consciousness among the people, the term “Taiwan” is therefore 
transformed from a geographic unit or a provincial identity to an imagined political 
community and the term “Taiwanese” from an ethnic term for native Taiwanese to a civic 
term for “citizens of Taiwan.” In the words of Ernest Renan, if the existence of a nation 
can be revealed through the “everyday plebiscite” of the people, then democratization 
practices in Taiwan certainly strengthen their sense of belonging to a civic nation through 
participation in the public sphere every day. 
 
Before-and-After Elections and National Identification 
 Table 5.1 to Table 5.3 ccompare three major elections in the 1990s and their 
impacts on Taiwan people’s national identification.  As shown in Table 5.1, Table 5.2, 
and Table 5.3, the sense of national belonging and attitude toward the Reunification 
versus Independence issues vary significantly before and after the three nation-wide 
elections held in Taiwan in the first half of 1990s— the first all-seats re-election of 
Legislative Yuan in 1992, the first Taiwan Governor election in 1994, and the first 
presidential election in 1996.  Table 5.4 and Table 5.5, demonstrate the variation of 
national identification at seven time points from 1992 to 1996.   
For example, the results of Table 5.2 demonstrate that, one and half months 
before the 1994 Taiwan Governor election, 19.4% of respondents identified themselves 
as ‘Taiwanese only,’ but the percentage went up to 25.8% after the election;  the “pro-
independence” percentage was 10.3 before the election, which went up to 12.9% after the 
election.  Again, in the 1996 presidential election (see Table 5.3), the percentage of 
“Taiwanese identity” increased 14% (from 19.9% to 33.9%), while the “pro-




election. We are mindful that the political campaign effect would reduce in strength after 
the heat of political campaign diminished.  As it is shown in the summary figures, all 
three categories of national identity fluctuated during the study periods.  Dual identities 
percentage decreased 4.5% after  the1992 Legislative election, but went back to 52.9% 
before the 1994 Taiwan Governor election; and dropped again by  5.6% after the 1994 
Taiwan Governor, then went back to 52% before the 1996 presidential election, finally 
decreasing 8% after the 1996 Presidential election. In other words, dual identity dropped 
to a mid-forty percentage after the three elections, but it went back to 52% before the 
next elections. The “Taiwanese identity” and “Chinese identity” figures show a similar 
pattern: after each election the Taiwanese identity percentage increased significantly and 
it went back to lower percentage before the three elections, despite that fact that 
Taiwanese identity increased in an overall pattern. 
 







National Consciousness N % N % 
Taiwanese 183 18.0 301 19.8 
Both Taiwanese and Chinese 507 50.0 693 45.5 
Chinese 236 23.3 442 29.0 
Others 89 8.7 87 5.7 
Statehood Preferences N % N % 
Pro-independence 68 6.7 107 7.0 
Pro-status quo 428 42.2 868 57 
Pro-unification 189 18.6 260 17.1 
Others 330 32.5 288 18.9 
Total 1015 100.0 1523 100.0 
Note: 1. The before-election result was based on telephone interview, cited from the National Chengchi 
University Election Study Center. 2. The after-election data came from the face-to-face interview, 
conducted by the same institute. The statistics are re-calculated by the author. 3. Others include “No 
















N % N % 
Taiwanese 204 19.4 280 25.8 
Both Taiwanese and Chinese 555 52.9 512 47.3 
Chinese 208 19.8 230 21.2 
Others 83 7.9 61 5.7 
Statehood Preferences 
N % N % 
Pro-independence 108 10.3 140 12.9 
Pro-status quo 479 45.6 470 43.3 
Pro-unification 244 23.2 292 27.0 
Others 219 20.8 181 16.8 
Total 1050 100.0 1083 100.0 
Data Source: Same as Table 5.3 
 
 






National Consciousness N % N % 
Taiwanese 243 19.9 473 33.9 
Both Taiwanese and Chinese 636 52.0 614 44.0 
Chinese 194 15.9 234 16.8 
Others 150 12.2 75 5.4 
Statehood Preferences N % N % 
Pro-independence 137 11.2 247 17.7 
Pro-status quo 575 47.0 622 44.6 
Pro-unification 253 20.7 300 21.5 
Others 258 21.1 227 16.3 
Total 1223 100.0 1396 100.0 
















Table 5. 4  Changes of National Consciousness, 1992-1996 
 
 
























% % % % % % % 
Taiwanese 
Only 




49.7 45.5 40.1 47.3 45.1 44.8 44.0 
Chinese 
Only 
23.4 29.0 22.8 21.2 18.9 18.5 16.8 
Others 3.1 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.8 5.5 5.4 
Total N 1408 1523 1394 1083 2093 1485 1396 
Data Source: Same as Table 5.3. 
 
 
Table 5. 5  Changes of the Statehood Preferences, 1992-1996 






















% % % % % % % 
Pro- 
Independence 
7.6 7.0 10.0 12.9 16.8 13.5 17.7 
Pro- 
Status Quo 
40.6 57.0 43.6 43.3 53.6 44.8 44.6 
Pro- 
Unification 
37.1 17.1 26.2 27.0 15.6 23.3 21.5 
Others 14.6 18.9 20.2 16.8 14.0 18.4 16.3 
Total N 1408 1523 1394 1083 2093 1485 1396 









Opinions about Democracy and National Identification 
 
Table 5.6 and Table 5.7 demonstrate people's opinion about democracy and how 
such attitude associated with their national identification in the past decade. The data are 
from the panel surveys conducted by the "Election Study Center" in Taiwan from 2008 to 
2012.  The questionnaire wording of "opinions about democracy" is: "Which of these 
four statements is closest to your own opinion? 01. democracy is preferable to any other 
kind of regime; 02. in some circumstances, an authoritarian regime - a dictatorship can be 
a democratic system; 03. an authoritarian regime - a dictatorship is preferable to any 
other kind of regime; 04. for someone like me, it doesn't matter what kind of regime we 
have; 95. refuse to answer; 96. it depends; 97. no opinion; 98. don't know.  
The respondents' answers to the above question are grouped into three categories - 
prefer democracy, prefer authoritarianism, and neutral.  According to the Table 5.6 and 
5.7, we find that people who prefer democracy over authoritarianism have much higher 
percentage to identify themselves as Taiwanese and choose Taiwan independence as their 
statehood preferences.  This result is consistent with the above analysis of 












Table 5. 6  Opinions about Democracy and National Consciousness, 2008-2012 
  National Identity (2008) 






















  National Identity (2012) 




























Table 5. 7  Opinions about Democracy and Statehood Preferences 2008-2012 
  Statehood Preferences (2008) 
2008-2  Unification Status Quo Independence 
Opinions of 
Democracy*(2280) 


















  Statehood Preferences (2012) 
2012  Unification Status Quo Independence 
Opinions of 
Democracy*(1358) 

























Campaign Participation and National Identification 
The TEDS surveys from 2001 to 2012 list the following campaign activities and let 
respondents choose if they participate any of the activity items. (Multiple responses 
permitted.) 
01. read the official notice 
02. read candidates' leaflets, newsletters, or newspaper ads 
03. watch candidate debates or campaign speeches on TV 
04. do volunteer work in campaign for either a candidate or party 
05. attend an election related gathering or banquets 
06. join a candidate's support organization 
07. remind your friends to watch candidate debates or campaign speeches on TV 
08. persuade others to vote for particular candidate or party? 
09. give money to a political party or candidate  
 
According to the respondents' responses, I grouped them into two categories: one 
is the "lower" level of participation group, referring to those who chose any or more of 
the listed activities but not including any of 04-06 and 09; the other is the "higher level" 
participation group, referring to those choosing any or more items from 04-06 and 09.
110
  
The results in the Table 5.8 (see below) demonstrate the levels of campaign 
participation in the last decade and how they are associated with the national 
identification changes -- the higher level of political participation during the campaign 
process, the higher percentage of their Taiwanese identity and the support for Taiwan 
independence.      
On the other hand, people with lower level of political participation during the 
campaign process tend to have higher percentage of favoring the status quo over the other 
two statehood preferences, but for the people who have high level of political 
participation, the support for Taiwan independence is much higher than the other two 
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options, "unification" and "status quo". It suggests that the higher level of campaign 
participation group tends to have a stronger Taiwan-centered national identification. In 
contrast, the trend is not clear in the China-centered national identification. 
 
Table 5. 8  Level of Campaign Participation and National Identification 


















































































Data source: TEDS 2001-12 survey data. The statistics are author's own calculation. * refers to significance 
level <.05 
 
Mechanism of Electoral Politics -- From Ethnic Mobilization to Civic Discourses 
 
Scholars drawing from the experiences of the former Yugoslavia, Soviet Union, 
and Baltic States pointed out that once an authoritarian regime initiates political transition 
in an ethnically divided society, national identity-related issues very often become the 
most natural mobilization choice for the opposition forces. The main reason for this is 
because the opposition forces tend to be fragile initially, and often lacked organizational 




unsurprisingly become the cheapest, fastest, and most effective mobilization appeal. 
Taiwan’s situation was no exception.  
Prior to the democratization in the 1990s, as the KMT regime was dominated by a 
small group of Mainlanders, the native opposition forces utilized ethnic cleavages or 
provincial consciousness for mass mobilization. In the 1990s, as free electoral 
competitions were made possible through democratic transition, it further strengthened 
the opportunity and incentives of political elites, especially from the opposition camp at 
that time.  Therefore, ethnic cleavages and nationalistic mobilization had gained more 
momentum after the onset of democratization.   
However, the mobilization capacity of nationalism reached a bottleneck at the 
later period of democratization, and it induced the political elites of major parties to 
modify their ethnicity-based nationalism discourses toward a civic and liberal nationalism. 
Why did Taiwan’s political elites choose to ease up on ethnic mobilization and turn to the 
construction of civic-territory based national identity?  To answer the question, we need 
to analyze the mechanism of electoral politics and focus on the elite-mass linkage in the 
democratization process. To begin with, three major contextual changes in Taiwan are 
worth noting. 
First, Taiwanese voters’ attitude has changed over time.  As shown in the surveys 
and empirical analysis in Chapter 3 and 4, the median voters in Taiwan prefer the Status 
Quo to either independence or reunification. And, there are a quarter of residents consider 
"both unification and independence acceptable".  More importantly, the majority of  the 
Taiwanese population holds a dual identity--- both Chinese and Taiwanese. As neither 




dual identities and the status quo preference have become a critical group in steering the 
calculations of political elites. To win over the median voters, major political parties were 
therefore induced to modify their ethnic nationalist appeals and soften their ideological 
stances. 
The second major change in social contexts is that, after nearly five decades of 
social integration, mostly through intermarriages, work and school, most native 
Taiwanese have relatives, friends, and neighbors who are mainlanders--- which makes it 
too costly and nearly impossible for any political parties to pursue the building of a 
Taiwanese state that excludes the mainlanders. At the same time, with the KMT 
completing its indigenization under Lee Teng-hui’s leadership, the DPP also found it 
difficult to continue mobilizing the people with ethnic cleavages.  Besides, there exists a 
sub-ethnic division between the Minnan-speaking and Hakka-speaking communities; the 
latter accounts for about 12 percent of the population.  If the DPP overplays the ethnic 
card, which had been essentially Minnan-centric, it is bound to lose support from the 
Hakka- speaking native Taiwanese. Many DPP elites realized that overdoing ethnic 
mobilization might even hinder the construction of Taiwanese nationalism. [Note: refer to 
Chu Yun-han's analysis on this point.] As to the New Party, the extreme pro-Unification 
party split from the KMT in the early 1990s, an explicit ethnic and nationalist 
mobilization is also not a good approach, not only because mainlanders only account for 
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The third challenge to ethnic mobilization is the surfacing of multiple crosscutting 
issues in the society. Some empirical studies have found that the emergence of many 
crosscutting social and economic issues, such as social redistribution, anti-corruption, and 
environmental protection have greatly weakened the power of ethnic and national identity 
mobilization
112
. Because each political party has comparative advantages on certain 
issues and can form different winning coalitions depending on issues, it can be argued 
that Taiwan’s politics is no longer a zero-sum game.  
 The most dramatic example was that the two opposing political ideology parties, 
DPP and New Party, together proposed a “Grand Reconciliation” and cooperated 
numerous times on economic and social reform issues, a reflection of elite convergence 
and coalition politics. Since DPP and New Party elites needed each other’s support on 
certain issues, both parties were forced to soften their nationalism discourses and 
cultivated new issues so as to form coalitions with others.  One recent empirical study has 
demonstrated a divergent support for the DPP and the Taiwan Independence Movement 
(TIM) in the last decade.
113
 Against the mainstream views that tend to believe the lower 
popular support for the DPP in the 2008 presidential election would indicate a parallel 
declining support for the TIM, but empirical evidence proves to the opposite.  
 
Inter-marriage and National Identification 
Table 5.9 and Table 5.10 demonstrate the relationship between people's national 
identification and inter-marriage family background from 2001 to 2012. (see below)  
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Table 5. 9  Inter-marriage and National Consciousness 2001-2012 
  National Identity (2001) 









  National Identity (2004) 









  National Identity (2008) 









  National Identity (2012) 













Table 5. 10  Intermarriage and Statehood Preferences 2001-2012 
  Statehood Preferences in 2001 









  Statehood Preferences in 2004 









  Statehood Preferences in 2008 









  Statehood Preferences in 2012 













After recoding between two groups - one group whose parents are from the same 
ethnic backgrounds (either Minnan, Hakka, or Mainlanders), and the other group whose 




parents belong to different ethnic backgrounds (e.g., father Mainlander, mother Minnan 
or Hakka; or father Hakka, mother Minnan or Mainlanders, etc.), the percentages of "dual 
identities" (63.4% in 2001, 59.6% in 2004, and 55.3% in 2008) are higher than the other 
two identity options, except for the year 2012. It suggests that people from intermarriage 
family tend to identify with "dual identities".  Table 5.10 shows that the statehood 
preferences for the people with inter-marriage family backgrounds are roughly with equal 
distribution, especially from 2004 to 2012. 
David Truman and Seymour Lipset, as well as Arend Lijphant and Giovanni 
Satori, had pointed out, in a party system with crosscutting social cleavages, people tend 
to take mellower political stance because they have to face cross-pressures from multiple 
identities or interests
114
. Taiwan seems no exception to this analysis.   
 
Strategic Interaction among Competing Elites 
This section examines the role of political elites in the construction of new 
collective identity and focuses the interaction among competing elites (within and 
between political parties) in the democratization process
115
, which illustrate how the 
linkage of mass-elites would further transform the elites’ national identity discourses. 
It is true that from the very beginning, the DPP leaders have built up their 
electoral support through highlighting the shared sense of suffering and deprivation 
among the native Taiwanese. The salient cleavage was played up because it could unite 
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the DPP supporters of different social and economic interests under a common cause and 
was considered an effective counter strategy against the KMT's broadly-based socio-
economic development program. The critical turning point for the growth of Taiwan-
centered collective identification was the power struggle within the KMT after the 
passing of Chiang Ching-kuo.    
In the late 1980s, Lee Teng-hui succeeded Chiang Ching-kuo as both President 
and the KMT chairman. On his way to power consolidation within the KMT, Lee Teng-
hui skillfully shifted the burden of defending the KMT’s orthodox lines -- that is, 
defending the extra-constitutional arrangements (that is the Temporary Articles under the 
“Period of Mobilization and Combating Communist Rebellion”) amid a global wave of 
democratization, insisting on the "One-China" principle when virtually all major nations 
have shifted their diplomatic recognition to the PRC as the sole legitimate government of 
China, and upholding a Chinese identity in the wake of a emergence of Taiwanese 
identity --- to his mainlander rivalry (known as non-mainstream factions) within the 
KMT.  Alternatively, Lee emphasized a "Taiwan-centered" view in managing the island's 
external relations and launched a series of bold policy initiatives toward Mainland 
China
116
. The redirection of both the foreign and mainland policy aggravated the division 
over the one-China principle within the KMT and, more importantly, transformed both 
intra-party and inter-party coalitional politics. 
The intra-party struggle, known as Mainstream versus Non-mainstream factions, 
came to the forefront in the early 1990s, when Lee Teng-hu nomiated Lee Yuan-tsu as his 
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running mate for presidency.
117
. In the fierce power struggle, Lee characterized his 
rivalry as a conservative group interested only in preserving its past prerogatives and 
identifying more closely with Mainland China than with the 21 million people on the 
island. Since Hau Pei-tsun, a key actor of non-mainstream faction, resigned from the post 
of primary minister at the end of 1992, Lee began to exercise full control of both the 
party and state apparatus. Lee strategically endorsed the burgeoning Taiwanese 
consciousness and cultivated a new sense of common destiny among the 21 million 
people.  Disagreeing with Lee's movements, some leading figures of the KMT non-
mainstream faction decided to break away from the KMT and established the New Party. 
The New Party built up its electoral support initially by appealing to the besieged 
mentality of the mainlander voters, who were greatly alienated by the swift 
Taiwanization of the KMT power structure.  In the 1994 Taipei mayoral race, the NP 
candidate Chao Shao-kang heated up the crisis mentality of the voters with strong 
Chinese nationalist sentiment to a boiling point by attacking Lee Teng-hui for his hidden 
agenda of Taiwanese independence.   
However, the more the non-mainstream faction questioned Lee's commitment to 
Chinese nationalism and objected to his efforts of seeking ideological accommodation 
with the opposition camp, the more popular Lee became among the native Taiwanese.  
Increasingly, Lee Teng-hui has been perceived as the protector of the island's autonomy 
from the PRC and the embodiment of the glory and honor of the Taiwanese people for his 
dedicated efforts in accelerating the Taiwanization, alleviating the past grievance such as 
the February 28th incident, restoring the pride and self-respect of the Taiwanese, and 
asserting an separate sovereign status from the R.O.C. in the international community. In 
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his most revealing interview with Ryotaro Shiba, a well-known Japanese writer, in the 
fall of 1993, Lee spoke of “the misery of being a Taiwanese,” (sheng wei tai wan ren de 
bei ai) implying that Taiwan has for hundreds of years been ruled by different foreign 
regimes and had never been granted a chance to determine its own fate. It is believed that 
this widely-cited line came very close to a tacit endorsement of the principle of self-
determination. Therefore, the logic of strategic alliance compelled the opposition DPP 
with no other choice but to side with Lee Teng-hui at all crucial junctures of  KMT intra-
party power struggle between the mainstream and non-mainstream factions in order to 
pursue the development of Taiwanese identity.   
 
Elite-Mass Linkage: From Ethnic Mobilization to Civic Discourses 
This section analyzes how the frequent election campaigns in the past two 
decades linked the masses with elites, and transformed the nationalist discourses in both 
KMT and DPP.  The purpose is to explain how the civic-based nationalist discourse 
gradually emerged among political elites in the 1990s.    
Again, Lee Teng-hui played a significant role in the process. Under his control of 
both the KMT and the national government, Lee was able to harness the independence 
zeal with a call for the formation of the sense of shared-destiny among the twenty-one 
million people and a gradual defection from the one-China principle. As an alternative to 
the pursuit of de jure independence, Lee promoted the so-called "Republic of China on 
Taiwan" formula anchored on a two-China model while being ingeniously evasive, 
flexible, and ambiguous on the issue of national re-unification. At the same time, the 




irresponsible and the New Party's pro-reunification platform disloyal to the Taiwanese 
people.   
It is fair to say that Lee Deng Hui’s indigenous program has enabled the KMT to 
reconcile effectively the seeming contradiction between the popular aspiration for a 
separate identity in the international community and the prevailing concern for stability 
and prosperity. This approach also virtually pushed the DPP and NP into a corner on the 
two polar ends of the political spectrum
118
.  
As Lee Teng-hui and his mainstream allies moved to consolidate the centrist 
position on the sensitive national identity issue, the DPP was inevitably compelled to 
soften their nationalist stances when faced with the pressure from the median voters. 
Starting in the early 1995, DPP leaders, Shih Ming-teh and Hsu Hsin-liang), began to 
soft-peddle the Taiwan independence claim through a re-interpretation of the status quo. 
They argued that, since Taiwan had already been an independent sovereign state for 
almost half a century, there was no need to declare formal independence or to hold 
plebiscite to decide the matter.
119
 At the end of 1998, the DPP experienced a serious 
electoral setback in the Legislative election and Taipei City Mayoral election, which 
further forced the DPP elites to consider “recognizing the ROC” as a way of 
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In January 1999, DPP Secretary and leader of the pro-independence New Tide faction, Chiu Yi-jen, also 
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reinterpreting Taiwan’s statehood status
120
. In other words, the DPP was ready to accept 
the ROC by stressing that Taiwan is an independent state whose name is Republic of 
China.  It can be argued that DPP was willing to make this change because the Republic 
of China, under Lee Teng-hui’s leadership, no longer claimed sovereignty over the 
Mainland, thus obviating the perceived need to deny the legitimacy of the ROC, and 
because that DPP found it acceptable to strategically redefine ROC as synonymous with 
the Republic of Taiwan. The more important reason is that DPP realized the necessity to 
moderate its nationalist appeal for electoral survival in facing the pressure from median 
voters who took a rather moderate view on the national identity issues.   
In May 1999, DPP’s Party Congress further passed a “Resolution on Taiwan’s 
Future,” stated that “[S]ince the DPP passed the guidelines of ‘establishing an 
independent sovereignty Republic of Taiwan” in 1991, both domestic and foreign 
political and economic situations have changed significantly and our party’s advocacy on 
Taiwan’s future has also been challenged and questioned. .. [T]he current name of 
Taiwan is the Republic of China, and the Republic of China and the People’s Republic of 
China are two mutually independent states.  … [T]hat Taiwan is an independent 
sovereign state is an undoubted fact.  Any actions to change Taiwan’s status quo or 
symbols need to be approved of by all residents of Taiwan via a plebiscite.”
121 
In response to the adjustments from the KMT and DPP, New Party also 
reformulated its nationalist appeal to highlight the "New Taiwanese” consciousness and 
the consolidation of a new democracy before the pursuit of unification. Since the option 
of an immediate unification with the Mainland seems unacceptable to most people in 
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Taiwan, the NP found it necessary to moderate its nationalist appeal and cultivate other 
issues to survive at the ballot box.  Immediately after the 1995 Legislative election, in 
which the KMT barely passed the majority threshold, some NP and DPP leaders held 
symbolic talks, the so-called "Grand Reconciliation", to signal that the two parties were 
willing to set aside their ethnic and ideological differences and jointly promote reforms 
and the building of a coalition government. Afterwards, the NP began to articulate a new 
set of rhetoric that emphasized the party’s sincere commitment to democracy and its 
willingness to cooperate with the DPP on democratic reform issues. 
It is interesting to note that, among the supporters of the “New Taiwanese” 
concept that Lee Teng-hui stressed during the 1998 Taipei City Mayoral election, many 
were pro-unification, as well as in favor of assuming a Chinese identity. According to one 
post-election survey, the New Taiwanese concept was accepted by 72%, 55% and 55% of 
KMT, DPP, and NP supporters, respectively.
122
 Comparatively speaking, the young, the 
better-educated, and the middle class found it easier to accept the New Taiwanese 
identity. In addition, among those interviewees who accepted the New Taiwanese 
discourse, 78% view Taiwan and China as two independent states.  Driven by this trend, 
many New Party leaders and supporters also attempted to present a new nationalism 
discourse, one that could be accepted by most people in Taiwan.  
 
Convergent Taiwan-oriented Identification Emerging? 
The above analysis suggests that democratic process is conducive to the 
narrowing of the formerly severe polarization on the independence-unification issue. As a 
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result of the mass-elites connection under electoral pressure, a consensus gradually 
emerged on the national identity and statehood issues. To most political parties and 
Taiwanese people, “Chinese” identity has gradually become a cultural concept, while 
“Taiwanese” tends to be a political identity.  In terms of statehood, most people have 
come to recognize Taiwan (or the ROC) as a de facto, if not de jure, independent 
sovereign state.  
 Table 5.11 refers to three public surveys, conducted in the late 1990s, that 
demonstrated the public perceptions of the national territory (homeland), citizenship, and 
sovereignty of the Republic of China.  The results suggest that a convergent, instead of 
divided, collective imagination gradually developed in the late 1990s.  
 
Table 5. 11  Perceived National Territory, Citizenship, and Sovereignty of the Republic 
of China 








Q1. Do you think the territory of ROC only covers Taiwan and its 
neighboring islands or extends to cove the mainland as well?   
   
  (1) Taiwan and its neighboring islands  41% 51% 65% 
  (2) Both Taiwan and the mainland 42% 33% 27% 
 
Q2. Do you think the citizens of the ROC refer to the people of Taiwan 
only or both the people in Taiwan and the mainland? 
   
  (1) The people in Taiwan only 44% 58% 64% 
  (2) The people in both Taiwan and the mainland 39% 28% 28% 
 
Q3. Who, do you think, have the right to determine the future of Taiwan--




  (1) Only the people in Taiwan  n.a. 73% 81% 
  (2) All of the people in both Taiwan and the mainland n.a. 13% 13% 
 N=1376 N=1406 N=1027 
Source: Data in Feb. and July 1996 come from face-to-face interviews that were conducted by the “Political 
System and Change Workshop” led by Professor Hu Fo, Department of Political Science, National Taiwan 




Cable and Communication company, in July. 
The most significant finding from these surveys is that there has been a civic line 
clearly drawn between Taiwan and the Mainland China in public perceptions. First, there 
are more than half of the people in Taiwan (51% in July 1996, 65% in 1998) recognize 
the jurisdiction of the their government (the Republic of China) limited only to Taiwan 
and its outlying islands. The majority of people in Taiwan agreed that the citizens of the 
ROC are meant to be the people in Taiwan only, not including the people in mainland 
China. In addition, a very high percentage of people (73% in 1996 and 81% in 1998) 
agree with the idea of “popular sovereignty” and claim only people who live in Taiwan 
have the right to determine the future of Taiwan. 
 
Personal In-depth Interviews 
  
 This section reports the personal in-depth interviews that are designed and 
conducted to understand why and how individuals identify themselves in each national 
identity categories and choose their statehood preferences. Two general underlying 
identity formation mechanisms -- primordial ethnic-cultural vs. constructive civic-
territorial dimensions-- are presented to informants to learn how their national identities 
are constructed and/or re-constructed through these two underlying mechanisms in 
response to three major external contextual changes -- democratization, new dynamics of 
cross-Strait exchanges, and the rise of China in the international society.  
 




 Throughout the interviews, most informants have clearly demonstrated that the 
mechanisms working under Chinese identity and Taiwanese identity are different.  For 
those who identify themselves as Taiwanese, the underlying mechanisms are mainly 
civic-territorial principles and the so-called "Taiwanese" refer to the citizens who live in 
the Taiwan political community.  On the contrary, people with Chinese identity 
emphasized the primordial linage, culture, and history to define themselves as Chinese.  
 Informant No. 5 , 23 years old, whose parents are Hakka, said,: "I am a 
Taiwanese, as Taiwan is the place where I was born and grew up; Taiwan is 
my homeland.  Although we cannot deny the lineage and cultural roots and 
historical connections with China, however, we have settled down in Taiwan 
for a long time. We have established our own political system and institutions. 
We are citizens and live here, so we are Taiwanese, that is for sure!"  
 
 
 Informant No. 21, in his early thirties with Minnan background, said: " I 
understand the history that, as the result of the Chinese civil war, the KMT 
government moved to Taiwan.  However, after two-decade political reforms,  
we have created a democracy, Taiwan has established a new government. Of 
course, Taiwanese refer to the citizens who live in this place. I'm a citizen of 
this country, so I am Taiwanese."   
 
 
 Informant No. 15, 25 years old, with mixed ethnic background, 
Minnan/Mainlander, has expressed a very strong Taiwanese identity, he even 
denied the common culture and lineage with the mainland Chinese. He said, 
"according to several authoritative researches, Taiwanese are actually more 
closer to the residents in the Southeast Asian countries.  As to the culture and 
history, Taiwan is closer to Japan, not to China." He said that there is "no 
reason to connect Taiwanese with Chinese." 
 
 
 Informant No. 11,  58 years old, both parents are Mainlanders, said, "Chinese 
are the people who share the same lineage and culture. My father was born in 
Guangxi, my mother in Guangdong. Of course, I am a Chinese…  Since I have 
been living in Taiwan for a long time, I can say 'I am also a Taiwanese.' In 
some occasions, I will also say that I am a Chinese from Taiwan."  
 
 
 Informant No. 20, 52 years old, both parents are Mainlanders, said, "Just like 




Although I was born in Taiwan, but according to the lineage and history, I am 
a Chinese.  Depending on the situations, I sometimes will say I am Taiwanese; 
it is just like in Guangdong and Sichuan, Jiangsu, or other provinces, they will 
say they are Guangdong people, Sichuan people.  Of course, Guangdong is 
not Sichuan, nor is Jiangsu.  In Taiwan, we know Taichung is not Tainan, 
Tainan is not Taipei. These are just the 'regional' and 'provincial differences; 
but, in terms of national identity, we are all Chinese.  So you understand, I am 
Chinese, 'Taiwanese' is not a 'national' identity to me." 
 
2. "Dual identities" -- "Taiwanese can also be Chinese, there is no conflict!"   
 Several informants considered themselves as both "Chinese and Taiwanese", and 
clarified that the "Chinese" component is connected to the primordial mechanism -- 
lineage, culture, and history--while the "Taiwanese" component is civic-territorially 
defined.  The ethnic and civic mechanisms work together without any conflict to form 
their national identification.   
 Informant No. 2, 26 years old, Mainlander/Minnan backgrounds, said, " I 
consider myself as both Chinese and Taiwanese. From the perspective of 
history, culture, and lineage, my ancestors are from the mainland China, it is 
true that I am a Chinese.  However, I am also a Taiwanese as I live in Taiwan 
and am proud of the democratic system in this political community. I grew up 
in Taiwan and live under Taiwan's institution, therefore I am also a 
Taiwanese. Cultural and lineage roots are not in conflict with the political 
system and citizenship."  
 
 
 Informant No. 4, 36 years old with Minnan background, said "Based on 
emotional attachment, I thought I was both Chinese and Taiwanese; dual 
identities worked well to me.  However, after the recent cross-strait exchanges, 
I somehow feel both sides are quite different in many aspects, especially in the 
fields of culture and value system, which make me feel some distance to the 
Chinese. Although I am still ethnically Chinese, but I am not sure if I still hold 
the dual identities."    
 




 According to the interviews, the main differences between people claiming 
"Taiwanese identity" and those who carried "Dual identities" are not the ways they define 
"Taiwanese" differently, but the different weights of the primordial Chineseness they put 
in their national identification.  Informants with Taiwanese identity did not deny their 
Chinese lineage and cultural roots, but they think the "Chineseness" is too remote and 
trivial, and it becomes meaningless to claim "Chinese" as a part of national identity.  
Being a Taiwanese, the most important  mechanisms are based on the civic principles 
(e.g., the citizenship) and a deeper attachment to the territory.  In contrast, for those who 
claim Chinese identity or Dual identities, the primordial connection of lineage and culture 
is still important to them, therefore, the ethnic "Chineseness" remains a part of their 
national identity.   
 Informant No. 22, in the mid-thirties, with Minnan backgrounds, said, "It is 
true that Taiwanese and Chinese share the same lineage and ancestors, but 
after hundreds of years of separation, both sides have established their own 
cultural, social, and political systems, and have moved toward different 
directions.  Just like Americans, their ancestors immigrated to the United 
States from England and many other European countries, and have now 
gradually become Americans.  Do you see Americans claim they are British?  
Will British say Americans are British? I can understand why some people 
still claim dual identities; but I'm not one of them, I am a Taiwanese." 
 
 
 Informant No. 21,33 years old, with Minnan background, also said, "The 
ancestors of Korean and Japanese are all from China too, but the Koreans 
and Japanese never say they are Chinese. I don't understand why people 
would claim they are 'Both Chinese and Taiwanese. Anyway, it is their right 
to say so, but I don't have dual identities." 
 
 
 Informant No. 16, 27 years old, with Minnan background, said, "From my 
point of view, national identification depends on the life experiences, the older 
generation people whose life experiences are quite different from the younger 
generations. It is not a surprise that different generations have different 
national identifications. I was born and grew up in Taiwan, Taiwan is a 






 Informant No. 14, in the mid twenties, with Minnan/Mainlander background, 
said, "Yes, we have shared the same lineage, culture, and long history with 
China, but we are now living under a completely different political system.  
After so many years, both sides have also developed their own unique  culture 
and history; those remote cultural and historical roots are very light and 
trivial, they do not influence my national identification."  
 
4. National Identification: Ethnic Backgrounds vs. Age Generations  
 The empirical surveys in the earlier chapters have demonstrated a clear 
relationship between the ethnic backgrounds and national identification.  For example, 
the Mainlanders are more likely to support unification and identify themselves as Chinese 
or Dual identities, Minnan people tend to support Independence or the Status Quo, while 
the Hakka people take the stand closer to Mainlander in Chinese identity but closer to the 
Minnan in the statehood preferences.  Given the general trend from the empirical surveys, 
the personal in-depth interviews however suggest that the younger generations, across the 
ethnic backgrounds, have developed a common civic-based approach to the national 
identity issue.  Several next generation Mainlander informants, like Minnan and Hakka 
next generations, have demonstrated a very similar approach to the national identification 
and define themselves "Taiwanese" following the civic mechanisms -- democracy, 
homeland, and citizenship. For example, Informant No. 12, 28 years old, a third 
generation Mainlanders, said, "I understand why older generation people might have dual 
identities, because the cultural and lineage root are important to them;  but I'm different, I 
don't consider myself "both Chinese and Taiwanese". My national identity comes from 
the  institution and citizenship.  Taiwan has its own culture, values and, most importantly, 




5. Party affiliation and National Identification --" Party affiliation and Tong-du 
attitudes are not necessarily the same!"  
 Most informants said that they don't support political parties only because of their 
tong-du standpoints, but whether or not the political parties have good policies and can 
deliver to the people.  
 Informant No. 9, a younger Minnan generation and a firm Taiwan 
Independence supporter, said, "I don't think people, especially the younger 
generation, still use the Tong-du as the base to choose their support of 
political parties. What we care more now is the economic development. I 
support the political party that can really help us to promote economy."   
 
 
 Informant No. 20, said, "I strongly support the Taiwan independence, but I 
don't like the DPP.  My support for political party is based on the democratic 
value and practice, not its Tong-du ideology."   
 
 
 Informant No. 6, 25 years old with Minnan background, said, "I guess there 
are some people, such as the fundamentalists, still based their party support 
on the ideology.  However, I think most reasonable people would choose their 
support by their performance, not by what they say. What they can really 
deliver is more important than ideology. Party affiliation and statehood 
preferences are not necessarily the same.  Even a die-hard Taiwan 
independence supporter, I think, will choose the KMT if he/she believes that 
the KMT can help develop Taiwan's economy. On the other hand, I also 
believe there are many KMT supporters who don't favor the unification. Like 
myself, I'm a KMT supporter, but don't support unification."   
 
6. New Civic Taiwanese identity has emerged: "The boundary of my homeland is 
Taiwan, not including the mainland China." 
 In the interview questionnaire, there are three specific questions  (Section III, 
questions  no. 1, 2, and 3) regarding the boundary of state, compatriots, and sovereignty.  
When asked these three questions, all informants (except for informant No. 11, 58 years 




older generations, demonstrated a clear consensus that the current boundary of our 
homeland is Taiwan (including Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu), the compatriots are those 
who live in Taiwan (not including the people in the mainland), the sovereignty is limited 
to Taiwan/Penghu/Kinmen/Matsu, and only Taiwan people have the right to decide the 
future of Taiwan. The consensus on the territory, compatriots, and sovereignty boundary, 
along with  earlier civic-territory defined Taiwanese identity, confirms with the Table 





In the past two decades, the newly-installed democratic practices in effect 
functioned like political re-socilialization. Political democratization, especially the 
intensive and broad electoral opening, has effectively drawn people into the political 
process through campaigning, voting, political discussion, and participation in political 
parties and social movements. The practice of democracy has made the people gradually 
accustomed to deliberating “national” affairs and made them implicitly or explicitly 
accept the island of Taiwan as the legitimate unit of governance. 
Many scholars are concerned about the conflicting nature between nationalism 
and democratic principles,
123
because people tend to narrowly define nations in terms of 
ethnic characteristics, not political status, and believe that a state should be made up of 
one nation.  However, if nation can be a political concept embedded in the civic and 
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ethnicity, and religion while liberal democrats usually define nation politically and territorially in terms of 




territorial terms, and refer to the identity that citizens have toward their state, then such 
kind of nationalism will not jeopardize democratic stability. As a matter of fact, theories 
on both democracy and liberalism all assume the existence of a political community 
(state) with a well-defined boundary and citizenship.   
Juan Linz pointed out (1985: 203-53) that in a heterogeneous society where 
people of various primordial backgrounds are cohabiting, building a nation-state solely 
on primordial ties is nearly impossible and always too costly.  Most nationalist elites 
therefore are eventually forced/induced to put more emphasis on territoriality and to shine 
less spotlight on primordial characteristics, albeit the importance of primordial (ethnic) 
mobilization in their initial development stage
124
. According to Linz, in order to 
consolidate democracy in a divided society that is troubled by national identity conflicts,  
what people should strive for is not a nation-state but a state-nation, because the latter is 
made up of those who live in and identify with the same political community, those who 
can tolerate or even appreciate different national imaginations.   
The case of Taiwan in the last decade has proved that democracy and nationalism 
can be reconciled, and it further demonstrates that democracy and nationalism are not 
only interdependent in theory, the two also engage a dynamic relationship in the real 
world.  On the one hand, with three underlying transforming mechanisms, as discssed in 
this chapter, democratic practices help to create a collective sense of citizenship in a 
given political community; on the other hand, a consensus of a political boundary and the 
sense of citizenship are also important to democratic practices and further consolidation.   
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However, the democratization practices would not guarantee a harmonious 
development especially when people are having conflicting national orientations, and in a 
society many ethnic groups with different historical experiences and national 
imaginations. The convergent development, to a certain degree, is explained by the role 
played by the political elites and the elite-mass linkage during the process.  
The organization principles underlying people's national identification do not 
change automatically or grew out of natural transformation. The direction moving to 
either ethnicity or civic principles requires discussion and explanation. And I suppose 
different countries might have different development patterns.  
From this perspective, the role of political elites is very important. The results of 
Taiwan governor election in 1994, first presidential election in 1996, and Taipei mayoral 
election in 1998, have proved the acceptance of "New Taiwanese identity" by people 
across ethnic backgrounds. Otherwise, it is hard to explain two second generation 
Mainlanders, James Soong and Ma Ying-jeou's victory in these two elections. Their 
victory cannot be taken as a given; without the political endorsement from Lee Teng-hui, 
the native Taiwanese, and fifty years cross-ethnic integration, an inclusive identity is not 




Chapter 6:     Cross-Strait Dynamics and International Dimensions 
 
Chapter Five explored the dynamic relationship between democratic transition 
and the transformation of national identification in Taiwan, and suggested a civic-
territorial type of collective consciousness has been formed out of a two-decade long 
democratic practices in the society.  It however raises an important question: How does 
the newly developed national orientation interact with the long-existing Chinese national 
identity? In theory, the newly formed Taiwan-oriented collective identity does not 
necessarily bring about conflict with the existing Chinese identity; however, as the 
empirical studies shown in the Chapter 3 and 4, the latter seems to have been gradually 
pushed away from the newly emerged collective identity, a process that many observers 
have label as “de-sinicization.” 
This chapter examines the influence of two inter-related contextual forces - first, 
the cross-strait dynamics in the last two decades, and second, the international factors, 
especially the rise of China in the international society -- on the transformation of 
Taiwanese identification, and explain how these two contextual forces work together to 
further consolidate the civic nature of the newly developed collective identification and 
gradually push away the traditional Chinese national identity.  In addition to several 








As far as national identity transformation is concerned, cross-Strait interactions 
can be analyzed at two levels: the bilateral level, and the international level. The latter 
refers to the ROC-PRC rivalry in the international society, mainly on the sovereignty 
issue and the “One China” principle. In this section, I would like to focus on the bilateral 
interactions and demonstrate how the dynamics of cross-Strait interaction has exerted as 
much influence on the process of national identity transformation in Taiwan as the 
island’s internal political process. In the second part of this chapter, I will discuss the 
ROC-PRC rivalry over the sovereignty issue and the "one China" dilemma in the 
international society. Finally, I would report the personal in-depth interviews conducted 
and designed to understand how and why people in Taiwan defined and redefined their 
national identification through the influences of the new dynamics of cross-Strait 
interactions and the rise of China in international society.   
Many nationalism scholars have emphasized the role of “Other” in contrast to 
“Us” in the process of nation formation. The “Other” serves as one important function 
because that national consciousness often emerges as much as a result of foreign threat as 
the internally shared history and culture. As it was exemplified by many colonial cases, 
especially when they had not established their own states, their nationalisms were based 
on hostility toward the foreign authorities.
125
  Then, after establishing their states, 
nationalism turned to inward-looking and sought to construct an integrated nation, and 
starting the process of nation-building. 
In the development of Taiwanese nationalist discourses, the mainlander- 
dominated KMT authoritarian regime was first depicted as the “Other.”  As it was seen in 
the “internal colonialism” (nei bu zhi min 內部殖民) discourse (see Chapter 2), the KMT 
                                                     
125




regime was considered by most Taiwanese nationalists as a foreign regime that ruled 
Taiwanese people.  Later on when the KMT became indigenized under Lee Teng-hui and 
Taiwan began its democratic transition; native Taiwanese people began to include the 
mainlander (Wai-sheng ren) as a part of “Us” (see the analysis in Chapter 2 and 5). As a 
substitute, the Mainland China becomes the new “Other”, especially after the two 
societies began to resume contact since the late 1980s.   
The cross-Strait contacts in the past two decades did not help the two societies 
reconcile but instead exposed the huge differences in social as well as political lives 
between the two societies. Moreover, fearing that Taiwan may move toward 
independence after democratization, the People’s Republic of China had chosen to further 
isolate Taiwan from the international community and force Taiwan into unification talks. 
Not surprisingly, the people in Taiwan reacted strongly to these moves.   
The following section refers to several earlier empirical surveys that demonstrate 
how the PRC’s hostile reunification campaign, recurring military threat, and measures of 
diplomatic strangulation in the international society have all served to alienate the people 
of Taiwan from Chinese identity, and therefore strengthened their desire for a separate 
identity.   
 
Cross-Strait Interactions and National Identification 
  
 The United Daily, from October 1989 to July 1997, conducted several telephone 
surveys and presented a clear trend that Taiwan independence support increased as the 




understanding of the changes in public opinion. As it is shown in Figure 1 below, there 
exists a positive correlation between the cross-strait tensions and the increasing support 
of Taiwan Independence and Taiwanese identity. For example, between early 1991 and 
late 1993, Taiwanese identity and support for Taiwan Independence doubled, which was 
closely related to two developments in the cross-Strait relations at that time: First, the 
sharpening of the sovereignty dispute with the launch of semi-official negotiations 
between the SEF and ARATS, and, second, Beijing’s intensive efforts to further isolate 
Taiwan in the international community, such as forcing South Korea to de-recognize the 
ROC government, publishing a white paper on the “Principles on the Taiwan Issue,” and 
boycotting Taiwan’s efforts to seek UN membership. 
 Figure 6.1 also demonstrates that the Thousand Island Incident of 1994 was 
another critical turning point. In the incident, 24 Taiwanese tourists were robbed and 
murdered in mainland China, reportedly by the Chinese Liberation Army, but the PRC 
officials quickly destroyed the evidence and burned the victim bodies. This event had 
severely damaged Taiwanese people’s perceptions and feelings toward the PRC. 
Taiwanese people started to realize how wide the gap is between the two societies in 
terms of respect for human rights and rule of law. Also, Taiwan people realized that, no 
matter the differences between Wai-sheng ren or Ben-sheng ren; in the eyes of PRC 
residents, they were all “Taiwanese.”
126
 
 Between early 1994 and late 1997, there was another surge related to national 
identity issues. During the period, the support of Taiwan Independence had increased up 
to more than 30% and the percentage of Taiwanese identifiers moved up to 50%.  A 
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number of cross-Strait interactions contributed to the changes, among which the two most 
important ones were the PRC’s vociferous attack against Lee Teng-hui's visit to the 
United States and Taiwan’s first direct presidential election. In June 1995, the PRC began 
a series of hostile moves to further intimidate Taiwan and even launched several rounds 
of military exercises and shooting missiles in Taiwan’s surrounding waters in an attempt 
to influence the outcome of Taiwan’s first direct presidential election.   
 
Figure 6. 1  Support for Taiwan Independence and Taiwanese Identity during 1989-1997 
Source: The United Daily News 
 
The next section refers to other surveys, which were conducted immediately 
before and after the 1996 missile crisis, to demonstrate the impact of PRC’s military 
threat on the mind-set of the people of Taiwan. As shown in the Figure 6.2, we see 




the status quo, respectively, before the PRC’s announcement of the military exercises 
before March 1996, then the percentages changed quite significantly within the two 
weeks of actual military exercises.  This survey suggests that the tension and animosity 




Figure 6. 2  Change of Public Opinion on the Stateness Issue during the PRC’s Military 
Exercises around the March 1996 Presidential Elections.  
Source: Democratic Progressive Party. 
  
 In short, after more than a decade of cross-Strait contact, Taiwanese people 
seemed to realize a wide gap between Taiwan and the Mainland, and a slim chance of 
closing such a huge gap in the immediate future. Such a perception was critical to the 
development of a separate Taiwanese identity.  As a matter of fact, when large-scale 




impressions of the Mainland people, and some of them even considered them as 
compatriots. However, this perception took a big turn in the mid-1990s especially after 
several serious conflicting interactions across the Taiwan Straits. Besides getting a first-
hand feeling of the average lives on the Mainland, many of those who have been to the 
Mainland also began to question their own Chinese sentiments after having unhappy 
personal experiences with the Mainland people
127
. The most significant examples are the 
groups of old generations of Mainlanders who visited their families after decades of 
separation, who often complained about the greedy demand and lack of “sincerity” of 
their Mainland relatives. Some Taiwanese businessmen in the Mainland also complained 
about the selfish characteristic of the Mainland people and the difficulties of managing 
them.  These negative perceptions may have some components of misunderstanding, as 
the Mainland people also did not find the Taiwanese characteristics too attractive.  
 
New Cross-Strait Exchanges and National Identification 
  
 The cross-Strait relationship entered into a new stage in the last decade. The range 
of cultural and economic exchanges expanded intensively; all three direct links that had 
been discussed in the 1990s have come true in the 2000s.  The exchanges between the 
two sides across Taiwan Strait jumped to a new stage after 2008, when the KMT regained 
political power.  
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 In this section, three empirical analyses from recent TEDS survey data will be 
used to analyze the relationship between the new cross-Strait exchanges and national 
identification in the last decade.   
 
China travel experience and national identification.  
 Table 6.1 shows an interesting relationship between China travel frequencies and 
national identity - the more times people traveled to China in the past five years, the 
lower percentage of Taiwan identity in this group.  In contrast, the higher of travel times 
to China, the higher percentage of dual identities. For instance, in 2004, there were 50% 
of people who had not travelled to China identified themselves as Taiwanese, while there 
were only 37.1% and 29.6% Taiwanese identity found in the people who travelled to 
China one or two times and three times above respectively. The similar trend continues in 
all three years when the surveys were conducted.  Although the percentage increases in 
the Chinese identity are not consistent during the study periods, there is a clear trend 
showing that the more China travel times, the higher the dual identities among Taiwan 
people from 2004 to 2012.  
 On the statehood preferences, Table 6.2 demonstrates a positive relationship 
between travel times and Chinese identity and a clear opposite direction to the Taiwanese 
identity.  In other words, the more times Taiwan people travelled to China, the higher 
percentage people prefer unification, and the lower percentage prefers Taiwan 
independence.  In 2008, for example, the percentages of supporting Taiwan independence 
were 44.2%, 40.0%, and 35.4% among people who never went to China, travelled to 




contrast, the support of unification increased from 19.4% to 25.9% to 29.2% among 
people when their travel times to China increased in the past five years.  
 
Table 6. 1 China Travel and National Consciousness, 2004-2012 
  National Consciousness in 2004 
2004  Chinese Dual Identities Taiwanese 
S13a (travel to China)* 
N=1761 










High (3 +) 
  National Consciousness in 2008 
2008  Chinese Dual Identities Taiwanese 
S13a (travel to China)* 
N=1834 










High (3 +) 
  National Consciousness in 2012 
2012  Chinese Dual Identities Taiwanese 
S13a (travel to China)* 
N=1756 










High (3 +) 
 
Table 6. 2  New Statehood Preferences 2004-2012 
  New Statehood Preference in 2004 
2004  Unification Status Quo Independence 
S13a (travel to China)* 
N=1626 










High (3 +) 
  New Statehood preference in 2008 
2008  Unification Status Quo Independence 
S13a (travel to China)* 
N=1725 










High (3 +) 
  New Statehood Preference in 2012 
2012  Unification Status Quo Independence 
S13a (travel to China)* 
N=1679 










High (3 +) 
Source: TEDS survey data sets, 2004 to 2012, conducted by Election Study Center at national Chengchi 
University. The statistics are author's own coding and calculation. * refers to significance level <.05 
 
Economic evaluations and national identification 




on cross-Strait economic exchanges at both national and personal level, and how these 
evaluations related to people's national identification in the year 2008. It is not surprising 
to find that, as it is shown in Table 6.3, when people perceive a better evaluation on 
economic exchanges with the mainland China, their support of unification is higher and 
the support for independence is lower. However, it is worth noting that the percentage of 
supporting independence is very high (close to 70 percent) within the group of people 
who perceive a worse off economic situation for Taiwan or themselves; on the contrary, 
the support level for unification within the group who have positive economic evaluations 
with cross-Strait economic exchanges is around mid-30 percent, and there are close to 40 
percent of them choose the status quo instead of unification even though they have 
positive economic evaluations with the mainland.  The results suggest that national 
identification is closely associated with people's economic concerns with the mainland 
China. 
Table 6. 3  Economic Evaluations and National Consciousness/Statehood Preferences, 
2008 
  National Identity  (2008) 
2008  Chinese Dual Identities Taiwanese 
K5. (overall economy)* 
N=1543 











K6. (personal economy)* 
n=1603 











  Statehood preference (2008) 
2008  Unification Status Quo Independence 
K.5. (overall economy)*  
n=1499 
























Data Source: TEDS survey data sets, 2004 to 2012, conducted by Election Study Center, national Chengchi 





Table 6. 4  Economic Evaluation and National Identity (2012) 
  










N P value 
Overall economic status 



















Overall economic status 





































































































Data Source: TEDS 2001-12 by the Election Study Center, National Chengchi University. The statistics are 




















Table 6. 5  Economic Evaluation and Statehood Preferences (2012)  
  


































































































































































Data Source: TEDS 2001-12 by the Election Study Center, National Chengchi University. The statistics are 









Economic connections in China and change patterns of national identification.  
 Table 6.6 and Table 6.7 employ two sets of panel data to examine the relationship 
between people's economic connections in the mainland and their change patterns of 
national identification. Note that the crosstab analysis in the Table 6.4 is not statistically 
significant from both panel data. It suggests that we don't have a meaningful relationship 
between economic connections in China and people's national consciousness changes. In 
contrast, Table 6.5 shows a significant relationship on the statehood preferences. 
 
Table 6. 6  Economic connection in Mainland China and Change Patterns of National 
Identity: Panel Studies (2004-2012) 








































Yes 3.7% 12.8% 12.8% 70.6% 
No 2.1% 11.8% 13.7% 72.3% 
Source: TEDS panel data, 2004-08 and 2008-12, conducted by Election Study Center at national Chengchi 















Table 6. 7  Economic connection in Mainland China and Change Patterns of Statehood 
Preferences: Panel Studies (2004-2012) 














Yes 15.7% 17.1% 18.6% 48.6% 
No 8.0% 18.6% 12.0% 61.4% 














Yes 12.1% 22.4% 14.9% 50.6% 
No 11.6% 18.6% 14.3% 55.5% 
Data Source: same as Table 6.6. 
  
 According to Table 6.7,  there are two findings worth noting: First, people with no 
economic connections in the mainland tend to have a more stable national identification 
than those having economic connections in China. For example, there are 61.4 percent of 
people having no economic connections in China remain constant of their statehood 
preferences between 2004 and 2008. During the same study periods, the percentage of 
remaining constant for those having economic connections in China was 48.6%.  Second, 
if we compare these two study periods, the percentage of changing to status quo increases 
from 17.1% to 22.4% among people who have economic connections in China, and the 
percentages of changing to unification and independence drop to 12.1% and 14.9% 
respectively for the same group of people.  However, in both study periods, the 
percentage of changing to the status quo remains the same 18.6% among those having no 




on the changes to unification and independence, but the changes are quite small, only 
around 3 percent.  
 The above three empirical analyses in the last decade presents a different picture 
of national identification among Taiwanese people when the cross-Strait interactions 
enter into a different stage. Overall, empirical surveys suggest that the cross-Strait 
interactions - no matter it is negative military threat or positive economic evaluation - 





In the second part of this chapter, I'd like to discuss the linkage between 
international factors and Taiwan’s national identity transformation. Specifically, the 
purpose is to explore how international dimensions –- such as the international 
institutions and transnational experiences under the general globalization processes --- are 
connected with the national imaginations in Taiwan. Unlike scholarly prediction of the 
end of a nation and nationalism in the globalization era
128
, I argue that international 
institutions and certain forms of globalization have helped to strengthen, rather than 
weaken, aspirations for the pursuit of nationhood and statehood. From the point of 
international dimension, just as Partha Chatterjee has argued that nationalism outside 
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Europe is necessarily a “derivative discourse,”
129
 the recent national identity 
transformation in Taiwan could be seen as a reflection of, as well as being derived from, 
Taiwan’s accelerated engagement with the international institutions and globalization 
processes.  
In the following, I will first elaborate the theoretical linkage between the 
international dimensions and national identity transformation, focusing on the underlying 
mechanisms through which the international institutions and globalization processes 
work for national identity transformation. Then I will turn to review Taiwan’s 
participation in the international organizations and explain how these transnational 
interactions and experiences have actually led to the transformation of national identity in 
Taiwan. 
 
International Institutions, Globalization and National Identity Change 
 
Alexander Wendt, as well as other scholars, has pointed out that the formation, 
persistence and change of national identity are mainly shaped by the interaction of at least 
three crucial variables: the concerned “nation”, the political “state” and an international 
system of nation-states (Bell and Freeman 1974; Bloom 1990; Wendt 1994)
130
. That is to 
say, from a theoretical point, whether the national identity of a country is clear and stable 
depends on the compatibility of these three variables in interaction. Kim and Dittmer also 
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pointed out, national identity crises together with the rise of various national discourses
131
 
would tend to occur when the interactions of these three variables are in conflict
132
.   
The importance of the international system of nation-states in the national identity 
formation dynamics is accelerated through two underlying mechanisms. First, as many 
scholars have pointed out, nations, nationalism, and nation-states are all globalized and 
globalizing phenomena.
133
 In other words, the “national’”question can be best understood 
if it is viewed against the proper global/international backdrop.  As a classification system 
of grouping people in the international society, nationality is also usually defined in 
relation to the exogenous “Other.” In other words, national identity is dependent upon the 
recognition of this identity as a national otherness by other nations. From this point of 
view, Taiwan’s “national” status hinges as much on whether Taiwanese people think of 
themselves in terms of a nation as on whether or not other nations in the international 
society consider the Taiwanese people a nation. 
Moreover, national identity describes the condition in which a mass of people 
have made the same identification with national symbols so that they could act as one 
psychological group when there is a threat to these symbols of national identity (Bloom 
1990: 52).  If we consider nations as “imagined communities”, as Benedict Anderson has 
put it, then the ‘national’ question in Taiwan is perhaps more threatened and troubled than 
others in the international society because, on the one hand, the official “Republic of 
China” on Taiwan is rarely recognized by most nations in the world, and, on the other 
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hand, the contending “Republic of Taiwan” advocated by Taiwanese nationalists and 
Independence movements has not yet come into existence. In the globalized era, where 
the nation-state remains as an indispensable, institutionalized category in the international 
society, Taiwan has inevitably faced a national identity crisis as a result of the diplomatic 
isolation and de-recognition.   
 Secondly, as John Meyer and his colleges have argued in the article, “World 
Society and the Nation-State,” through the intensification of the interactions among 
different constituents of the global village, globalization may assert and reinforce the 
institutional prerogatives of nations and nation-states, thereby re-emphasizing the 
significance and the necessity of nationhood and being a nation-state
134
. They suggest 
that the features of the contemporary nation-state are derived from worldwide models 
constructed and propagated through global cultural and associated processes. Under the 
highly rationalized and universalistic world culture, the nation-states have become the 
dominant form out of all the possible forms that political entities might take. Therefore, it 
is not surprising to find that all nation-states tend to claim similar features, such as 
territorial boundaries and a demarcated population, sovereign authority, self-
determination, and responsibility.  This also explains why and how nation-states routinely 
present themselves, both internally (in their constitutions) and externally  in seeking 
admission to the United Nations and other international bodies.   
From the insight of their “isomorphic” perspective under the globalization 
processes, I would like to point out, as Taiwan becomes more globalized, the 
transnational interactions would have had a profound impact upon identity formation and 
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transformation for the people in Taiwan. Given the failure of the “Republic of China” in 
the existing international system, the interactions between Taiwan and other parts of the 
global community would intensify the circumstances leading people to question their 
own citizenship and nationality.  Moreover, facing the Chinese identity crisis, the 
circumstances would further open new opportunities to foster a separate Taiwanese 
identity, or at least lead them to a quest for a new national identity.   
For the Taiwanese nationalists, transnational experiences and subsequent 
integration into the world can also be used as a strategy to build Taiwan into a nation 
different from the traditional Chinese nation. On the one hand, transnational mobility can 
be regarded as one of the defining characteristics of the Taiwanese people and as a 
component of Taiwanese culture to distinguish Taiwanese from the Chinese
135
. On the 
other hand, the increasing importance of international organizations and transnational 
institutions has given Taiwan people stronger aspirations to pursue a recognized 
nationhood and nation-state identity, as Taiwan’s exclusion from these organizations and 
institutions in international society has fostered a sense of injustice and collective anxiety 
about being an “international orphan.”
136
  
In short, through institutional recognition, symbolic support and isomorphic 
pressure for a certain “nation” in the existing world system, international institutions and 
globalization processes are crucial for the constitution of the national imagination. This  
is especially true in the case of Taiwan.   
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Globalization and National Identity Transformation in Taiwan 
 The following discussion focuses on how various transnational experiences and 
interactions are shaping and transforming the national identity among the Taiwan 
populace, especially the political and cultural elites. To avoid conceiving of globalization 
as a homogeneous world-historical development, it is necessary that we distinguish some 
of the components of globalization
137
. According to the globalization index developed by 
the A. T. Kearney, four major aspects of globalization are identified: (1) economic 
integration—such as  trade, foreign direct investment and portfolio capital flows, and 
income payments and receipts, (2) personal contact—such as international travel and 
tourism, international telephone traffic, and cross-border transfers, (3) technology—such 
as number of internet users, Internet hosts, and secure servers, and (4) political 
engagement—such as number of memberships in international organizations, U.N. 




In the four aspects, the top ten most globalized countries are Ireland, Switzerland, 
Singapore, Netherlands, Sweden, Finland, Canada, Denmark, Austria, and United 
Kingdom, while Taiwan, at year of 2012, was located at the 32nd, right after South Korea 
and Slovenia, but ahead of Japan (38).  Among the indicators, Taiwan performs favorably 
on economic integration, technology, and personal contact-- international travel and 
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tourism, international telephone traffic, and cross-border transfers, but scores poorly in 
terms of political engagement – which was clearly a result of its diplomatic isolation. 
Indeed, with the economic and technological development, Taiwanese people 
have travelled across national boundaries regularly and frequently. According to Taiwan 
Ministry of the Interior, the total number of outbound travelers from Taiwan has reached 
3.36 million, equal to one-sixth of the entire population in 1991.  The ratio, exceeding 
that of Japan for the first time, was the highest in the world.  And, from 1990 to 1996, the 
number of emigrants from Taiwan has increased more than four times, of which the 
majority consists of middle-class businesspersons, investors, and professionals.
139
   
Scholars often hold that transnational flows of people diversify the ethnic and 
cultural composition of society, thus shattering the illusion of homogeneity and enclosure 
on which the modern nation, as imagined community, is founded.
140
 However, if we 
consider the influences of these frequent flows of people and culture in shaping and 
transforming national identity in the highly globalized Taiwan, I would argue, that the 
impact of these transnational experiences to Taiwan is quite different from the theoretical 
prediction.  To demonstrate the point, three mechanisms are worth noting.   
First, under the circumstances of Taiwan’s diplomatic isolation and de-
recognition in the international society, as Taiwanese people travel abroad and interact 
with people from other parts of the world more intensely, the issues of citizenship and 
nationality are becoming more and more problematic. Indeed, as they carry un-
recognized ROC passports or are misidentified as PRC citizens, more and more 
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Taiwanese people are complaining about discrimination in foreign countries. The 
troubles concerning Visas, passports, and other travel documents are the most frequent 
topic of discussion among Taiwanese when they talk about Taiwan’s awkward 
international status and dubious national identifications.  Here, I would like to quote two 
popular writers in Taiwan, Long Ying-tai and Kuling, whose comments on the issues are 
symbolic and illustrative.   
In an article entitled “From Taiwan,” Long Ying-tai, a second-generation 
mainlander, vividly illustrates a number of episodes in which she was frustrated by 
traveling with a Taiwan passport.
141
  Once she was rejected for a visa by the French 
Consulate in Zurich due to the lack of diplomatic ties between Taiwan and France; 
another time she was misidentified as a national of the People’s Republic of China, 
because her Taiwan passport was stamped with Taiwan’s official title “Republic of 
China,” and her nationality was registered as “Chinese.”  On another occasion, she felt 
publicly humiliated as  the citizen of a third-class country when Greek authorities refused 
to admit her into Greece due to her un-recognized Taiwan passport.  Furious and 
desperate, she could not help but make a sarcastic analogy--- “Using a Taiwan passport” 
she wrote, “is like a beggar soliciting from one door to another.”  At first, Ms Long 
thought she was discriminated against because Taiwan was a small nation, but she soon 
realized that people from other less important, smaller nations enjoyed better treatment 
than did those from Taiwan.  Reflecting upon the situation of her homeland, Long asks: 
Who says Taiwan is a ‘small’ nation?  In terms of population, Switzerland is only 
one-third the size of Taiwan; Taiwan is about of the same size as Holland and 
Switzerland, and in terms of wealth, we are much richer than most nations in the 
world. All in all, Taiwan is a rather a ‘big’ nation—but why is my passport a 
disrespectable, unwelcome mark? 
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Another popular writer in Taiwan, Kuling, wrote about his personal experiences and 
make a quite sarcastic comment:
142
 
If you have a chance to go abroad, you will know that Taiwan’s national status 
has never been established.  Most nations do not even issue visas to us directly.  
Some visas have to be acquired through an agency in Hong Kong, and some 
European nations even issue ‘political refugee’s visas’ to Taiwanese travelers –we 
are even inferior to Hong Kong, which is not even a nation!’ 
 
 To most people from other nations, a passport perhaps means little more than an 
official travel document carrying no broader significance, but the humiliating experiences 
of people bearing an un-recognized ROC passport has made the ‘national’ issue a very 
‘personal’ matter and gradually culminated into a collective concern in Taiwan.  
Experiences such as those described by Long Ying-tai and Kuling have compelled people 
to question their citizenship and nationality; in yet other cases, it has even become a kind 
of catalyst that triggers the transformation of national identity.  Here I would like to refer 
to two notable Taiwanese writers, Chen Fang-ming and Lin Heng-zhe.  Both Chen and 
Lin admitted that before leaving Taiwan, they had whole-heartedly embraced the dream 
of a “Greater China” and Chinese identity. 
 In his book, At the Crossroad of an Epoch, Chen Fang-ming recalls that when he 
first arrived in the USA in 1974, he was still a ‘Great Chinese chauvinist from inside 
out’
143
 (Chen, 1989: 397).  As a student majoring in Chinese history at the University of 
Washington in Seattle, Chen was able to broaden his knowledge of modern China 
through the abundant resources and information in the USA that had not been previously 
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available to him in Taiwan. However, the more he learned about contemporary China, the 
more he felt that “China is a strange country to me” (Chen, 1989: 317). About the same 
time, Chen began to have a chance to read about the history of Taiwan, through which his 
‘Taiwanese personality’ emerged. In a travel experience to Canada, he found his 
nationality severely challenged and eventually triggered his transformation of national 
identity. As he reflects: 
In the winter of 1974, when driving northbound from Seattle to Vancouver in 
Canada for the first time, I keenly suffered from being a citizen without 
international personality. Witnessing many foreigners holding different passports 
enter the Canadian territory without any difficulties, I was the only one being held 
at the entry point, simply because my passport was not recognized. However, I 
was finally admitted into Canada, not because of my passport, but because of my 
student’s status.  I profoundly realized that a US student certificate – I-20- is much 
more useful than an official passport of Taiwan… . I can imagine that, on this 
planet, wherever there is a cross-border entry point, there must frequently be some 
obstructed, questioned, and scorned fellow Taiwanese…  Deep in my heart, there 
was a severe battle regarding the national identity.  
 
The case of Lin Heng-zhe takes a similar course. Before leaving Taiwan, Lin 
Heng-zhe was the editor of a series of books known as “New Tide Books” ,which had a 
long-standing reputation of introducing Western thought and literature to the young 
generation in Taiwan. Famous for his translation of the British philosopher Bertrand 
Russell, Lin held a typical cosmopolitan world-view and aspired to become a world 
citizen.  Reflecting on his path of identity transformation, Lin confesses that “Before 
going abroad, I knew only Western Culture and Chinese culture. At that time, it could be 
said that I was illiterate about of Taiwanese culture, knowing absolutely nothing about the 
existence of colorful varieties of Taiwanese culture.”
144
 He recalls that after he left 
Taiwan and arrived in the USA, he began to realize that “only those mentally retarded can 
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become world citizens, since we ordinary people cannot live without our own nation and 
cultural tradition”. (Lin, 1989: 15).  By his own account, his Taiwanese identity was 
enlightened, and his political belief in Taiwan Independence was further enhanced by the 
experiences of living abroad and particularly a trip to the mainland China. 
The cases of Chen and Lin should not be seen as isolated incidents. On the 
contrary, they reflect the general experience of many people from Taiwan. In the 
discourses of Taiwanese nationalism,
145
we can find numerous illustrations of how 
Taiwan Independence supporters convert their identities from “Chinese” to “Taiwanese” 
after going abroad.  I am not suggesting that all Taiwanese people would certainly 
transform their national identity after traveling abroad; but it is true that, given Taiwan’s 
awkward situation, transnational experiences have had a profound influence upon 
people’s identity formation and transformation.      
The second mechanism linking globalization and national identity transformation 
in Taiwan is the process in which transnational experiences and hyper-mobility of the 
Taiwanese people have been employed as a new ground for imagining the nation.  One of 
the most significant examples comes from the “The Rising People” (xin xing minzu), 
written by the former DPP’s party chairman Hsu Hsin-liang. In an attempt to lay down a 
new theoretical foundation for Taiwanese nationalism, Hsu contrasts Taiwanese with 
other “rising peoples” who have successfully ascended in world history – for example, 
the Mongolians, the Manchurians, the Dutch, the British, the Americans and the 
Japanese.
146
  The global/transnational mobility is viewed by Hsu as the most important 
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defining characteristic of the newly risen “Taiwanese People.” Throughout the book, Hsu 
repeatedly stresses that the Taiwanese people are more active and more knowledgeable 
than others due to their geographical dispersal and mobility, and that for this reason they 
will be playing an increasingly important role at the turn of the century.   
In addition to Hsu’s emphasis on transnational mobility, some Taiwan 
Independence supporters take a step further by maintaining that Taiwanese culture is now 
distinct from Chinese culture. They also suggest that Taiwanese culture is characterized 
by a variety of “international colors,” a spectrum including Chinese, Japanese, American, 
Spanish and Dutch cultures, intertwined through complicated historical legacies (Lin, 
1989:39-41). It is through the deliberate articulation of the mixing between global and  
national culture that Taiwan Independence supporters and Taiwanese nationalists intend 
to construct a new identity that can be distinguished from China not only politically but 
also culturally.  
Finally, the third mechanism through which globalization might work for the 
transformation of Taiwanese national identity lies in the economic realm. Again, 
transnational activity in the economic realm under the globalization is often considered of 
central importance in undermining the foundations of nation-states, as it is odd to the 
sovereignty and autonomy of nation-states in at least two senses
147
. First, cross-border 
flows of capital, circulating through transnational monetary systems and multinational 
companies, can undermine a state’s control over the wealth of its nation. Second, the 
international division of labor and the global circulation of commodities have gradually 
rendered irrelevant the conventional concept of the ‘national’ economy, as the process of 
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production, exchange, and consumption is no longer confined to a geographically 
bounded territory. However, in the case of Taiwan, the impacts of economic globalization 
on the nation-state imagination take another turn.   
Having gained its international reputation as successful NICs (Newly 
Industrialized Countries), Taiwan has perceived globalization in the economic realm not 
as a purely economic matter but as a moral and nationalist issue. Moreover, as Taiwan 
has been isolated in the international society due to the lack of diplomatic ties, the official 
nationalist discourses have long been constructed upon the imagery of the so-called 
“Taiwan Economic Miracle.” Conversely, Taiwan’s advanced economic development, as 
well as a better living standard and lifestyles, have also long been cited by Taiwan 
Independence advocates as reasons to oppose unification with China. Moreover, the 
political leaders, scholars, and elites of different nationalist stances converge to agree that 
Taiwan’s security can be enhanced as long as the issue is internationalized and Taiwan 
still plays an integral role in the world economy. Paradoxical as it may seem, 
globalization or internationalization, is now regarded as one of the best strategies to build 
Taiwan into a nation, or at least to maintain the status quo as a sovereign political 
entity.
148
  As a matter of fact, recent ideological shifts of Taiwanese nationalists have 
been characterized by their deliberate attempts to stage Taiwan against a global backdrop 
and to incorporate elements of “internationalization/ globalization” into the new 
Taiwanese identity. 
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Personal In-depth Interviews 
  
 The above analyses on the influence of two inter-related contextual forces -  the 
cross-strait dynamics in the last two decades, and the international factors, especially the 
rise of China in the international society -- on the transformation of Taiwanese 
identification are supported by the information collected from in-depth interviews, which 
help to explain how these two contextual forces work together to further consolidate the 
civic nature of the newly developed collective identification and gradually push away the 
traditional Chinese national identity. 
 
1. The Influence of Cross-Strait Exchanges on National Identity - "The more 
understanding of Chinese people from the mainland, the more certain I am 
Taiwanese." 
 The cross-Strait exchanges and people-to-people contacts in the past decade have 
generated significant impact on Taiwan people's image of "Chinese" and their sense of 
national belonging.  According to the interviews, the majority informants demonstrated a 
quite negative Chinese image, based on their personal experiences and/or media reports.  
In their eyes, "Chinese" from the mainland are so different from Taiwanese not only on 
their behaviors (such as they are rude, speak too loud, no manners, …, etc.) but also the 
mentality and value system.  Many informants, especially the younger generation, stated 
that, throughout the cross-strait exchanges, they did get to know better the Chinese from 
mainland; but the more they know them, the less of "We group" sense felt between the 




 Informant No. 13, 42 years old, Minnan background, said, "Mainland people 
are weird! They are so different from us.  Did you see how loud they spoke in 
the supermarket, in the shopping mall, in the National Palace Museum? Did 
you see them fight back to people who asked them to line up for buying tickets? 
Not only my personal experiences in the National Palace Museum, but also 
from a lot of media reports, I can clearly sense that Mainland people are not 
like us. It seems the phrase "Thank you" never exists in their dictionary. It is 
true some of them are fine and understandable, but most of them are just too 
weird!"  
 
 Informant No. 1, 26 years old with Minnan background, "Through the cross-
strait exchanges, I did have the chance to know better the Chinese from the 
mainland, but it only let me feel more of difference between two sides, and it 
has strengthened my Taiwanese identity. The more I know them, the more I 
am certain about my own identity." 
 
 Informant No. 9, 25 years old with Minnan backgrounds, said, “If we see the 
people from China as simply foreigners, such as Americans or Russians, you 
might feel that they are  close to us; if we consider them as a people sharing 
the same cultural roots with us, I cannot help but notice many big and 
significant differences between us. The sense of distance between the two sides 
becomes  longer and longer; I just cannot identify with them and I cannot 
imagine we belong to the same cultural group."   
 
2. Cross-Strait exchanges and national identity --"I had dual identities before, but 
now I think I am Taiwanese only."   
 Informant No. 20, a second generation Mainlander at the age of 45, said, 
"After the cross-Strait exchanges, we have witnessed so many differences 
between Chinese people from the mainland and us in Taiwan.  In my personal 
experiences -- travelling with my parents back to the Jiangu province, where 
my father was born and grew up. Yes, I met with many people who are my 
relatives, but, to be honest, it is hard to feel the attachment, and they are so 
different from what I expected.  Although it is true that we share the same 
cultural roots and lineage, but it is a shame to admit the 'Chineseness' in my 
national identity. I cannot change the cultural and lineage roots, but I'd rather 
hide the 'Chineseness' in my national identity." 
 
 Informant No.2, 26 years old, Mainlander/Minnan background, said: "The 
difference between Chinese and Taiwanese is not the lineage, or history, or 




is a democracy, Taiwanese are the citizens of Taiwan; China is a communist 
country, Chinese refer to the PRC citizens.  Because of the lineage and 
cultural connection with China, I had dual identities before; but now, I would 
like to say I am Taiwanese."  
 
 Informant No.19,  mixed ethnic backgrounds (Minnan/Hakka), said, 
"Throughout the cross-strait exchanges in the past years, I have clearly 
sensed  the differences between Chinese from the mainland and us in Taiwan. 
I don't want to identify with Chinese anymore. I am now much clearer that I 
am a Taiwanese, not a Chinese.  Although we shared similar lineage and 
history, but those are no longer important; as far as the national identity is 
concerned, I am a Taiwanese, as I live in Taiwan and I am proud of Taiwan's 
democratic system and civic culture." 
 
3. National identity and Statehood Preferences -- "I'll never change my personal 
national identity; but the Tong-du issue is complicated, let's be realistic!" 
 The majority of informants in the interviews have demonstrated a quite stable and 
consistent approach toward the national identity and claim that they will not change their 
Taiwanese identity even when China becomes a strong world economic power or a 
democracy. There are only two informants saying that they would consider to change 
their mind when the PRC China becomes a democracy, but they soon added "I think that 
chance is very slim, it seems no one believes China will be a democracy in the near 
future." (Informant No. 12 and No. 24).  In contrast, informants have demonstrated a 
quite flexible and pragmatic approach to the statehood preferences, except for a strong 
Taiwanese nationalist (Informant No. 3) who insisted national identity and statehood 
preference should be consistent; otherwise, it is a betray to Taiwan. However, the 
majority views thought the Tong-du issues are complicated, should be rationally 
discussed, and depends on the situations.   Among many factors mentioned in the 




PRC, Taiwan's economic status and its economic reliance on the mainland market, and 
Taiwan's international status after the rise of China in the international society.  
 Informant No. 19, 40 years with Hakka/Minnan backgrounds, although a firm 
Taiwan independence supporter, said, "As to the Tong-du issue,  I think we 
need to be pragmatic. The simple fact is that China is too big.  Independence 
is our goal, that is no doubt; but the "status quo" is also acceptable to me.  By 
the way,  I think the "status quo" means substantial independence. Republic of 
China, or Republic of Taiwan, whatever the name is, once we are independent 
from China's control, that is fine."  
 
 Informant No. 21, 33 years old with Minnan background, said "National 
identity and Tong-du are different issues.  I am a Taiwanese, but I don't 
necessarily support Taiwan Independence.  Why? I think the Tong-du issue 
need to be put under a broader context to consider.  I support whatever the 
best policy for Taiwan.  Before we find out the best policy, I will choose the 
'status quo'.   The preferences toward the Tong-du issue should be situation 
specific and we should be flexible and open-minded to embrace the best 
options for Taiwan!"  
 
 Informant No.1, 26 years old, Minnan, like Informant No. 21, considered the 
'national identity' and 'statehood preference' as two separate issues, said, 
"Rengtong (National identity) is about your own identity, but Tong-du is 
simply your political opinion.  I cannot and won't change my identity, but my 
political opinion towards the Tong-du issue will change according to different 
situations and cross-strait events. In other words, it depends."  
 
 Informant 24, 25 years old, Mainlander/Minnan backgrounds, said that " 
national identity and Tong-du are two separate issues to me; there is no 
absolute and fixed relationship between these two. Identifying with Taiwan 
does not mean you have to support Taiwan independence. To me, both 
unification and Independence are acceptable, depending on which works 
better for Taiwan."  
 
 Informant No. 3, 28 female, Minnan, said, " If you think you are Taiwanese, 
you should support Taiwan independence.  To me, this is a principle! National 
identity involves deeper attachment, it is about who you are.  How can you 
change your own identity?! I won't change my identity, as I won't betray my 
identity.  Tong-du issue is the same.  I don't care what other people would 
think, they have the right and freedom to be a fence-sitter, but I am a 





4. Cross-Strait Exchanges and Statehood preferences--"I  think the "Status Quo" 
is the best strategy for the time being!" 
 If we turn to the statehood preferences, the cross-strait exchanges however 
generated a different impact.  Given the fact that China has become the second largest 
economic power in the world and Taiwan's economy has been heavily relied on the 
mainland market, many Informants, especially in the middle ages, would take a 
pragmatic viewpoint on the Tong-du issue.  From the interviews, I found a few 
Informants would consider Unification as an option under the condition that PRC has 
become a democracy, some people expressed their concerns of military threat  and 
considered the option of Independence too dangerous, still others are worried about the 
international isolation as a result of China's rising status in the world.  The majority view 
on the Tong-du issue take a moderate "Status Quo" approach, as they considered the 
"Status quo" the best strategy for the time being.   
 Informant No.21, 36 years old with Minnan background, said "In recent years, 
we see many Chinese tourists coming to visit Taiwan. Through the media 
reports and my personal experiences, the real difference between the two 
sides is the quality and mentality regarding democracy. Their democratic 




 Informant No. 18, in the mid-twenties, with Minnan background, said, "Even 
if China becomes a democracy, I don't think I will support reunification.  As 
you know, Taiwan is far away from the mainland China.  In the case of 
reunification, Taiwan is nothing but a remote frontier, a distant periphery to 
the Beijing government.  In reality, the PRC central government has too many 
things to care, they won't take Taiwan's concerns and issues seriously.  It is 
just like Miaoli county (where I live now) to the central government in Taipei.  
As a remote county, Miaoli county is not important to Taipei central 
government, that is why the Dapu incidents and Yuanli anti-windmill social 






 Informant No. 6 said, “Even China has become the second largest economy in 
the world, I don't think I will change my identity to Chinese; and I believe, 
under the current situation, Taiwanese identity would grow stronger instead 
of  weaker.  The most important reason is that we care about Taiwan's 
democracy and we are very proud of Taiwan's democracy. As far as the 
national identity is concerned, China's economic development is not an 
important factor to me; there are many other factors should be considered, 
such as culture, mind-sets, and value system. Chinese are so different from 
us." As to Tong-du issue,  Informant No. 6 took a softer attitude, and said, " If 
China really becomes a democracy, I might change my attitude; before that, I 




 Informant No. 13, said, "In my experience, Chinese people from the mainland 
are very loud and rude.  However, what makes me hate them the most is their 
comments on  taking back Taiwan.  Such attitude and comment really let me 
feel sick! Taiwan is not a part of PRC, they have no right to claim Taiwan. "  
 
 
 Informant No. 11, an older generation, his national identity is primordially 
defined; the lineage, culture, tradition, and history are important components 
of his national identification.  He said, "The status quo is the best choice for 
the time being; but in the future, China and Taiwan must be reunified.  I 
believe that economic integration would lead to political integration.  I'm very 
pleased to see the current cross-strait economic exchanges move forward."  
 
5. The rise of China in the international society -- "Who am I?!"  
 Several informants described their personal experiences in study abroad and 
foreign travels, expressing a strong resentment as their Taiwanese identity (Republic of 
China passport) were confused or not recognized by foreign countries.   
 Informant No. 8, 38 years old, Hakka background, said "I  strongly hope that 
Taiwan become an independent country. Currently, our international status is 
very vague!  In many of my personal foreign travel experiences, it was so 
obvious that I hold the passport of the Republic of China (ROC), but I was 
still discriminately treated as the "mainland Chinese" in foreign countries. 
Two years ago, when I was in Turkey as an exchange student, the Turkish 
authority issued me the Visa, but added a note "China" within a bracket.  The 




was added the word "China"; but, ironically, they did not ask me to the 
specific "China window" to submit my application.  I strongly hope that 
Taiwan can become an independent country soon; when the day comes, I can 
proudly and loudly claim myself as a Taiwanese, instead of Chinese!"  
 
 
 Informant No. 17, 28 years old, with Minnan/Hakka background, said, "In my 
opinion, the development of globalization makes the issue of national identity 
even more important! For example, we should be able to discuss and 
negotiate any international treaties with other countries in the name of 
Taiwan and on the equal footing.  It is simply not right if we need to get 
approval from PRC first or look at China's face before we can conclude our 
treaties with other foreign countries.  Given the current trend, there will be 
many cross-strait treaties and agreements in the future. If we don't have an 
independent status, we will be in a very weak  position and won't be able to 
stand on equal footing with the PRC on the negotiation table."  
 
 
 Informant No. 13, 42 years old, with Minnan background, said "From many 
events in the international society, we can see clearly that PRC China has 
always suppressed our living space, not allowing us to use the name of 
Taiwan to attend international events.  We are not a part of PRC China! Let 
me remind you,  I'll never consider the people from the mainland as my 
compatriots, as there is no such country in the world that would use missiles 
to aim at their compatriots!"  
 
 
 Informant No. 9, 38 years old, with Minnan/Hakka background, said, "The 
real reason why I support Taiwan independence is not because I am a 
Taiwanese, but that the Republic of China is not recognized by most of the 
countries in the world.  They just don't tell the difference between the 
"Republic of China" and the "People's Republic of China"….  The most simple 
and effective solution is to declare Taiwan Independence and let the world 
know who we are, and, most importantly, we can therefore avoid 




 The above discussion suggests that Taiwan’s national identity transformation had 
been intertwined with its increasing participation in international organizations and 




from Gellner’s Nation and Nationalism
149
to sum up the importance of international 
dimensions: 
A man without a nation defies recognized categories and provokes revulsion. A man 
must have a nationality as he must have a nose and two ears; a deficiency in any of 
these particulars is not inconceivable and does from time to time occur, but only as a 
result of some disaster, and it is itself a disaster of a kind. 
 
Initially, Gellner made this analogy in an attempt to discredit the essentialist view 
of nations put forward by most nationalist ideologies. Nevertheless, his analogy vividly 
illustrates the predicament that people in Taiwan currently endure: Being unable to be 
categorized in the existing international system, Taiwanese people would ‘defy 
recognized categories and provoke revulsion’, and are ‘in a disaster of a kind’-- as having 
no nation or nationhood is perceived as a shame, an embarrassment, or a defect that leads 
to collective humiliation resentment, and longing for a new national identity.   
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Chapter 7:    Conclusion -- Taiwanese Identity Becoming Civic and National 
  
National identity change did not happen overnight. The transition process takes 
time.  Following the transition process-oriented approach, this research assumes national 
identification changes and various change patterns in Taiwan were derived from different 
considerations between two underlying identity formation mechanisms - primordial-
ethnic and constructive-civic -- that people used to define and redefine themselves in 
response to the external transformations - democratization, new stages of cross-strait 
exchanges, and the rise of China in the world - that the society have experienced in the 
past two decades.    
Many studies have presented the general trends of national identity changes in the 
past two decades, but the dynamics of internal changes and various change patterns 
underlying the general trends were often overlooked or under-studied in the previous 
researches.  This thesis assumes that ethnic and civic national identification are not 
mutually exclusive concepts; instead, they can work together, but in different ways, to 
define and redefine people's national identity.  In light of this new analytical approach, 
we can therefore explore and explain better the changes of national identification in the 
past two decades - the paradox and puzzling aspects of two 'conflicting' national identities, 
the existence of "dual identities" and both "Unification and Independence" acceptable  in 
a large segment of the population, the divergent rationales behind the national identity 
and statehood preferences, the growth of Taiwanese identity through democratic 




with the new dynamics of cross-strait exchanges and the rise of China in the international 
society.  
 
Review of Main Arguments  
 
Through critical review of nationalist discourses in the elite circle (Chapter 2) and 
empirical analysis of the mass national identification (Chapter 3 and 4), this thesis has 
explored and explained the process of national identity transformation that has occurred 
in the past two decades under three contextual forces -- democratization, new dynamics 
of cross-strait exchanges and the rise of China in the international society  (Chapter 5 and 
6) .  To summarize the main arguments, I would like to emphasize the following: 
 First, national identity in this thesis is defined as a two-dimensional concept 
including both the national consciousness (Chinese identity vs. Taiwanese identity) and 
statehood preferences (Unification vs. Independence).  Different from previous empirical 
studies of national identity in Taiwan which tend reduce the concept to either "Chinese 
identity versus Taiwanese identity" or the "unification versus independence" issues, I 
argue both the boundaries of nationhood and statehood are the integral elements of one's 
national imagination. From both the empirical and theoretical perspectives, the two-
dimensional national identification helps to understand the comprehensive but 
complicated picture of people's national identification in Taiwan, and reveal several 
internal dynamics and changing patterns that were not found from the previous studies 




Empirical analyses in Chapter 3 and 4 have confirmed the national identity and 
statehood preferences are non-exclusive to each other.  The ups and downs of "dual 
identities" in the past twenty years suggest the decline of Chinese identity is not a linear 
development, as many previous studies have assumed, but actually a gradual two-stage 
change that reflects the underlying changes between ethnic and civic mechanisms. The 
continuous and consistent decline of dual identities in the past decade have substantiated 
the trend of moving from ethnic to civic type national identity in Taiwan.  The civic-
territorial nature of Taiwanese identity has been further confirmed by the personal in-
depth interviews that the majority informants have revealed that democracy and 
citizenship are the two most important mechanisms they used to define themselves as 
Taiwanese.  In particular, the younger informants have demonstrated a strong consensus 
on the boundary of homeland, compatriots, and sovereignty based on civic principles.  
 Second, although this thesis challenges the West/Civic versus East/ethnic 
dichotomy on the path toward people’s national imagination, the ethnic-civic analytical 
framework,  proposed by Anthony D. Smith, has been useful as a guideline to understand 
the transformation and the newly emerged Taiwan-oriented national identity.  It is argued 
that the development of ethnic or civic nationalism is not a natural inborn and does not 
grow naturally out of ethno-cultural factors or civic principles. Chapter 2 discussed 
various nationalist discourses in contemporary Taiwan and has demonstrated both ethnic 
and civic mechanisms can be chosen to define the boundaries of nationhood and 
statehood, depending on the political needs that elites sought to meet their political 




 Put national identity change under a historical context, the dissertation agrees that 
the causes of national identification transformation in the past twenty years has partially 
rooted in the earlier history, such as Japanese colonization and KMT authoritarian rules, 
as many scholars have argued, and the "identity problem" in the 1970s under the "one 
China" dilemma and serious "Republic of China" legitimacy crises in the international 
society.  However the political liberalization in the late 1980s and a series of 
democratization reforms in the 1990s have played a more important role in forging the 
emergence of civic-territorial nationalism in Taiwan.  The development of convergent, 
instead of divergent, national identification in Taiwan should also take into consideration 
of the new dynamics of cross-strait exchanges and the rise of China in the world, which 
have served to further consolidate the newly formed civic political com   
 Although the current state of national identification in Taiwan is still controversial, 
the trend of rising civic-defined Taiwanese identity and declining ethnic-defined Chinese 
identity seems to suggest that people in Taiwan have gradually moved away from ethnic 
to civic type of national identification.  Through personal interviews, the majority of 
informants' answers to the boundary questions of homeland, compatriots, and sovereignty 
in the interview questionnaire have further confirmed the civic-nature of newly emerged 
Taiwanese identity.  Indeed, "Taiwanese" identity is a heavily loaded concept, with many 
different meanings developed in different stages of Taiwan's unique history; however, 
after the two-decade democratization, new dynamics of cross-strait exchanges, and the 
rise of China in the international society, the Taiwanese identity has gradually become a 





Theoretical and Policy Implications - Dual Identities and Variations of Statehood 
Preferences 
 
 Through a new measurement of statehood preferences, suggested in the Chapter 3, 
the so-called Tong-du attitudes (unification versus independence) has proved to be not a 
one-dimensional political position; independence and unification are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive and in conflict to each other. Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, as well as the 
personal interviews, demonstrate a significant segment of Taiwan residents would accept 
both the unification and independence if China and Taiwan under compatible institutions 
in social, economic, and political systems, or the goal of Taiwan independence can be 
pursued peacefully without military threat from China. The finding is a great departure 
from previous studies that oversimplify the situation and prevents us from discovering the 
conditions that can cause people to shift between independence, status quo, and 
unification.  
 This finding has both theoretical and policy implications. It points to the 
possibility that the political dimension of national identity can be built out of different 
organization principles/mechanisms than one's sense of national belonging. Beyond the  
dichotomous types of ethnic or civic mechanism, the finding helps to propose a useful 
direction for further research to determine if there are other non-nationalist factors that 
can help to explain better  the variations of national identification.   
 The study of Taiwanese national identity transformation in the past two decades 
serves as a good case to revisit the long-standing debate between essentialists and 




contemporary Taiwan also helped to demonstrate the organization principles/mechanisms 
underlying the nation formation and reconstruction were actually not a given; under 
specific historical contexts, various objective or subjective traits were chosen between the 
ethnic and civic elements for the purpose of nation building which  political elites saw fit 
to meet specific political goals.  
 Empirical studies from cross-tabulation analyses illustrate statistically significant 
relationship between socio-demographic factors and the variances of national 
identification among people in Taiwan. However, the findings of social profile associated 
with certain types of national identification did not provide a full explanation as to why 
individuals choose certain type of national orientations in terms of national consciousness 
and statehood preferences.  In this thesis, three contextual forces -- democratization, 
cross-Strait exchanges, and international factors-- have offered plausible explanations, 
but their relative impacts on national identification formation and transformation were 
not being tested.  For example, the relative influences between economic interests and 
military threats on the statehood preferences or national consciousness could be 
hypothesized to do further research; it is also useful to use the new findings from above 
panel studies, such as different change patterns and various levels of stability between 
national consciousness and statehood preferences, to help generate meaningful 
hypotheses to the study of national identity and its transformation.   
  On the policy side, the existence of a significant number of non-committed 
residents (i.e., those who accept both unification and independence under preferable 
conditions) would, in the short run, mitigate the polarized political conflict over national 




depending on whether external conditions become more favorable to unification or 
independence.
150
 Many empirical studies in Taiwan have demonstrated the inconsistency 
between one's national consciousness and statehood preferences (also discussed in 
Chapters 3 and 4); that is, Chinese identifiers do not necessarily support unification, and 
Taiwanese identifiers do not necessarily go with independence preferences.
151
 In the past, 
the "Taiwanese vs. Chinese" complex has been widely used as a tool for electoral 
mobilization and Taiwanese politicians frequently equate "Taiwanese identity" with 
"supporting independence" and "Chinese identity" with "backing unification".  The 
assertion is no longer true and valid. On the other hand, if both sides across the Taiwan 
Straits move toward a positive development, then the balance will be likely to shift 
toward cooperation and reduce the possibility of military conflict across the Straits.  
 As it has been demonstrated in the previous chapters, the people of Taiwan, 
through collective experiences in the past two decades, appear to have moved from a 
parochial ethnic nationalism to a continued fulfillment of the ideals of citizenship. 
However, Taiwanese residents have also begun to consider unification under favorable 
conditions, and the majority, especially the younger generation, choose the status quo and 
waiting for the favorable conditions to come. Perhaps, Taiwanese would be able to re-
structure the cross-strait communication and establish a creative form of union with the 
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mainland under a more flexibly defined "one China" framework, which approximates the 
Habermasian ideal of a universal practice of citizenship.
152
  
 The case of Taiwan is unique from its historic, cultural and political experiences, 
but it does not mean it cannot compare to other national identity transformation cases in 
other countries.  I do hope this study serves as a starting point to communication between 

















                                                     
152
 Jurgen Habermas, "Citizenship and National Identity," in Bart van Steenbergen, ed., The Condition of 







Anderson, Benedict. 1991. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread         
of Nationalism. 2nd ed. London: Verso. 
 
Appadurai, Arjun. 1996. Modernity at Large. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press. 
 
Barrington, Lowell. 1997. "'Nation' and 'Nationalism': The Misuse of Key Concepts of 
Political Science”. PS: Political Science & Politics, December 712-715. 
 
Bell, Wendell,  and Walter E. Freeman. 1974.  eds., Ethnicity and Nation-Building: 
 Comparative International and Historical Perspectives. Beverly Hills: Sage.  
 
Bloom, William. 1990. Personal Identity, National Identity, and International Relations.  
 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
 
Breuilly, John. 1994. Nationalism and the State. Chicago: The University of Chicago 
 Press. 
 
Brass, Paul. 1991.  Ethnicity and  Nationalism: Theory and Comparison. New Delhi: 
Sage. 
 
Brubaker, Rogers. 1996. Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question 
 in the New Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Calhoun, Craig. 1997. Nationalism. MN: University of Minnesota Press. 
 
Chang, Maukuei, eds. 1993. Zuqun Guanxi yu Guojia Rentong (Ethnic Relations and 
 National Identity). Taipei: Chang Yung-Fa Foundation.  
______. 1993. "Shengji wenti yu minzu zhuyi (Provincial Issues and National Identity)” 
in Zuqun Guanxi yu Guojia Rentong (Ethnic Relations and National  Identity). 
Taipei: Chang Yung- Fa Foundation. 233-278.  
 
______. 1997. “Taiwan de zhengzhi zhuanxing yu zhengzhi de zuqun hua guocheng 
(Political Transition and the Political Process of the Ethnic Groups)” Shih 
Chengfeng, eds., Zuqun Zhengzhi yu zhengce (Ethnic Politics and Policies). 
Taipei: AvanGuard Publishing House. 37-71. 
 
______. 1993. “Duoyuan ronghe de zuqun guanxi yu wenhuan-minzhu jinbu dang de 
 zuqun  yu wenhua zhengce” (Merging Ethnic Relations and Culture – Ethnic and 
 Cultural Policies of the Democratic Progressive Party).  Taipei: The Democratic 





Chang, Pinglin. 1985. “Zhonghua minguo jie” (The Explanation of ROC), Zhang Taiyan 
Quanji” ( Zhang Taiyan Collections 4). Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Publishing 
House. 252-262.  
 
Chatterjee, Partha. 1986.  Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative 
 Discourse? Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Zed Books. 
 
Chen, Chinan. 1994.  “Chuantong zhongguo de guojia xingtai, jiazu yili yu mingjian 
shehui”  (Traditional Chinese State Patterns, Family Ideologies and Civil Society).  
Rentong yu Guojia – Jingdai zhong xi lishi bijiao (National Identity and Nation 
State –Comparison of the History of China and the West). Taipei: Institute of 
Comtemporary History, Academia Sinica.201-204.  
 
Chen, Fangming. 1992. Tansuo Taiwan Shiguan (Explore Taiwan’s History). Taipei: 
 Independence Evening Post. 39. 
 
             .“Zai Shidai Fenhe de Lukou( At the Crossroads of an Epoch).” 1989. Taipei: 
 Avantgarde. 1989:397. 
 
Chen, Kuang-hui. 1997.  A Study of Taiwan People's National Identity. Master's thesis, 
National Chengchi University.  
 
Chen, Lih-torng. 1994.  “A Practice of One-China Principle in International 
Organizations.” Tugnhai University Law Review 8: 329-532. 
 
Chen Lu-huei, Keng Shu, Tu Ping-lan and Huang Kuan-bo. 2009. "Interest-Driven or 
Identity-based? An Analysis of Taiwanese People's Positions on Cross-Strait 
Economic Exchanges." Soochow Journal of Political Science, 27 (2): 87-125.  
 
Chen Lu-huei, and Chou Ying-lung. 2004. "Change and Continuity of People's 
Preference on the Taiwan Independence Issue, " East Asia Studies. 35 (2):143-
186. 
 
Chen, Yingchen. “Xiang zhe geng kuanguang de lishi shiye (Toward a Broader Historical 
 Perspective).”  Shih Minhui, eds., Taiwan Yishi Lunzhan Xuanji ( the Taiwan 
 Consciousness Debate Anthology). Taipei: AvanGuard Publishing Group. 31-37.  
 
            . “Tai du pipan de ruogang lilun wenti”(Critical Theory of Taiwan Independence), 
Haixia  Pinglun (Cross Strait Commentary), 52 edition, pp.30-38.  
 
Chen, Yishen. 1994. “Ershi shiji shangbanye zhongguo minzu zhiyi de fazhang” (the 
Development of Chinese Nationalism in the First Half of the Twentieth Century). 
Rentong yu Guojia – jindai zhongxi lishi de bijiao (National Identity and Nation 
State –Comparison of the History of China and the West). Taipei: Institute of 





Chen, Yih-yan, and Chen Lu-huei. 2003.  "Ambiguity or Uncertainty: Preference on the 
Taiwan Independence Issue among the Electorate in Taiwan," Mainland China 
Studies. 46(5): 1-20. 
 
Chiang, Kai-shek. 1984. “Zhongguo zhi mingyun (China’s destiny).” Xian zongtong jiang 
gong  quanji( Chiang Kai-shek Collections). Taipei: Chinese Culture University. 
Volume 1:126. 
 
Chu, Hungyuan. 1994.  “Minguo yilai huaren guojia guannian de yanhua (The Evolution 
of the Chinese Concept of State Since the Republic of China).” Rentong yu 
Guojia – jindai zhongxi lishi de bijiao (National Identity and Nation State –
Comparison of the Contemporary History of China and the West). Taipei: Institute 
of Contemporary History, Academia Sinica. 
 
Chu ,Yun-han, and Lin Jih-wen. 2001. "Political Development in 20th Century Taiwan: 
State Building, Regime Transformation and the Construction of National 
Identity." The China Quarterly. 102-129. 
 
Chu, Yunzhen. 1997. Taiwan minzu zhuyi: qiyuan yu neihan fenxi (Taiwan Nationalism: 
Origin  and Content Analysis).  Master Degree Dissertation Department of 
Political Science, Soochow University. 107-108.  
 
John L. Comaroff, John L. 1994. Ethnicity, Nationalism, and the Politics or Identity in an 
Age of  Revolution. Chicago, IL: American Bar Foundation. 1994: 26 
 
Connor, Walker. 1978 “A Nation is a Nation, is a State, is an Ethnic Group, is …”, 
Ethnic and Racial Studies 1/4:379-88. 
 
Deng, Zhao-fang. 1998. “Taiwan Should not be Excluded from WHO.” China Times. 8 
May, 1998. 
 
DPP Policy White Book No. 10. 1993. Independence, Autonomous International Status. 
Taipei: DPP Press. 
 
Duara, Rrasenjit. 1995. Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning Narratives of 
Modern China. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Edmondson, Robert. 2002.  "The February 28 Incident and National Identity." Stephane 
Corcuff, ed., Memories of the Future, New York: M.E. Sharpe Inc.,  3-46.  
 
Fei, Xiaotong. 1989. Zhonghua minzu duoyuan yiti geju” (The Structure of Diversity in 
Unity of Chinese Nation). Beijing, Publishing House of Minzu University of 
China. 1-36. 
 





Gold, Thomas B. 1994. "Civil society and Taiwan’s Quest for Identity," Stevan Harrell & 
Huang  Chun-chieh eds. Cultural Change in Postwar Taiwan. Taipei: SMC 
Publishing Inc. 22-68. 
 
Giddens, Anthony. 1985. The Nation-State and Violence, Vol 2 of A Contemporary 
Critique of Historical Materialism. Cambridge: Polity Press.  
 
Greenfeld, Liah. 1992. Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity. London: Harvard 
University Press. 
 
Habermas, Jurgen. 1994.  “Citizenship and National Identity.”" Bart van Steenbergen, ed., 
The Condition of Citizenship, London: Sage Publications. 22-28. 
 
Hu, Fo. 1998.  “Zhengzhixue de kexue tanjiu (Scientific Investigation on Political 
Science)”. Taipei: Sanmin Publisher. 1-5. 
 
            . “Zhengzhi wenhua yu qingnian de guojia rentong (Political Culture and National 
Identity of Youth).” Zhongguo Luntan (China Forum). 15 (12):16-19. 
 
Huang, Chaotang. 1998. Taiwan Nationalism. Taipei: AvanGuard Publishing Group. 77-
82 
 
Ho, Szu-yin, and I-Chou Liu. 2002. The Taiwanese/Chinese Identity of the Taiwan 
People in the 1990s. American Asian Review. 20-2:29-73. 
 
Hobsbawm, Eric, and Terence Ranger, eds. 1993. The Invention of Tradition. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.  
 
______. 1992. Nations and Nationalism Since 1780. Second edition Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
            . 1983. “Introduction: Inventing Traditions. ” Terence Ranger eds., The Invention 
of Tradition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 13-14, 264-5, 271-8. 
 
Hsieh, Ch’ang T’ing. 1995. “Minzhu, zijue, jiu Taiwan (Democracy, Self-Determination, 
Saving Taiwan).”  Chang Fumei, ed., Taiwan wenti taolun ji ( Taiwan Issue 
Discussion Collection), Taipei: AvanGuard Publishing House. 247-252.  
 
Hsieh, John Fuh-sheng, and Emerson M.S. Niou. 2005. “Measuring Taiwan Public 
Opinion on Taiwanese Independence.” The China Quarterly. 2005:158-168. 
 






Hroch, Miroslav. 1993. "From National Movement to the Fully Formed Nation: The 
Nation- Building Process in Europe." Geoff Eley and Ronald Grigor Suny eds. 
Becoming National, New York: Oxford University Press. 60-77 
 
Hsu, Hsinliang. 1995. Xinxing Minzu (A New Nation). Taipei: Yuan-Liou Publishing Co., 
Ltd.,  
 
Jiang, Yi-huah. 2006. "Is Taiwan a Nation? On the Current Debate over Taiwanese 
National Identity and National Recognition". The Dignity of Nations: Equality, 
Competition, and Honor in East Asian Nationalism. Hong Kong University Press. 
141-164 
 
            .1998. “Ziyou zhuyi, minzhu zhuyi yu guojia rentong (Liberalism, Nationalism 
and National Identity)”. Yang-Chih Book Co., Ltd. 
 
Kao, Lan. 1994. The Evolution of Republic of China’s Foreign Relations, 1972-1992. 
Taipei: Wunan. 202-3 
 
Kearney, A.T. 2002. “Globalization’s Last Hurrah?” Foreign Policy (January/February 
2002). 38-51.   
 
Kim, Samuel, and Lowell Dittmer. 1993.  eds., China’s Quest for National Identity. 
Ithaca:  Cornell University Press. 240-5. 
 
Kohn, Hans. 1994. Western and eastern nationalism. John Hutchinson and Anthony D. 
Smith,  eds., Nationalism.  Oxford: Oxford University Press. 162-165. 
 
Ku, ling. 1991. “Talk about Independence with Students.” the Independence Evening 
Post. 2  November, 1991. 
 
Kymlickal, Will. 1995. Misunderstanding Nationalism, Dissent, Multicultural Citizenship. 
Oxford: Clarenden Press. 130-35 
 
 Li, Chiao. 1993.  “Taiwan (guojia) de rentong jiegou (Taiwan (National) Identity 
Structure).” Li Hunghsi, eds.,Guojia rentong xueshu yantao hui lunwen ji (Paper 
Collection of National Identity Conference). Taipei: Modern Academy Research 
Fund.   
 
             . 1994. “Taiwan minzu zhuyi de jige wenti”(Several Issues of Taiwan 
Nationalism),  Shih Chengfeng, eds, Taiwan Minzu Zhuyi( Taiwan Nationalism), 
(Taipei: AvanGuard Publishing Group, 1994), p. 17-21 
 
 
Li, Kuochi. 1994. “Manqing de rentong yu fouding – zhongguo jindai han minzu zhuyi 
sixiang de yanbian” (Manchu Identity and Negation – the Evolution of Modern 




(Identity and Nation – Comparison of Modern Chinese and Western History). 
Taipei:  Institute of Contemporary History, Academia Sinica. 98-103.  
 
Liang, Ch’ich’ao. 1978. “Shenlun zhongzu geming yu zhengzhi geming zhi deshi” (The 
Pros and Cons of Racial Revolution and Political Revolution).  Yinbing shi wenji 
(19) ( Collected Works of Yingbinshi (19)). Taiwan:Taiwan Chung Hwa Book Co. 
29. 
 
             .1978. “Zhengzhi xue dajia bolunzhili zhi xueshuo” (the Theory of Political 
Expert  Bluntchli Johann Caspar). Yinbin shi wenji zhi shisan (Collected Works of 
Yingbinshi (13), Taiwan:Taiwan Chung Hwa Book Co. 75-76. 
 
Lin, Cheng-I, et. al. 1990. An Analysis of Taiwan’s Strategy in Joining International 
Organizations. Taipei: Institute for National Policy Research,1990: 27 
 
Lin, Chia-lung. 2002. "The Political Formation of Taiwanese Nationalism," in Memories 
of the Future: National Identity Issues and the Search for a New Taiwan. 
Stephane Corchff, ed. New York: M. D. Sharpe Inc., . 219-241. 
 
             . 2001.  "Taiwan Democratization and the Formation of Nationalism." Lin Chia-
lung and Zheng Yong-nian eds., Nationalism and Cross-Srait Relations, Taipei: 
Xin Zi Ran Zhuyi publisher. 
 
Lin, Chiung-chu. 2012. "Change and Continuity: An Analysis of Taiwanese/Chinese 
Identity and Position on the Cross-Strait Relations," Journal of Electoral Studies, 
Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 97-127.  
 
Lin, Choshui. 1999.  Cong tuo hua, dao huaren shijie de hejie, dao hua ren shijie de 
zhengzhi zhixu” (From Off China, to the Chinese World of Reconciliation, to the 
Chinese World Political Order). Paper presented at the “Yi Guo Liang Zhi (One 
Country with Good System)” Conference, June 5-6, Taipei.  
 
Lin, Heng-zhe. 1989. Diao chu Taiwan wenhua zhi meng (Carving the Dream of 
Taiwanese Culture). Taipei: Avantgarde.  
 
Linz, Juan, and Alfred Stepan. 1996.  Problems of Democratic Transition and 
Consolidation: Southern Europe, South American and Postcommunist Europe. 
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
 
Liu, I-chou. 1996. "Generational Discrepancies in Public Attitude on Taiwan’s 
Unification Issue," Issues and Studies. 32:9. 
 
             , and Ho Szu-yin. 1999.  “The Taiwanese/Chinese Identity of the Taiwan 






Long, Ying-tai. 1996. Ren zai Ouzhou (When in Europe). Taipei: China Times Publishing. 
1996:60-1 
 
Luo, Jiurong. 1994. “Jiuwang yinying xiao de guojia rentong yu zhongzu rentong 
(Salvation under the Shadow of National Identity and Ethnic Identity).” Rentong 
yu Guojia – jindai zhongxi lishi de bijiao (National Identity and Nation State –
Comparison of the History of China and the West). Taipei: Institute of 
Contemporary History, Academia Sinica.74.  
 
Meyer, John W., John Boli, George M. Thomas, and Francisco O. Ramirex. 1997. 
“World Society and the Nation-State.” American Journal of Sociology. 103( 1 ) 
(July):144-81. 
 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 1991. Republic of China Foreign Relations Yearbook. Taipei: 
MOFA. 1991:264-272 
 
Morris, Andrew. "The Taiwan Republic of 1895 and the Failure of the Qing Modernizing 
Project."2002.  Stephane Corcuff, ed., Memories of the Future. New York: M.E. 
Sharpe Inc. 
 
Nieguth, Tim. 1999. "Beyond dichotomy: concepts of the nation and the distribution of 
membership." Nations and Nationalism. 5 (2):155-173. 
 
Peng, Ming-min. 1994., Peng Mingmin kan Taiwan (Peng Mingmin Observes Taiwan). 
Peng Ming-min Culture and Education Foundation. Taipei: Yuan-Liou Publishing 
Co., Ltd. pp. 187-201. 
 
            . 1995. “Taiwan jianglai zhengzhi zhidu de lixiang he keti”(Ideals and Issues of 
Taiwan’s Future Political System).”  Chang Fumei,ed., Taiwan wenti taolun ji 
( Taiwan Issue Discussion Collection). Taipei: AvanGuard Publishing House.  
 
Qi, Dongtao. 2012. "Divergent Popular Support for the DPP and the Taiwan 
Independence  Movement, 2001-2012."  Journal of Contemporary China. (2012) 
21 (78), November: 973-991 
 
Renan, Ernest.  1990. “What Is a Nation?” translated and annotated by Martin Thom, 
from Homi K. bhabha (ed.), Nation and Narration. London: Routledge. 8-22.  
 
            . 1996.  Geoff Eley and Ronald Grigor Sunny eds., Becoming National: A Reader. 
New York: Oxford University Press. 53. 
 
Saur, K.G. 1988. The Yearbook of International Organizations. the Union of 
International  Associations, UIA. Munich. 
 
Schubert, Gunter. 1998.  A new rising nation? Paper presented at the international 




for Cross-Strait Relations, The Asia-Pacific Region and Europe”, Taipei, Dec. 16-
17. 
 
Shih, Chengfeng. 1998. Zuqun yu Minzu Zhuyi (Ethnicity and Nationalism). Avanguard 
Publishing House. 
 
______. 1995. “Taiwan de zuqun zhengzhi”(Taiwan’s Ethnic Politics). Shih 
Chengfeng,eds., Zuqun zhengzhi yu zhengce (Ethnic Politics and Policies).  Taipei: 
AvanGuard Publishing House.  
 
            .1994. “Guojia rentong zhi wenhua lunshu (Cultural Discourse of National 
Identity)”. in Shih ed., Taiwan Minzu Zhuyi( Taiwan Nationalism). Taipei: 
AvanGuard Publishing Group.  
 
             . eds. 1994. Taiwan Minzu Zhuyi( Taiwan Nationalism). Taipei: AvanGuard 
Publishing Group. 
 
Shaw, Karl K. Y. 1996. The Idea of Community: A Historical Review. Taiwanese 
Political Science Review. No. 1 
 
Sheng, Shing-yuan. 2002.  "The Issue Taiwan Independence vs. Unification with the 
Mainland and Voting Behavior in Taiwan: An Analysis in the 1990s," Journal of 
electoral Studies. 9 (1): 41-80 
 
Shi, Ming. 1980. Taiwan ren si bai nian shi, shang xia ce (Taiwan’s 400 Year  History, 
Two Volumes). CA: Peng Dao Culture Company. 
  
           . 1992. “Taiwan minzu de xingchen fazhang”(the Formation and Development of 
the Nation in Taiwan).” Minzu xingchen yu Taiwan minzu (Nation Formation and 
Taiwan Nation) (Tokyo: Kenbunsya) Reprint TaiwanVersion.  
  
           . 1995. Taiwan bushi zhongguo de yi bufen (Taiwan is not a Part of China). Taipei: 
AvanGuard Publishing House. 
 
Smith, Anthony D. 1991. National Identity. Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era. 
London: Penguin Books. 14. 
 
            . 1998. Nationalism and Modernism.  London: Routledge. 
 
            . 1992. "National Identity and the European Unity." International Affairs, 68(1). 
55-76. 
 
Sun Yet-sen. 1973. “He wu zu wei yiti jianshe gonghe (Combing Five Races to Construct 
the Republican).” Guofu quanji di er ce (Sun Yet-sen Collections (2). Taipei, KMT 





            . “San min zhuyi zhi juti banfa (The Specific Way of Three Principles of the 
People).” Guofu quanji di er ce (Sun Yet-sen Collections 2). Taipei, KMT Party 
History Committee. 404-405.  
 
Tamir, Yael. 1995. “The Enigma of Nationalism.” World Politics 47(3): 418-40. 
 
Tsai, Peihuo, Chen Fengyuan, Lin Poshou, Wu Sanlien, and Yeh Jungtung. 1993. Taiwan 
minzu  yundong shi (History of National Movement in Taiwan). Taipei: 
Independence Evening Post,  First Edition Seventh Print 
 
Tien, Hung-mao and Yun-han Chu. 1994.  “Taiwan’s Domestic Political Reforms, 
Institutional Change and Power Realignment,” in Gary Klintworth ed., Taiwan in 
the Asia- Pacific in the 1990s. Sidney: Allen & Unwin. Table 12-4. 
 
Tseng, Yen-fen. 1995. “Beyond Little Taipei: The Development of Taiwanese Immigrant 
Business in Los Angeles.” International Migration Review. 29,1995: 33-58 
 
Wachman, Alan M. 1994.  Taiwan: National Identity and Democratization. New York: 
M.E. Sharpe, Inc. 
 
Wang Hung-jen. 2012. "Liberalist Variation in Taiwan: Four Democratization 
Orientations." Journal of Current Chinese Affairs. 3:93-116 
 
Wang, Cengcai. 1994. “zhongguo de guojia rentong yu xiandaihua (China’s national 
identity and modernization).” Rentong yu Guojia – jindai zhongxi lishi de bijiao 
(National Identity and Nation State – Comparison of the History of China and the 
West). Taipei: Institute of Contemporary History, Academia Sinica. 
 
Wang, Yute. 1993. “Taiwan – kumen de lishi (zhongwen ban) (Taiwan – An Anguishing 
History (Chinese Edition)).”  Taipei: Independence Evening Post. 204-206. 
 
Wendt, Alexander. 1988. "Collective identity formation and the international state". 
American Political Science Review. 88, 2: 385-6 
 
Wong, Timothy Ka-ying, and Milan Tung-Wen Sin. 1998. “Dissolution and 
reconstruction of national identity; the experience of subjectivity in Taiwan.” 
Nation and Nationalism. 4(2): 24-72. 
 
Winckler, Edwin A. 1994. "Cultural policy on postwar Taiwan". Stevan Harrell & Huang 
Chun-chieh eds. Cultural Change in Postwar Taiwan. Taipei: SMC Publishing Inc.  
 
Wu, Micha. 1994. “Pinglun Liao Binghui zhu (zuqun yu minzu zhuyi) (Commentary on 
Liao Binghui’s ‘Ethnic Groups and Nationalism’).” Shih Chengfeng, eds., Taiwan 





Wu, Naiteh. 2005. “Mianbao yu Aiqing: chutan Taiwan minzhong minzu rentong de 
biandong (Bread and Love: A preliminary study of changes in the national 
identity of the people of Taiwan).  Taiwan zhengzhi xuekan (Taiwan Political 
Science Journal). 9 (2):5-39.  
 
______. 1996. Liberalism, Ethnic Identity, and Taiwanese Nationalism. Taiwanese 
Political Science Review. No. 1 
 
            . 1996. “Guojia rentong zhengzhi zhichi: minjin dang de lijie he wujie (National 
Identity and Political Support: Understanding and Misunderstanding of the 
DPP).” Minzhong Ribao, August 13-15. 
 
             . 1993. "National Identity and Party Support: Social Bases of Party Competition 
in Taiwan," Bulletin of the Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica. Vol. 74: 33-
61. 
 
Wu, Rui-ren. 1994.  “Zhuiqiu mingyun gongtong ti –renmin zijiu xuanyan yu zhanhou 
Taiwan gongmin minzu zhuyi (Pursuit of a Common Destiny- the People Help 
Themselves Declaration and Post-war Taiwan Civic Nationalism)” Paper 
presented in Taiwan ziyou zhuyi de chuantong yu chuancheng (the Tradition and 
Heritage of Taiwan Liberalism). Taipei, September 18, 1994. 
 
Wu, Yu-shan Wu. 1996. “From a Clash of Ideologies to a Duel of Nation States: The 
Impact of the PRC’s Missile Tests.” Asiaview 6 (3) :4 
 
Wong, Timonty Ka-ying.  2001. "From Ethnic to Civic Nationalism: The Formation and 
Changing Nature of Taiwanese Identity." Asian Perspective. 25(3): 175-206 
 
You, Ying-lung. 1996. "Ethnic Identity and Political Cognition: An Analysis of 



















TEDS Questionnaires  
 
National Identity and Statehood Preferences 
 
In Taiwan, some people think they're Taiwanese. There are also some people who think 





95. refuse to answer 
98. don't know 
 
Concerning the relationship between Taiwan and mainland China, which of the following 
six positions do you agree with: (DV2) 
 
01. immediate unification 
02. immediate independence 
03. maintain the status quo, move toward unification in the future 
04. maintain the status quo, move toward independence in the future 
05. maintain the status quo, decide either unification or independence in the future 
06. maintain the status quo forever 
96. it is hard to say 
95. refuse to answer 
97. no opinion 
98. don't know 
 
Some people say, "if, after declaring for independence, Taiwan could maintain peaceful 
relations with the PRC, then Taiwan should establish a new independent country." Do 
you agree or disagree with this statement?  
 
01. strongly agree 
02. agree 
03. disagree 
04. strongly disagree 
96. it depends 
95. refuse to answer 
97. no opinion 
98. don't know 
 
Some people say, "Even if PRC decides to attack Taiwan after Taiwan declare 
independence, Taiwan should still become a new country." Do you agree or disagree with 





01. strongly agree 
02. agree 
03. disagree 
04. strongly disagree 
96. it depends 
95. refuse to answer 
97. no opinion 
98. don't know 
 
Some people say, "if the economic, social, and political conditions were about the same 
in both the mainland and Taiwan, then the two sides should unify."  Do you agree or 
disagree with this statement? (2008 M5) 
 
01. strongly agree 
02. agree 
03. disagree 
04. strongly disagree 
96. it depends 
95. refuse to answer 
97. no opinion 
98. don't know 
 
Some people say, "Suppose that the gaps in economic, social, and political conditions 
were quite large. The two sides should still unify." Do you agree or disagree with this 
statement? (2008 M5a.) 
 
01. strongly agree 
02. agree 
03. disagree 
04. strongly disagree 
96. it depends 
95. refuse to answer 
97. no opinion 




Would you say that over the past year, the state of the economy of Taiwan has gotten 
better, stayed about the same, or gotten worse? (EV14) 
 
01. better 
02. about the same 
03. worse 
95. refuse to answer 
96. it depends 




98. don't know 
 
Would you say that in the forthcoming year, the state of the economy of Taiwan will get 
better, stay about the same, or get worse? (EV15) 
 
01. better 
02. about the same 
03. worse 
95. refuse to answer 
96. it depends 
97. no opinion 
98. don't know 
 
Would you say that over the past year, your own household's economic condition has 
gotten better, stayed about the same, or gotten worse? (EV16) 
 
01. better 
02. about the same 
03. worse 
95. refuse to answer 
96. it depends 
97. no opinion 
98. don't know 
 
Would you say that in the forthcoming year, the state of your own household's condition 
will get better, stay about the same, or get worse? (EV17) 
 
01. better 
02. about the same 
03. worse 
95. refuse to answer 
96. it depends 
97. no opinion 
98. don't know 
 
After signing the cross-Strait "Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement" 





03. about the same 
95. refuse to answer 
96. it depends 
97. no opinion 





Thinking about your own economic situation, do you think it has gotten better or gotten 




03. about the same 
95. refuse to answer 
96. it depends 
97. no opinion 
98. don't know 
 
Opinions about elections and democracy 
 
Do you think this presidential election helped to promote ethnic harmony, intensify 
ethnic conflict, or did it not have influence in this area?(EV4) 
 
01. promoted ethnic harmony 
02. intensified ethnic conflict 
03. no influence in this area 
96. it depends 
95. refuse to answer 
97. no opinion 
98. don't know 
 
Do you think this presidential election help to improve democracy in Taiwan, damage 
democracy in Taiwan, or did it not have any influence in this area?(EV7) 
 
01. improved democracy 
02. damaged democracy 
03. no influence in this area 
96. it depends 
95. refuse to answer 
97. no opinion 
98. don't know 
 
Overall, do you feel satisfied or dissatisfied with the practice of democracy in Taiwan? 
(EV25) 
 
01. very satisfied 
02. somewhat satisfied 
03. somewhat dissatisfied 
04. very dissatisfied 
95. refuse to answer 
96. it depends 






Personal Interview Questionnaire 
 
 
A. Views on National Identity and Formation Mechanisms (Ethno-cultural vs. Civic-
territorial bases)  
 
1. How do you identify yourself ("Chinese", "Taiwanese ", or "both") and on what 
bases (ethno-cultural vs. civic-territorial mechanism)?  [Please use the following space to 
fully explain your views. There is no word limit.] 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
2. In Taiwan, some people identify themselves as “both Chinese and Taiwanese”. 
Do you accept people who have dual identities? Do you think Chinese identity is in 
conflict with Taiwanese identity? Why?  [Please use the following space to fully explain 
your views. There is no word limit.] 
____________________________________________________________________ 
3. In Taiwan, some people think that “Taiwanese” are not “Chinese”. They are 
different peoples. What do you think? Do you agree or not, and why? [Please use the 
following space to fully explain your views. There is no word limit.] 
________________________________________________________________ 
4. In Taiwan, some people have changed their national identity (for example, from 
Chinese identity to both, or from both to Taiwanese identity only), while others haven’t. 
What about you? Would you explain why and how you changed your national identity, or 
not? [Please use the following space to fully explain your views. There is no word limit.] 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
5. In Taiwan, some people think self-identity (Chinese vs. Taiwanese) is closely 
related to the statehood preferences (Reunification vs. Independence). What do you think, 
and why? [Please use the following space to fully explain your views. There is no word 
limit.] 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
6. In Taiwan, some people link closely their self-identity to the statehood 
preferences, some don’t.  Some people choose their statehood preferences based on 
pragmatic considerations instead of national consciousness. What about you, and why? 
[Please use the following space to fully explain your views. There is no word limit.] 
________________________________________________________________ 
7. Do you agree with the concept of "new Taiwanese"? What does it mean to you? 
Do you agree the “new Taiwanese” should include mainlanders and their next 
generations? Why? [Please use the following space to fully explain your views. There is 
no word limit.] 
 _______________________________________________________ 
8. From your own experiences, do you see any different “Chinese” images after the 
cross-Strait exchanges? In the past years, did you change your national identity because 




following space to fully explain your views. There is no word limit.] 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
9. From your own experiences, do you see a gap between Taiwanese and Chinese? 
Is the gap getting bigger or smaller after the cross-Strait exchanges in the past years? 
What about you? [Please use the following space to fully explain your views. There is no 
word limit.] 
________________________________________________________________ 
10. What does the term “Chinese” mean to you?  
1 ) ROC citizens 
2 ) PRC citizens 
3 ) Chinese refers to ethnic Han people. 
4 ) others?  
_____________________________________________________________ 
11. What does the term “Taiwanese” mean to you?  
1 ) Taiwanese refers to the people living in Taiwan 
2 ) Taiwanese is a part of Chinese 
3 ) others? ______________________________________________________________ 
12. What does the term “dual identity” (“both Chinese and Taiwanese”) mean to you?  
1 ) They identify China in cultural term, but identity Taiwan in a political term. 
2 ) They identify China in historical term, but identify Taiwan in a political term.  
3 ) They identity China in ethnic term, but identify Taiwan in a political term. 
4 ) Others?  
_______________________________________________________________ 
13. How do you construct your national identity? Through what channels (such as 
family, school, work, political parties, politicians, …, etc.)?  What channel is most 
influential? [Please use the following space to fully explain your views. There is no word 
limit.] 
____________________________________________________________________ 




B. Views on the Statehood Preferences (“Reunification vs. Independence”) 
 
1. In Taiwan, some people favor unification with China, some Taiwan Independence, 
while others choose to maintain the status quo.  There are still other consider both 
unification and independence are acceptable. What is your view on the statehood 
preference, and why? [Please use the following space to fully explain your views. There 
is no word limit.] 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
2. Have you ever changed your views on the statehood preferences? Why, and how? 
[Please use the following space to fully explain your views. There is no word limit.] 
____________________________________________________________________ 
3. What does the term “Status quo” mean to you? Independence, divided country, or 





4. Do you expect to change your views on the statehood preferences in the future? 
What will make you change your views, and why? [Please use the following space to 
fully explain your views. There is no word limit.] 
___________________________________________________________________ 
5. Do you agree to use referendum to solve the disputes of statehood preferences in 
this society?  In case the result of referendum is against your favorite choice, will you 
take it and abide by the result?  [Please use the following space to fully explain your 
views. There is no word limit.] 
____________________________________________________________________ 
6. Do you agree that Taiwan should reunify with China if China becomes a 
democracy and a strong economic power? Why?  [Please use the following space to fully 
explain your views. There is no word limit.] 
________________________________________________________________ 
7. Do you agree that Taiwan should declare independence if China won’t use 
military force against Taiwan Independence? Why? [Please use the following space to 
fully explain your views. There is no word limit.] 
___________________________________________________________________ 
8. Do you think the current “Status Quo” will be maintained forever? Do you agree 
that Taiwan should maintain the status quo forever, why? [Please use the following space 




C. Views on Other National Identity Issues 
 
1. How do you define the homeland? Does it include mainland China, or only 
Taiwan? Why do you think so? [Please use the following space to fully explain your 
views. There is no word limit.] 
___________________________________________________________________ 
2. How do you define the compatriot? Does it include the Chinese people in the 
mainland, or only the people living in Taiwan? Why? [Please use the following space to 
fully explain your views. There is no word limit.] 
___________________________________________________________________ 
3. How do you define the scope of sovereignty? Does it include mainland or only 
Taiwan? [Please use the following space to fully explain your views. There is no word 
limit.] 
__________________________________________________________________ 
4. Who have the right to decide Taiwan’s future, people in the mainland or Taiwan 
people only? Why? [Please use the following space to fully explain your views. There is 
no word limit.] 
____________________________________________________________________ 
5. In Taiwan, some people say the China-oriented national identity (such as the 
Chinese identity and the support for reunification) will increase in Taiwan as a result of 
China’s growing economic power and the rise of China in the world.  What do you think? 






6. In Taiwan, some people believe the new dynamics of cross-Strait exchanges in 
the past two decades will cause national identity change – either moving toward to China 
or against it. What do you think? Why? [Please use the following space to fully explain 
your views. There is no word limit.] 
___________________________________________________________________ 
7. What is the impact of the rise of China in the world on the national identity 
change in Taiwan? What is your view? For examples, 1) Taiwan should increase its 
international space; 2) Taiwan should seek its statehood identity in the world; 3) 
Statehood issue becomes less and less important as the world becomes more globalized; 4) 
others? [Please use the following space to fully explain your views. There is no word 
limit.] 
____________________________________________________________________ 
8. What is the impact of democratization on the national identity change in Taiwan? 
What is your view? For examples, 1) Democracy is a new mechanism to establish a new 
Taiwan identity; 2) Democracy won’t lead to national identity change; 3) Democracy 
makes Taiwan a new country; 4) others? [Please use the following space to fully explain 
your views. There is no word limit.] 
____________________________________________________________________ 
9. What is the relationship between the party affiliation and national identity in 
Taiwan? For example, do you think KMT supporters will definitely support unification 
and DPP supporters will definitely favor independence? Do you agree or not, why? 





1. Questionnaire no.  _____________________ 
2. Age:  _______________________ 
3. Ethnicity: Father _____________; Mother ________________ 
4. Political Party Affiliation: _______________________ 
5. Gender: _____________________ 
6. Resident location (Northern, Middle or Southern Taiwan): ______________ 
 
 
 
